First Paper Assignment
Select one of the following topics on which to write a paper approximately five pages long. Papers are due Sunday, Feb. 21st at midnight and must be submitted via turnitin.com. (BTW, that means that they're due effectively at the end of the day (11:59 pm) on the 16th, not the end of the day on the 15th. I assume you'll be celebrating Presidents' Day with great festitivites on the 15th!) Your TA may also require you to sumbit a hard copy (print-out) of your paper. He or she will let you know about that.
: arrange with your TA in advance when you'll be able to turn the paper in. We will accommodate athletic travel, of course, but it must be arranged explicitly and in advance.
Be sure to consult the following documents, as well as your notes from the lectures on philosophical argumentation and how to write a philosophy paper:
My Tips on Writing Philosophy Papers
Guidelines for Submitting Papers
My Grading and Academic Integrity Policies
- On p. 34 of the Reader Aquinas argues, "I answer that, Concupiscence [lust] does not cause involuntariness, but, on the contrary, makes something to be voluntary." What is Aquinas's argument in this paragraph for this thesis, and is it a sound argument?
- Consider Aquinas's case on p. 35: "[A] man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag." Now, Aquinas and Aristotle both argue that the hunter in this case does not kill his foe involuntarily, because after all he wished to kill his foe anyhow. But this is odd. Supposing the hunter were not otherwise negligent (e.g., did not shoot at a figure that looked like a man in an orange hunting vest), would we hold the hunter morally responsible at all for the death of his foe, or would we just regard it as a tragic accident with a bizarre twist (that the hunter also wanted to kill the man he accidentally did kill)? So, here's the official question: in this case is it correct to deny that the hunter's killing of his foe is involuntary?
- On pp. 60-61 of the Reader Aquinas argues that we can choose "whatever reason can apprehend as good." But is this true? Consider a person suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Before going to bed Jane compulsively checks each of her three doors seven times to make sure they're locked. She walks around the house in the same pattern seven times doing this. Now, suppose (as is sometimes the case in OCD) that Jane knows that this is irrational and that it would be better to check once and go to bed. She finds she cannot stop herself, however. Does this case refute Aquinas's view?