Main Campus," 1-5. This statement was the result of lengthy discussions between faculty and administrators. After being circulated to all the departments for comment, it was issued by the Office of the Provost in August 1981.

61. The recent removal of Charles E. Curran from his position as Professor of Moral Theology at Catholic University; the new oath of fidelity, published by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which is to be taken by, among others, university teachers of disciplines dealing with faith or morals; and potential interference because of Canon 812 in university hiring, promotion, and tenuring procedures have all contributed to this tension. The Land O'Lakes Statement insisted that the contemporary Catholic university must have "true autonomy and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself." See *Denver Workshop*, 13. Participants at the Rome meeting in May 1989 reported some progress between the Vatican and university leaders.

62. Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, Address to the U.S. Jesuit Higher Education Assembly at Georgetown University, June 7, 1989, cited from *Origins* 19:6 (22 June 1989), 83.

63. Ibid., 83-84.

64. Ibid., 86.

65. Ibid., 86.

JOHN B. BROUGH
Philosophy Department

Philosophy at Georgetown University

Philosophy has been a constant and usually robust presence at Georgetown since the University's inception. Indeed, throughout most of Georgetown's two hundred years, philosophy enjoyed pride of place in the curriculum: coming at the end of the student's career, it served as the culminating moment of a carefully structured classical education. Philosophy's place in the curriculum is now comparatively diminished. Most students take it in the first year or two of their education, rarely returning to it later; and most take it in quantity so small that their predecessors of only twenty years ago would be astonished. But philosophy is still wedged firmly in the curriculum and is still honored, in every official way, as centrally important to the liberal education in the Catholic and Jesuit tradition that Georgetown intends to provide.

If a subject has had such stature in the curriculum and in some measure still has it, and if—of more importance—it is said that it *should* have it, then one can reasonably seize on the Bicentennial as an occasion for reflection on that subject's place at Georgetown: on the position it held in the past, on its current state, and what prospects its future might hold. This essay attempts to start that reflection. The first section will focus chiefly on the history of undergraduate philosophy at Georgetown and the second on the history of graduate education in philosophy. The third will offer a few observations about the present and future course of the program.

I. Undergraduate Philosophy at Georgetown

THE EARLY YEARS

It is no secret that Georgetown did not spring full blown into existence in 1789; indeed, its first student did not arrive until 1791. Philosophy's appearance was even more tardy. But philosophy was intended from the beginning to be part of the curriculum, although the moment of its actual introduction seems to have been determined less by intellectual principle than by institutional expediency.

As for the intention, a prospectus for the College from 1798 announced plans "for the introduction 'of the study of the higher sciences, as history, moral and natural philosophy.'"[1] Since Georgetown in its initial years enrolled students who pursued what was basically a secondary school curriculum, it was contemplated that the moment of actual introduction of the "higher sciences" would have to wait for the presence of students (and faculty) sufficiently advanced to manage their study.[2]

But it was concern over competition, perceived as possibly fatal, that seems to have prompted the first offering of a course in philosophy. Bishop John Carroll, the guiding force behind Georgetown's founding, had always entertained a vision of two institutions in his diocese: an academy or college that would educate young men of all faiths but would also precipitate vocations to the clergy, and a seminary that would then provide the clerical training.[3] Carroll was determined to develop an indigenous clergy. The first part of Carroll's vision was realized with the opening of Georgetown. The second was put on the way to realization by members of the Sulpician order who, escaping the French Revolution, arrived in Baltimore and opened a seminary there in the 1790s. In the absence of a sufficient number of seminarians, however, the Sulpicians planned to introduce a course in humanities, including philosophy, into the seminary's curriculum.[4] Since Georgetown at this time relied heavily for its faculty on candidates for the clergy, the school's directors feared that, if philosophy were offered in Baltimore but not at Georgetown, the young clerical candidates might abruptly abandon their teaching responsibilities in order to study philosophy at the Sulpicians' seminary.[5] "Georgetown would steadily decline and the 'sanguine expectations formed by the clergy of Maryland in regard of the College . . . providing a sufficient supply of *operarii* in the vineyard of the Lord' would be frustrated."[6]

John Carroll was not convinced that the time was ripe for philosophy's introduction but said that he would give his approval if two conditions were met, one of which he stated as follows: ". . . if there were amongst us a man fit to undertake a course of philosophy, without disgracing himself and the College."[7] Bishop Leonard Neale, Georgetown's president at the time, attempted to bring one or two ex-Jesuits (the order was suppressed during this period) from England to teach the course, but was unable to do so. Instead, Georgetown's first teacher of philosophy was Ambrose Maréchal, a Sulpician, who lectured on metaphysics, ethics, and logic in the fall of 1801.[8] Those enrolled in Maréchal's course were young clerical candidates who intended to go on to the seminary in Baltimore after completing the course at Georgetown.[9]

That philosophy's introduction into the curriculum was immediately tied to the instruction of young candidates for the clergy could be misleading. In point of fact, philosophy's place in Georgetown's curriculum, particularly the undergraduate curriculum, has not been linked primarily with the preparation of the clergy.[10] Indeed, Maréchal, who had only arrived in 1801, was gone at the end of the next school year, and philosophy presumably left the curriculum for a few years with him. According to the *Classical Journal*, however, philosophy reappeared by 1817 at the latest in the form of logic and metaphysics, enrolling about seven "scholars," as they were called at the time.[11] In 1820, Roger Baxter, S.J., an English Jesuit, appears on the faculty roster as "Professor of Philosophy and Prefect of Studies."[12] With Baxter's appointment, one senses that philosophy gets a firm foothold in the curriculum—a foothold it never relinquishes, despite occasional periods of difficulty over the next few years. The course in logic and metaphysics now seems to be required of all those scholars who have advanced to the "higher schools" and seek a degree. In some years during the 1820s and 1830s, philosophy may not have been offered because there were no advanced scholars to take it; and even when it was offered during this period, course enrollments could be quite low. But there seems to have been no question that philosophy became the crowning course of the curriculum and the final step that anyone who aspired to a Georgetown A.B. would have to take.[13]

By way of illustration, consider that in the fall of 1821 only two students were enrolled in Baxter's philosophy course. Enough is said about them in the *Classical Journal*, however, to tell us a good deal about the status of philosophy and the way in which the subject was taught at the time. The following statement from the "Report of the

Compositions and Examinations" for the fall term, written by Baxter in his capacity as Prefect of Studies and read before the whole community on December 22, 1821, is worth quoting in full for what it tells us about the place of philosophy in particular and about the atmosphere of the school in general early in the nineteenth century:

> In speaking of the philosophers, I could employ the highest terms of approbation, but I feel that they are actuated by nobler motives, than the little official praise which I can give them here. If their future conduct in life correspond with the solid application, which they have given both to moral and natural philosophy during this short term, if they afterwards judge of what is truly honorable for themselves, by the same principles which have lately directed them in the employment of their time, every one in the circle of their future acquaintance will unite in the commendation. . . . The place which I hold forbids flattery, and I must not be conversant in it. These praises will wear well, for they have been dearly earned.[14]

On July 29 of the following year, the two students enrolled in philosophy received their degrees: "On this day Messrs. Jas. F. Faulkner, Va. and Lewis W. Jenkins, having finished their course of natural and moral philosophy, received the degree of A.B. . . . "[15] From the 1820s onward, getting a degree and passing through the "Class of Philosophy" were virtually synonymous at Georgetown, which suggests that philosophy was viewed as something more than one requirement among many.

Faulkner and Jenkins also received awards when they graduated, the character of which tells us something about what was required at the time of students in philosophy. Faulkner won the prize "for the best treatise in natural and moral philosophy," and Jenkins received the award "for the best defense of theses in natural and moral philosophy."[16] The "treatise" and the oral "defense of theses" were standard requirements for decades; oral examinations in philosophy, in fact, would continue to be required of all juniors and seniors in the College until well into the 1960s.

Throughout much of the nineteenth century the "Senior Classes"—that is, the students in the higher school—first pursued humanities, followed in order by poetry, rhetoric, and, in the final year, philosophy. In 1850, students "in philosophy" studied logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Lectures were delivered in Latin, an examination on the lecture was

given daily, and once a month the students had "public exercises before the faculty, to test their improvement."[17] This was a taxing regimen, and one senses from the slight changes in requirements that adjustments had to be made to accommodate the ability and stamina of the students. In 1852, for example, the daily examination on the lecture is replaced by "a daily discussion (in Latin) . . . on the lecture."[18] Only a year later we read:

> In order to consult the interests of the students of this class and to prepare them for their future professional career, the exercises have been enlarged and varied by introducing English Dissertations on the various subjects of philosophy, in addition to the regular discussions in Latin.[19]

Such efforts to make the course in philosophy less esoteric and demanding reflected a certain urgency, since during this period the Senior Department (roughly equivalent to undergraduate school) enrolled a fairly small number of students, and few of these persevered through the final year in philosophy and actually obtained a degree—only seven in 1851, for example. Still, the course in philosophy could not be escaped. The catalogue of 1850-51 makes it plain, as Georgetown catalogues will for the next 115 years, that the curriculum for students is laid out in advance and that there will be no deviation from it, "as experience has proved exemptions in this regard to have been a great source of idleness."[20]

What sort of treatises or dissertations did students in philosophy undertake at this time? The announcements of public defenses of dissertations, part of the exercises held immediately before commencement, suggest a rich array of topics. On July 6, 1858, for example, Beverly C. Kennedy of Louisiana defended his dissertation on "The foreknowledge of God Not Incompatible with the Liberty of Man." The titles of the other three dissertations for that year were "The Brute Soul," "The Origin of Evil," and "The Internal Possibility of Things."[21] A year later students were writing on topics such as the principle of causality, space, the origin of language, and the ontological argument for the existence of God. The diversity of topics suggests a course of study that was fairly broad. It also indicates that the curriculum in philosophy was a version of the mix of rationalism and Scholasticism that had prevailed in seminaries and church-related educational institutions since the seventeenth century. Frederick

Copleston describes this "rather wishy-washy eclecticism"[22] as "an emasculated Scholastic Aristotelianism, tinctured with ideas taken from other currents of thought, especially Cartesianism," and largely out of touch with contemporary philosophical and scientific developments.[23]

Thin as it may have been, this philosophical gruel inspired some students to titanic efforts. For example, the announcement of the "Annual Termination of the Course of Rational and Moral Philosophy" for 1863 included the following: "All the main topics of Rational Philosophy, and the Fundamental Principles of Ethics, will be defended in English, or Latin—by William L. Hirst, *Pennsylvania*."[24] Needless to say, Hirst won the philosophy medal that year.

THE RISE OF SYSTEMATIC SCHOLASTICISM

The form of the curriculum in philosophy remained fairly constant until 1900. In the early 1820s the list of philosophical subjects covered was logic, ontology (or metaphysics), and natural theology. In 1868, "the course of RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY includes LOGIC, METAPHYSICS, and ETHICS."[25] It is probable that natural theology was not simply dropped but incorporated into metaphysics when ethics was introduced.

The content of these three courses, however, may have undergone some change around 1870. The catalogue for 1869-70 lists for the first time the textbooks used in "rational philosophy": "Liberatore's Logic and Metaphysics.—Jouin's Ethics."[26] Matteo Liberatore (1820-72) was an Italian Jesuit who taught at the Gregorian University in Rome and was one of the early figures in the Neoscholastic movement in Italy in the nineteenth century, as was Tongiorgi (1820-65), whose texts were used in conjunction with or in place of Liberatore's during this period. Louis Jouin (1818-99) was an American Jesuit writing in the Scholastic tradition. While these textbooks were written in Latin and certainly belonged to the philosophical genre known as the Scholastic "manual," they were probably of higher quality than the eclectic Scholasticism that Copleston found so unsatisfactory. Still, they predated Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of 1879, which urged that the thought of Thomas Aquinas be taken as a guide by Catholic philosophers, and did not represent fully "Neoscholastic" or "neo-Thomist" texts. Later editions of Jouin, following the encyclical, added references to the works of Aquinas, but one gets the impression that these were basically cosmetic changes laid over what

was essentially a Scholastic manual of the sort intended originally for use in seminaries.[27]

The works adopted around 1870 would, therefore, probably be subject to the criticisms of Brother Azarias, F.S.C. (Patrick Francis Mullaney), who wrote in 1888 that courses in Catholic colleges prior to the final year in philosophy had been "carried out upon exclusively seminarian lines," and then "to these is added a course of some text book giving the essentials of scholastic philosophy with or without explanation. The whole trend of modern thought is ignored . . ."[28] Furthermore, the texts continued to be used for an extraordinarily long period of time, leaving one with the impression that for decades philosophy at Georgetown was not so much perennial as simply frozen. The scholastic text by Georgetown professor Nicholas Russo, S.J., for example, in use by 1886, continued to be assigned as late as 1921, almost twenty years after its author's death.[29] Although Russo's two-volume manual was called "probably the most valuable"[30] of the scholastic texts written by Jesuits in the late nineteenth century, its longevity says something about the constancy of the systematic content of the philosophy courses at Georgetown and about their dependence on the manual format.

Against this somewhat bleak picture of the stasis into which philosophy had fallen by the end of the century, one might balance the following pedagogically reasonable statement from the catalogue of 1889:

> The last year of the course serves especially to discipline the reasoning faculties by the study of Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics, and by higher studies in Mathematics and Natural Sciences. During this year great attention is given to Metaphysics, a thorough knowledge of which is regarded as of the utmost importance, since it serves to arrange systematically all the student's knowledge and to furnish the key to all true science. Whatever is important in Natural Science is made part of the curriculum and is taught with a philosophical analysis intended to guard the student against that confounding of mere information with learning that is the danger of modern education.[31]

In 1900, the philosophy curriculum was revised and expanded to nine courses. Seniors took psychology, natural theology, ethics (general and special), and the history of philosophy; juniors took cosmology, general metaphysics, first principles of knowledge, dialectics, and the history

of philosophy.[32] This elaborate set of courses represents systematic Scholastic philosophy in full bloom. It still maintains the spirit of the earlier and simpler curriculum—logic, metaphysics, ethics—that had prevailed throughout most of the century. But it signals by its baroque form that Georgetown has begun to adopt the complex course structure (though without electives) that was becoming increasingly characteristic of the modern college or university, while simultaneously attempting to conform to the church's determined support of Scholastic philosophy following Leo XIII's encyclical of 1879. To be sure, Georgetown's curriculum, like that at other Catholic colleges at the time, remained based on Scholastic manuals and was not leavened by a careful study of the writings of St. Thomas himself, which Leo's encyclical had particularly urged upon Catholic philosophers.

The form the curriculum assumed in 1900 would remain basically the same for the next sixty years. Georgetown had now entered fully into the era of systematic Neoscholasticism. What precisely did this mean in terms of the life of the student and of the College? It meant that each student would take as many as thirty-two credits in philosophy. It meant, too, that philosophy was intended to play an integrating role in the student's educational experience. This aim was already set down in 1889. Although that particular formulation disappears from the catalogues by 1895, there can be no question that the integrating function continues to be a principal reason for philosophy's presence in the curriculum for the next six or seven decades.

The declaration of 1889 certainly had in view a Scholastic approach to philosophy, but it did not directly mention Scholasticism and expressed no self-conscious concern for faithful adherence to a particular kind of philosophy. By the end of the century, however, as we have seen, Scholasticism had clearly begun to assume an official standing: "As Catholic higher education developed, its distinguishing characteristic would be philosophy and by the end of the nineteenth century, this meant scholastic philosophy."[33] And as the twentieth century progressed through its early decades, "neo-Thomistic philosophy became almost synonymous with Catholic thought."[34] Thus in the catalogue of the "Graduate Division" of 1932-33, Scholasticism is mentioned frequently, and there can be found the following description of a set of two courses in the "Fundamentals of Scholastic Philosophy," which might equally serve as a description of the entire undergraduate program at the time. The courses, we are told, are designed to give an overview with emphasis on that trait which is unique

in Scholasticism: "its organic unity, as an all embracing rational philosophy of life."[35] The description goes on:

> Care is taken . . . that no lacunae occur, which would blur the lines of the system as a whole and thus impair for the student the cultural value to be gained from contact with the most highly organized body of thought known to the history of philosophy.[36]

No doubt Scholasticism's "organic unity" is stressed because it endows Scholasticism with the capacity to integrate the student's personal and academic experience. But one cannot miss three other elements in this statement: first, a concern that nothing happen in the student's philosophical education that would stand in the way of his absorption of the system in its integrity; second, a conviction that Scholastic philosophy has a unique cultural value; third, an implied assertion of Scholastic philosophy's superiority among philosophical approaches.

The elements of cultural value and philosophical superiority are explicitly confirmed in the College catalogue of 1935-36:

> . . . The goal of a liberal education is culture, mental as well as moral development, and learning as such is a means toward that end. . . . The Jesuit system of education holds that a solid course in Scholastic Philosophy, based on a foundation of languages, both Ancient and Modern, History, Mathematics, and the Natural Sciences, has cultural advantages far superior to those offered by other Educational systems.[37]

Given the conviction that a particular kind of philosophy offers singular educational advantages, it is no surprise that all students were required to pursue a standard curriculum that did not and could not allow electives. Exemptions to the specified course of studies (along with the chewing of tobacco) were explicitly proscribed, as we have seen, as early as 1850,[38] and in 1935 the principle of "adherence to a fixed program of studies [that] . . . excludes the evils attendant on the elective system"[39] is strongly reaffirmed. Scholastic philosophy was the centerpiece and by far the largest portion of this fixed program. Its importance was signaled by the fact that, with rare exceptions, philosophy remained the first subject (or department, when the departmental system is introduced)[40] listed in the catalogue until the mid-thirties. And even when philosophy was

relegated to its proper alphabetical position, its preeminent place was unthreatened for at least another twenty years, when the changes began that led to philosophy's current position in the curriculum.

THE DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM

The forces leading to philosophy's present situation have a long and complicated history, but events that occurred in the 1950s certainly played a determining role. Chief among these was the influx of lay faculty members. In the early fifties, the College undergraduate faculty in philosophy was composed almost exclusively of Jesuits, most of whom did not have a doctorate in the field. By 1959 they had been joined by a number of lay faculty members, including Wilfrid Desan, Louis Dupré, Germain Grisez, Jesse Mann, Thomas McTighe, and Rocco Porreco.[41] Rudolf Allers and John Callahan are listed only on the graduate faculty at this date, but were important influences in shaping the department. All of these held the doctorate in philosophy. All were Catholic, and most had done their graduate work at Catholic universities (Desan, however, studied at Harvard, Callahan and Grisez at Chicago). Many, but not all, were in one degree or another committed to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. What chiefly distinguished them was that they had received a professional graduate education in the field. Whatever their religious commitments and philosophical predilections may have been, they brought new standards of scholarship and professionalism to the department. They also brought interest and expertise in the objective study of the history of philosophy, in contemporary nonscholastic continental thought, in certain areas of American philosophy, and—in the case of those committed to Thomism—in the careful study of the texts of Aquinas himself. It was no surprise, then, that the fixed Scholastic curriculum began to loosen and, after about a decade, disappeared entirely.

The decline of Scholasticism was not a phenomenon unique to Georgetown; it happened, to greater or less degree, in most major Catholic universities and colleges in this country and abroad. There is, it must be said, much that is poignant about it. Frederick Copleston could write in 1955: "Today the philosophy of Aquinas occupies a favored position in the intellectual life of the Catholic Church."[42] And by that he meant more than that Thomism simply enjoyed a kind of official sanction; he meant that it was a vital and developing movement, "deriving its inspiration from Aquinas but conducting its meditation on his writings in the

light of subsequent philosophy and of subsequent cultural developments in general."[43] But nineteen years later he writes: "Given the changed situation, it is arguable that the impetus of the Thomist revival is spent."[44] And why? The church no longer seems interested in promoting a particular philosophical approach: ". . . the Second Vatican Council was careful not to make pronouncements in the philosophical area."[45] Furthermore, significant changes have taken place in theology, which have turned it away from Thomism as a source of philosophical support. And then there has been ". . . the natural reaction in Catholic colleges and seminaries to past indoctrination in what amounted to a Thomist party line. . . ."[46]

As the allegiance to Scholasticism as a superior philosophical and educational instrument evaporated, both within the church and within the Jesuit order, philosophy's role and position within the University inevitably underwent change.

The most obvious manifestation of the change was the rapid decline in the number of courses required in the field. In 1962, twenty-five hours of philosophy were required of all undergraduates in the College. Modified Scholastic course titles remained largely in place, although, depending on the instructor, the content of the courses often had little or nothing to do with Scholasticism or the thought of Aquinas. The twenty-five hours required consisted of specified courses; no electives were allowed. All students in the College still sat for oral comprehensive examinations in philosophy at the end of junior and senior years—an ancient practice that came to an end over the next two years. In 1963, the number of required hours was reduced to eighteen, and philosophy was introduced into freshman year for the first time. In 1967, the requirement in philosophy in the College was further reduced to twelve hours. Finally, in the general curriculum revision implemented in 1970, the philosophy requirement was reduced to two three-credit courses, which is where it presently stands. The two courses, Introduction to Philosophy and Problems of Value (now Ethics), would normally be taken in freshman and sophomore years.

In about ten years, then, the grand philosophical edifice that dominated the curriculum for so much of Georgetown's history was dismantled. Philosophy was no longer the crowning moment of the student's undergraduate career, as it had been for Mr. Faulkner and Mr. Jenkins in 1822. It came at the beginning of undergraduate study and constituted only a small fraction of the student's total experience across four years.

The decline of Neoscholasticism did not play the only role in this

change—Georgetown's efforts to construct a more modern and comprehensive curriculum were essential factors in it—but it played a key role. Scholastic philosophy enjoyed its dominant position in the curriculum because it was understood to be the force integrating the student's entire education. With the demise of Scholasticism, philosophy at Georgetown effectively abandoned its role—at least its official and exclusive role—as the integrating discipline.[47] The end of its synthesizing function effectively removed the justification for philosophy's dominant place in the curriculum. Its shrinkage to a two-course requirement, located in freshman and sophomore years, should come as no shock, then.

Still, philosophy—and theology as well—were accorded special standing during the curriculum revision of 1970. Even if philosophy no longer performed the function it once did, it is still seen to be an integral part of a Jesuit education. The College continued to affirm its "commitment to liberal knowledge" and to hold that philosophy is among the subjects giving the student "the opportunity to avoid narrowness of mind and intellect."[48] In 1970, when philosophy and theology come to be listed together under "General Education Requirements," the following justification appears:

> Philosophy and Theology
>
> All students will take a year of Philosophy and a year of Theology since Georgetown feels by its commitment to the Jesuit tradition that the modern man and woman should consider seriously their relationship to God and their fellow man.[49]

The changes that have affected the undergraduate program in philosophy over the past twenty-five years have been immense, then, yet the subject itself has survived and, even in diminished form, remains at the center of the curriculum.

Now, to get a more complete sense of what philosophy at Georgetown has become in the "postscholastic" era, it will be helpful to look at the history of the graduate program.

II. Graduate Study in Philosophy

THE EARLY YEARS: BEFORE THE 1930s

Sorting out the origins and early years of graduate education in philosophy at Georgetown is a difficult task. Compared to the steady presence of undergraduate philosophy in the curriculum, graduate education

had the quality of an anemic phoenix for well over a century. A thing of fits and starts, it finally settled into a state of modest prosperity only in fairly recent times.

The *Classical Journal* notes that James Faulkner and Lewis Jenkins, who received their bachelor's degrees in 1822, could have received Master of Arts degrees and had the right to ask for them after one year.[50] Given the fact that the final year before the granting of the bachelor's degree was devoted to moral and natural philosophy, the master's degree in question could be considered essentially a degree in philosophy and science. In later catalogues, no mention is made of this early period of graduate education—assuming that it really deserves to be called that—until 1949, when the *Graduate Bulletin* states that "mathematics and philosophy were the first fields opened to higher studies" and that a Master of Arts degree was awarded to the Reverend John Fairclough on July 27, 1821.[51]

The next mention of advanced work in philosophy occurs in the 1850s. The "Catalogue of Students" for 1855-56, for example, includes a new section—"Resident Graduates"—with four names and the notation that their class is the "2d course of Philos'y."[52] The catalogue of 1906-07, in a less ambitious genealogical claim for the graduate program than the one cited above from 1949, refers to these four students in asserting that the Graduate School "was in existence as early as 1856, in which year it comprised four resident graduates. It has continued with varying degrees of success since that time."[53] Since these four students were apparently studying philosophy, it seems only mildly outlandish to claim that the birth of graduate education in philosophy at Georgetown coincided precisely with the birth of the Graduate School itself.

Whatever one thinks of that proposition, however, there is little doubt that the new arrival took its time in maturing. One step along this path seems to have occurred in the 1890s. A distinct "Department of Philosophy" emerged within the Graduate School, and catalogues (in 1897-98, for example) began to publish quite detailed accounts of the contents of graduate courses in philosophy.[54] In addition, *all* graduate students in whatever field were required to take a course in "rational philosophy"[55]—a practice that continued (only the name of the course changing) into the 1960s.

It is unclear how successful the program in philosophy was in the nineties. As a remarkable sketch of the history of the Graduate School

indicates, the period from 1891 to 1907 formed sixteen years of effort to build the graduate program as a whole.[56] That the success of these efforts proved to be modest is suggested by some rather startling announcements. We are told first that all scholarships were withdrawn in 1905-06. In the next academic year admissions standards were changed, requiring new graduate students to have an educational background more closely resembling the one received by undergraduates in the College. Furthermore, resident graduate students were made subject to the same strict regulations governing undergraduate students. The result? ". . . In 1907-8, no graduate students have matriculated."[57] Hence, no graduate courses were offered—not just in philosophy but in any field. No doubt the changes in standards and regulations stemmed from a desire to tighten and reform the program—many of the "graduate students" seem in fact to have been imported athletes whose academic credentials and standards of behavior were questionable[58]—but it does seem in this case that the baby was thrown out with the bath water.

For a number of years after the dramatic events recounted above, the Georgetown catalogue assured its readers that if enough eligible students applied for the coming year, graduate courses would be offered. It is not until 1914, however, that the Graduate School actually rises again, this time with its own Dean and professors appointed annually. Of the five departments in the school, philosophy is listed first in the catalogue and has the most lengthy course description.[59] Indeed, during the 1920s, the number of graduate courses in philosophy grows dramatically, reaching eighteen by 1925, including seven courses in ethics.[60] Among these were several that were devoted to specific themes and that we might now term courses in "applied" ethics. The range of topics these sections covered was remarkable: the morality of strikes and lockouts, the family, the press, war, intervention, and so on. These courses, and one offered in international ethics in 1921-22,[61] probably reflect the same institutional concerns that culminated in the founding of the School of Foreign Service in 1919. The emphasis on ethics reached its peak (at least before the present era) when, in the catalogue of 1925-26, a separate "Department of Ethics" with eight courses is listed.[62] By the end of the decade, however, the Department of Ethics has disappeared and only seven graduate philosophy courses are offered.[63] One suspects that the outpouring of activity in the mid-twenties did not meet with much more real success than the flurry of activity just before the turn of the century.

THE 1930s

The graduate curriculum was basically Scholastic during the period before 1930, although there is no explicit statement to that effect until 1932, when students in the program were required to have, or develop the equivalent of, an undergraduate background in Scholastic philosophy.[64] The graduate program itself included two courses in "Fundamentals of Scholastic Philosophy" that were highly and self-consciously systematic, affording the student the opportunity to appreciate Scholasticism's unique "cultural value" as "an all embracing philosophy of life"[65] and as "the most highly organized body of thought known to the history of philosophy."[66] The curriculum of the graduate program in philosophy, therefore, reflects the important role given to Scholasticism as an integrating force in Catholic intellectual and academic life during the 1920s and 1930s.[67] The program did include courses that were not rigidly Scholastic, however, and perhaps even pointed in nonscholastic—although still Catholic—directions. Thus Francis Burke, S.J., offered a seminar with the title "The New Humanism," which considered contemporary Catholic thinkers, such as Blondel, with the immediate purpose of providing "a metaphysical background for a Catholic new humanism."[68]

These statements from the early 1930s suggest that Georgetown had designs on becoming a significant force in graduate philosophy within specifically Catholic circles. Nothing, however, comes of these designs. In fact, graduate philosophy soon disappears entirely from the Georgetown campus. A solitary and cryptic message in the 1935 catalogue under the heading "Department of Philosophy" adumbrates this extraordinary occurrence: "Announcement will be made later."[69] What was later announced—in language so obscure that one wonders whether it was not willful—was that the Graduate Department of Philosophy had moved to Woodstock College in Maryland and that matriculation was restricted to members of the Society of Jesus. This dramatic turn of events occurs only three years after the confident pronouncements concerning the cultural value of Scholasticism and the possibility of building a new Catholic humanism.

THE POSTWAR YEARS

But in 1944 the phoenix rises again—along with the first truly straightforward statement about what had been going on during this period:

> Formerly this Department [Philosophy] was located at Woodstock College and available exclusively to members of the Society of Jesus. . . . It is now proposed to offer [graduate] courses in philosophy on the Georgetown campus and to open them to the general public.[70]

The entrance requirements were made quite stiff, although "special students" were allowed. What is said about the kind of special student the new program had in view indicates that the idea of a department with a self-consciously Catholic thrust, suggested in the early thirties, is still very much alive. Thus the special students the program sought would be those who "wish to deepen their culture or integrate their knowledge with the principles of Catholic thought and action."[71] This kind of declaration illustrates nicely that Georgetown supplied no exception to the general emphasis in American Catholic higher education during the twenties, thirties, and forties on culture integrated through specifically Catholic principles.

But the statement concerning special students, comparatively mild as it is, hardly prepares one for the dramatic and aggressively Catholic description of the graduate program that appears the next year. This description, given in its entirety below, is a fascinating sociological artifact; it also describes one of the ancestors—albeit a most sectarian one—of the contemporary program.

> Founded in 1944 as the Institute of Christian Philosophy, the Department proposes as its special field of research the relationship of philosophy to Christian revelation. Hence in addition to the conventional divisions of systematic philosophy and the history of philosophy, stress is laid upon the history of that relationship, its theoretic justification, the consequences of excluding revealed truths from the realm of rational speculation, and a study of those modern philosophies which stem ultimately from an erroneous interpretation of revelation. The program also includes analyses of modern culture, modern economic, political and social theories, modern art, drama and music, education, the physical sciences and mathematics. The intention will be to discover the force of Christian inspiration in these activities, as well as the philosophic confusions arising from certain interpretations of that inspiration.[72]

The Graduate Department of Philosophy, which was distinct in personnel and even in location from the Undergraduate Department, had three regular members and one visiting professor in 1945. The Chairman, who was also Dean of the Graduate School, was J. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. Joseph Durkin claims that it was only in the mid-forties that the Graduate School finally managed to establish itself on a firm basis, and that this occurred through the efforts of Hunter Guthrie.[73] It may equally be said that it was Guthrie who initiated the evolution of the graduate program in philosophy toward the form it now has. Guthrie did his graduate work at the Sorbonne and was conversant with the main trends of contemporary continental philosophy, including the thought of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, and Scheler, among others. With faculty members such as Guthrie involved in it, the curriculum of the "Institute of Christian Philosophy" was, therefore, not closed to twentieth century influences. On the other hand, course descriptions from the period suggest that contemporary thought was often explicitly related to the Scholastic tradition. For example, in 1946 it is said in the description of a course in the philosophy of science that, when the thought of such contemporaries as Duhem, Cassirer, Carnap, and Whitehead is taken up, "the purpose of the discussion will be to see the vital relation between the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas and these new doctrines."[74] One senses in a statement such as this the desire to create a Catholic intellectual culture that is open to the contemporary world but seeks to come to grips with it in terms of a tradition that has its roots in the Middle Ages and classical antiquity.

The strongly Catholic description of the Institute of Christian Philosophy disappears from the catalogue after two years. The fact that the department was founded as the Institute is still mentioned but the project of the Institute—the consideration of contemporary intellectual and cultural issues "in the light of the principles of Christian philosophy"[75]—is now listed together with the history of philosophy and systematic philosophy as things the program aims at doing. The description of the courses in the history of philosophy is particularly interesting, given the role of history in the department's subsequent development: "Courses in the history of philosophy emphasize the reading and interpretation of the texts of the leading philosophers and attempt to show the position of each in the philosophical tradition."[76] The department has five members in 1947, including John Callahan, whose career at Georgetown will extend for thirty years.

The form of the description is revised further in 1949, although its substance remains for the most part unchanged. Four areas are now mentioned. History of philosophy is one of them. The term "systematic" is no longer used in connection with any area. Instead, it is said that "courses in the treatment of the basic problems of philosophy from Hellenism to *and including* Neo-Scholasticism"[77] are offered. A third area is "applied philosophy," and it is here that "the principles of a Christian humanistic critique" still find a place. The fourth area, psychology and psychiatry, reflects the interests of Rudolf Allers, a philosopher and psychiatrist, who came from Catholic University to join the department at this time.

Over the next few years, the graduate department remained small, numbering three faculty members. In 1954, Professors Thomas McTighe and Rocco Porreco appear. Their arrival signals the beginning of a period of steady growth that leads directly to the present. It is in this year as well that a new and short program description appears that makes no mention of Christian philosophy or Christian humanism. Two areas of courses are cited: the history of philosophy and the problems of philosophy. The latter category continues to tip its hat to the Scholastic tradition: the courses are still described as treating "the basic problems in philosophy from Hellenism to and including Neo-Scholasticism."[78] But even that description goes two years later, when it is said that the department offers "courses on the basic problems of philosophy in systematic presentation and their historical development to our times."[79] One could argue plausibly that with this slight change the department has now become thoroughly "modern." Certainly, the change from the description of the Institute of Christian Philosophy only a decade earlier could hardly be more vivid. There is no immediate clue in the new language to suggest that the program has any sort of Jesuit and Catholic character. But to conclude that it did not would be a mistake. For the most part, members of the faculty continued to have a background in Scholastic philosophy received at other Catholic universities, a fact that was often reflected in the curriculum. And although most members of the graduate faculty were not Jesuits, they were Catholics—something that would continue to be the case into the seventies.

By 1959, the graduate faculty had grown to ten, now including Jesse Mann (who had been on the undergraduate faculty in the School of Foreign Service),[80] Wilfrid Desan, Germain Grisez, and Louis Dupré (George Farre arrived a year later). The Chair was Thomas McTighe. A year before, even the brief statement of the purpose of the graduate program had disappeared from the catalogue; only the listing of courses with their descriptions remained. At the same time, the Undergraduate and Graduate Departments had clearly begun to merge. Although the two departments were still being distinguished in the catalogue as late as 1960, the graduate faculty (with the exception of Rudolf Allers) had begun to be cross-listed in the undergraduate faculty two years before, reflecting the fact that graduate faculty members were also teaching undergraduates. In 1960, Professor McTighe became Chair of both departments, another indication of their merger. Furthermore, the two departments, which had been geographically distinct, now came to be located together in the Nevils Building.

FROM THE SIXTIES TO THE PRESENT

By the early sixties, then, the department had completed a period of considerable growth and evolution. It may be considered as a single unit serving graduate students as well as students from all five undergraduate schools. Its Chair is not a Jesuit. Furthermore, although the merger of graduate and undergraduate departments meant that there was a Jesuit presence in the department at this time, it was not a strong presence, either in terms of numbers or of influence. It would, in fact, be fair to say that the lay faculty, all of whom were Catholics, dominated the department in every respect from the early sixties on. The Jesuit presence became progressively weaker until, during certain periods in the seventies and eighties, the department had no Jesuit faculty members at all. The latter circumstance reflected changing conditions within the Society of Jesus rather than any hostility on the part of the lay members of the department. On the other hand, with the exception of the occasional Jesuit in training, such as Otto Hentz or David Hollenbach, who taught briefly in the department in the sixties, the era was now past in which Jesuits, usually without the doctorate, could simply be assigned to the faculty. (Although the department has what can now best be described as an "affirmative action" program for the hiring of Jesuits, Jesuit candidates must meet the department's standards if they are to be recommended for appointment. The department currently has two Jesuit faculty members out of nineteen, although the primary appointment of one of these is in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics.)

Some Catholic departments of philosophy experienced intense internal conflict during this period over the position and role of scholastic philosophy. Allowing for the influence of the general cultural climate, the issue was decided at Georgetown, as I noted in the last section, largely by the influx of lay faculty members who, while Catholic and often trained in scholastic thought, nonetheless had scholarly interests and standards different from those that had prevailed in earlier decades. On the graduate level, this was reflected in a curriculum in the sixties and seventies that did not stress Scholasticism at all. In fact, the emphases of the department came to settle on two areas: the history of philosophy and continental thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As David Tracy has remarked, Catholic scholars tended to turn towards the history of their field following the decline in the hegemony of neo-Thomism.[81] With the passing of Scholasticism, the movement of the department at Georgetown was not towards an embracing of the mainstream of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, nor was it finally in the direction of a new Catholic humanism suggested in the brave statements of the mid-forties. The "tradition" had now become the tradition of the field itself, its history. At the same time, when contemporary philosophy was taken into account, it was mainly the European line that had run from Hegel through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and on to the phenomenologists and existentialists of the twentieth century. I do not think that it would be an exaggeration to say that both emphases were viewed as "Catholic" in some sense. This was reasonable enough, given the fact that most American universities at this time—and particularly the best known research institutions, with the exception of the University of Chicago—stressed neither the history of philosophy nor continental thought. Indeed, they were often indifferent to the first and usually openly hostile to the latter.

Furthermore, there was a perception among most of the lay faculty that the dominant trends in Anglo-American philosophy were antimetaphysical and, therefore, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, antireligious, or at least dismissive of questions concerning religion and transcendence as of any relevance to philosophy. Thus, while the most influential thought in Anglo-American philosophical circles barely made its presence felt in the program throughout most of the sixties, the Georgetown curriculum offered a fairly steady array of courses that included continental theistic philosophers, such as Kierkegaard and Marcel, and continental atheistic philosophers, such as Sartre and Nietzsche. That the latter could

be included in the curriculum, both undergraduate and graduate, at a Jesuit university no doubt reflected the opening-up of American Catholic higher education that had begun in the fifties; but it also reflected the conviction that the continental philosophers, whether atheist or not, took seriously the great metaphysical questions in a way that the "analytic philosophers," who dominated the American philosophical scene, and who by and large were identified at Georgetown as logical positivists, did not.

The Georgetown department that took shape in the late fifties and sixties, therefore, had a *unique* form; it did not simply duplicate what was being done elsewhere. It had an openness to the larger philosophical world that it did not have during the years of Scholasticism's triumph, and it certainly had higher standards of scholarly excellence among its faculty members. On the other hand, it took a largely negative stance toward the dominant philosophical culture of the English-speaking world, and this negative stance owed a great deal to Georgetown's sense of identity as a Jesuit and Catholic university. It is probably true to say that the department of this era was trying to build a program of genuine scholarly and philosophical quality that was firmly rooted in tradition but that self-consciously turned away both from what was perceived as the rigidity and narrowness of the old Scholastic way and from what was perceived as the equal rigidity and narrowness of Anglo-American philosophy.

In addition to the emphasis on the history of philosophy and continental thought during this period, there were certain elements of the curriculum that manifested more immediately Georgetown's Catholic tradition. Germain Grisez offered courses in Thomistic ethical theory, which he also explored in his published work, and applied the natural law position to contemporary issues. Louis Dupré offered a series of courses in the philosophy of religion. Dupré's courses were not peculiarly or exclusively Catholic in character; they included Catholic as well as non-Catholic thinkers and did not hesitate to raise the full range of questions associated with religious experience. Dupré and Grisez also engaged in lively debates in the mid-sixties over the Church's position on artificial contraception. These arguments were as much theological as philosophical, but they sprang from the faculty of the Department of Philosophy and from there went on to engage a much larger audience in the Washington area and even nationally. With the departure of Dupré and Grisez in the early seventies, the department lost the two faculty members who were most inclined to write and speak on ethical issues from a specifically Catholic perspective.

Many of the features of the department that developed in the fifties and sixties remain visible today. The department still offers courses in the history of philosophy, and it still has specialists in continental thought. But there have also been profound changes that began in the seventies and accelerated in the eighties. As one would expect, these have to do both with changes in the contemporary philosophical world and with decisions made within the department. As for the changes in the general philosophical climate in America, there is much greater respect for, and activity *in*, both the history of philosophy and continental thought. Narrow linguistic analysis or positivism is no longer the norm for contemporary American philosophy. This means that the department need not take a defensive—or offensive—view of what it does in the history of philosophy and continental thought; it also means that, to the degree that it still actively promotes itself in these two areas, it can no longer claim the same degree of uniqueness it once did.

As for changes within the department, one must point first at the hiring that has taken place in recent years. If the department earlier experienced a shift in its membership from Jesuit to lay but Catholic, the shift recently has been from lay and Catholic to lay and non-Catholic. Furthermore, while most (though certainly not all) of the lay Catholic faculty members who replaced the Jesuits in the past came from graduate programs in Catholic universities in this country and abroad, our recent appointees received their degrees from some of the most prestigious secular departments in the country (Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Yale, Pittsburgh). This change in the composition of the faculty has brought to the department an openness to several contemporary currents of American philosophy and an active scholarly participation in them.

The change noted above began in the seventies, which was also the period in which the department first mentioned pluralism as one of its objectives. Soon after Henry Veatch arrived to chair the department in 1973, he drafted a "Statement of the Department's Objectives" (the department had been without such a statement for a number of years). The first objective affirmed the department's dedication to the history of philosophy and to "the sense that philosophy may best be learned . . . through a constant occupation with . . . the major figures in the history of Western philosophy." The second expressed "a concern for philosophic pluralism." And the third renewed the theme, and the question, of the role of a philosophy department in a Catholic institution. This third objective may also be taken as a variation on the theme of pluralism: "A concern for the

pursuit of philosophy in the over-all context of a Christian and Catholic university. Although such a concern in no wise manifests as being in any way an actual test for membership in the department, or even as involving curricular requirements of a particular kind, the department nevertheless recognizes the continuing relevance both in its research and its instruction of issues having to do with the import of philosophy for religion and of religion for philosophy."

While the objectives formulated by Henry Veatch and promulgated by the department well into the eighties might still be taken as setting it apart from other departments of philosophy, the department's ongoing evolution and its hiring continued to lead it in another direction. Indeed, although we remain something of a maverick in the field, the department of the eighties has come to resemble more and more closely departments in secular universities. Of the three objectives, only the one concerning pluralism continues to be applied actively in practice, and some would argue that even it is no longer fully honored. The questions of identity raised by this evolution will be discussed in the next section.

In addition to appointments, the single most important development in recent years was the decision to concentrate on ethics in the graduate program. In 1982, the Department of Philosophy, along with all other departments with graduate programs, was asked to submit a proposal outlining an area in which it might be able to achieve excellence and, therefore, national prominence. The department selected ethics as its area. Its initial proposal, submitted in 1983, was found unacceptable by the committee that had made the original request. The much longer proposal, submitted in 1984, was accepted. Basically, the department expressed its intent to offer specializations in ethical theory and the history of ethics and in certain areas of applied ethics, particularly biomedical ethics. It would still maintain a "general program," though with fewer students.

On one level, the department's proposal for attaining graduate excellence reflected certain realities that had made themselves felt a number of years before. The Kennedy Institute of Ethics, an independent research institute located on the campus and administratively under the president, had by the mid-seventies acquired a reputation as an outstanding research facility in the burgeoning field of biomedical ethics. People around the country began to express an interest in studying at the Institute, but the Institute was not a department and had no independent way of offering courses or establishing degree requirements. Furthermore, the scholars at

the Institute did not think that a concentration in biomedical ethics without strong philosophical underpinnings would be desirable. In the late seventies, therefore, the department put into place a joint program in biomedical ethics with the Kennedy Institute. Students were enrolled in the Department of Philosophy and met the standard requirements for the advanced degrees. Scholars from the Institute, who in most instances were given appointments in the department, offered graduate courses on a regular basis and participated in administering comprehensive examinations and mentoring theses and dissertations. This aspect of the program was flourishing before 1980, and one could make a convincing case that in a time of declining enrollments in graduate programs in philosophy nationwide, the concentration in biomedical ethics enabled the department's graduate program to survive. Furthermore, our graduates in this specialization were able to find jobs during the driest period of academic employment opportunities in the humanities. The proposal put in place in 1984 formalized the concentration in biomedical ethics and added to it the broader program in ethical theory and the history of ethics. The proposal also cited other fields of applied ethics into which the department hoped eventually to expand (hopes that persist, although nothing tangible has come of them).

The graduate program has been meeting with increasing success as the proposal for graduate excellence has been implemented—success reflected in the quality of admissions, in the recruitment of some first-rate young ethicists for the faculty, and in the growing national recognition the department has received.

This success, of course, should not be taken as a suggestion that either the department's present or its future is free from problems. The strong emphasis on building up the graduate program in recent years has led many in the department to suspect that it is now time to turn our attention and resources, including the hiring process, in the direction of the undergraduate program. This observation leads into the final section, which will look somewhat more closely at the present and at what might be done in the years to come.

III. Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?

Where philosophy at Georgetown comes from has been suggested by the previous sections, and something of what we are has been indicated

as well. Still, we can afford to say a bit more about the current state of the discipline at Georgetown and about where it might, or should, be going.

One of the things we are is a presence in the curriculum, and not incidentally so. If every undergraduate in every school is required to take two courses in philosophy, and if the graduate program has been selected for "excellence" and for the support that attends such selection, then there must be a reason—or better, a cluster of reasons. These will have to do with the fact that Georgetown is a university, and specifically, a Jesuit and Catholic university. In order to get a grip on these reasons, it might be useful, first, to say a few words about the discipline of philosophy itself, quite apart from the form it may have assumed at Georgetown. I realize that my comments in this respect are controversial and that many of my colleagues would disagree with them. What I hope they would not seriously disagree with are the conclusions to which they lead.

Philosophy is an unusual enterprise. To begin with, it does not have a specific subject matter, at least not in the sense in which chemistry or literary theory or art history or government does. Everything imaginable and conceivable is its subject matter—which, as philosophers are fond of saying in such cases, is tantamount to claiming that nothing is. Suffice it to say that there is no area of human experience that the philosopher cannot think about. On the other hand, the philosopher does not approach the subject of his or her reflection in the same way as the chemist or the art historian does. What distinguishes the philosopher is a matter of attitude or stance, and this is what saves the philosopher from foolishly competing, say, with biologists or sociologists on their own turf.

The philosopher tends to ask the most universal questions, questions aimed at essence and at fundamental distinctions and conflicts—the questions that will reveal the forest and not just the trees. And it is out of the autonomy of reason that the philosopher asks these questions. The philosopher will, therefore, give you no new facts about Gauguin's painting whose title supplied the heading for this section of the paper. The philosopher will ask, however, what the nature of a work of art is, and how works of art differ from other things—perfectly useless questions, to be sure, but hardly ones that could be charged with triviality.

Similarly, the philosopher does not engage in ordinary theory-construction, as it might be found in art history or geology. But the philosopher might tell you how such theories are related to the disciplines in which they are found and to whatever aspect of the world they purport to explain. The philosopher is never directly a player; he or she is always the

relentlessly reflective spectator, carefully sifting and analyzing, and, if need be, criticizing.

Now, in any education that claims to be liberal, this approach to reality—not a canon, but an approach—should be present. This, I think, has been the constant reason why philosophy has been in the Georgetown curriculum for most of the University's history. The Jesuit understanding of the intellectual life has recognized and continues to recognize that the way in which philosophy seeks to understand what it is to be human is simply not something optional. Philosophy asks the questions that must be asked in a truly liberal education. In asking these questions, philosophy cannot help but take on an integrating role; and this is true even if philosophy is no longer expected to carry the burden of integrating the whole of the student's experience. This realization may be as old as Plato and may not be unique to the Jesuit vision, but the Jesuits have held on to it, and this tenacity is reflected in the curriculum.

Now, if that is what philosophy is, more or less, and if that is a principal reason why it enjoys a privileged place in the curriculum, what form should it take within the setting of a university that is Jesuit and Catholic? First, since the setting here is that of a *university*, philosophy at Georgetown must meet the demands of the discipline that prevail for any university, whether Catholic and Jesuit or not. This involves among other things the presence in the department of scholars who are actively involved in contemporary philosophical investigation. This is by no means a stipulation that one must slavishly follow what happens to be in vogue in the field at the moment. But the department does have to have members who know from the inside what is being done at the moment and who are capable of engaging it critically on its own terms. The era is long past in which a Catholic department of philosophy that wants to be genuinely faithful to the field can adopt a hostile and defensive attitude towards what is being done in the larger philosophical world around it.

In this respect, the department at Georgetown is in fine shape. To play on Mark Tushnet's distinction,[82] we have become "national," not in opposition to "local," but to "narrowly sectarian." We have first-rate scholars who are actively conversant with the latest developments in the field. But in saying that, one is saying no more (though that may still be quite a bit) than that the department is doing what it must do to be academically respectable. It does not address the issue of whether there is or should or could be anything unique about the philosophy department at

Georgetown—unique, that is, because Georgetown is a Jesuit and Catholic institution.

One should say at the outset that there are probably some members of the department who would argue that there should not be anything unique about philosophy at Georgetown, that philosophy has a universal character that makes it the same everywhere, and that in this respect philosophy differs not at all from the sciences or from mathematics. I believe that one can accept this proposition and still argue that the department of philosophy at Georgetown should be committed to doing certain things precisely because it is *at Georgetown*. In saying this, I am not implying that the things the department might be committed to doing could not be done in non-Jesuit and non-Catholic institutions. They could be, and sometimes are. The point is rather that we have an obligation to do them here if we are to live up to the stated objectives of *this* university.

What are some of these things? Surely among the most obvious is ethics, which, in fact, is one of the two foci, and effectively the dominant one, of the graduate program; and, of course, all undergraduates take a basic course in ethics. To be sure, ethics is currently an immensely fashionable concern of philosophy departments (and of other sorts of departments and schools) across the country. In attempting to develop an excellent graduate program in ethics, we are, therefore, doing no more than many non-Catholic universities are doing. But we are also doing something that as a Catholic and Jesuit institution we should be doing. Furthermore, in our biomedical specialization we are doing something very well that few other institutions are doing at all, and that fewer still are doing at our level of excellence. This, and the other areas of applied ethics that the department would like to see developed in the future, represent the sort of philosophical endeavors that a department such as ours should undertake.

To say that ethics rightly holds a special place in philosophy at Georgetown is not to claim that a particular sort of ethical theory, whether Thomistic or Kantian or Schelerian, should be emphasized because it seems to be particularly in harmony with religious doctrine. The interest in ethics is there both because ethics is a fundamental part of philosophy and because it is part of the Jesuit tradition to recognize that the human being is a free subject, expected to exercise his or her freedom responsibly. In curricular terms, this means, for the undergraduates, courses that help the student to think carefully and rigorously about the moral life and about the intrinsic dignity of every human

being. For the graduate program, it means a broadly based and open curriculum that will familiarize the student with the full range of possibilities in ethical theory in its contemporary and historical forms. Finally, one might argue that it is part of the Jesuit tradition that ethical enquiry cannot, in the end, be coherently pursued apart from metaphysics and epistemology, and that the curriculum, both graduate and undergraduate, should reflect that conviction.

Openness in the curriculum is part and parcel of the discipline. But the openness must be authentic. Observers of the Catholic intellectual life, such as James Hitchcock, have noted that with the decline of the Thomistic establishment twenty-five years ago, Catholic philosophers, like scholars in other fields in Catholic institutions, often sought "professional respectability by hewing closely to the prevailing opinion within their disciplines."[83] If the mandarins in the discipline were disinclined to devote thought to such issues as the possibility of divine existence or of an immaterial dimension in the human being or of natural law in the ethical life, or even to major portions of the history of the field, then the curricular concerns in departments of philosophy in Catholic institutions were apt to reflect those disinclinations. Put more positively, the curriculum was likely to evolve in such a way that it mirrored more or less faithfully the dominant interests of the philosophical establishment, which in the English-speaking world was decidedly not located in Catholic universities.

This tendency was strengthened, of course, as departments such as Georgetown's began to hire new faculty in precisely the same way as major departments in non-Catholic institutions do; that is, by selecting the best available candidate in a given area. Georgetown's recent success in this regard has been little short of phenomenal. We have managed to attract to our faculty the very best young scholars from among the finest graduate programs in the current establishment. And we have done this in the face of competition from schools more prestigious and richer than we are. Our programs, both graduate and undergraduate, have benefited greatly from their presence. And certainly they would never have joined the faculty had the department not become open, which it indeed should have become.

Now, this openness, I am convinced, is genuine. It involves no overt and determining prejudices about what is permitted within the department. But as openness, above all, to the "mainstream," it may well allow areas that an institution such as ours should maintain to fall into neglect, or even to become regarded as old-fashioned. The avoidance of these dangers means, in practice, that certain questions should be respected by the faculty at large and should actually be addressed by someone in the department. The question about the possibility of divine existence is one example, already mentioned. The philosophical investigation of religious experience is another. And the department's long-standing strength in the history of philosophy, now in danger of weakening, is yet another. Again, none of these is a uniquely Catholic or Jesuit concern. Indeed, Georgetown was once very strong in the philosophy of religion on both graduate and undergraduate levels, thanks largely to Louis Dupré, who now holds a chair in the philosophy of religion at non-Catholic Yale, which, consequently, now has strength in the philosophy of religion. But they are nonetheless the sorts of concerns that should be actively addressed in a department such as ours.

How can this be brought about? The most obvious and direct way is through hiring. University departments do not achieve excellence simply by declaring that they offer specializations in this area or that. They become excellent by hiring the right people. Similarly, if there are certain areas in which we should raise questions, we will in fact raise them only if we hire people who are willing and equipped to do so. If, in addition, the department needs a core of faculty members acquainted with and in basic sympathy with the Jesuit and Catholic tradition, this again can come about only through a conscious effort to hire such people. Surely, one component of such a core would be members of the Society of Jesus. The prospects for hiring Jesuits are now improved, and it can be said that the department is quite willing to hire as many as are qualified. We will, of course, need the fulfillment of the administration's promises to help us in this respect.

On the whole, however, it remains true that given the University's and the department's thrust for mainstream excellence, hiring in these directions is very difficult to accomplish. If, for example, we need someone in metaphysics, particularly someone well schooled in contemporary metaphysics for the graduate program, the chances are excellent that we will hire a first-rate person who has no interest at all in certain traditional metaphysical questions, including those of divine existence, of "Being," of human nature, and so on.

But there is one way to come to grips with this issue, and one senses that the times are becoming more propitious for doing so. The department must raise, publicly and officially, that is, in committees and in full

departmental meetings, the question of its position in the University and its relation to the Jesuit and Catholic tradition. Such a discussion probably cannot be undertaken without active support and encouragement from the administration. In any event, it will be painful and difficult, but it will also be philosophically interesting and centrally important. Otherwise, we will be in even greater danger than we already are "of being passively carried along by the currents affecting American higher education generally."[84] This is not a call for a new Catholic humanism or intellectualism in the style of the department of the thirties and forties. It is not a call to return to or to take up any particular philosophical position or approach. It is certainly not a call to curtail the catholic character of the department in the name of a narrowly Catholic identity. It is simply to say that we have not had a discussion about what we are in the department or about where we are going. We will remain unclear to ourselves, at least collectively, until we have that discussion. For some departments, those that neither claim nor enjoy a special place in the curriculum, such vagueness may be acceptable. But surely in the case of the Philosophy Department it is not.

Notes

I am grateful to R. Emmett Curran, S.J., Jesse Mann, Thomas McTighe, Terry Pinkard, Rocco Porreco, and John Reuscher for their help in preparing this essay.

1. John M. Daley, S.J., *Georgetown University: Origin and Early Years* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1957), 90.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 73.
4. Ibid., 107.
5. Information supplied by R. Emmett Curran, S.J. In Daley's version the precise motivation for the introduction of philosophy at Georgetown does not emerge clearly. See Daley, *Origin and Early Years*, 105-12.
6. Ibid., 107-08.
7. Ibid., 105.
8. Ibid., 108-09, and note 32.
9. Ibid., 110.
10. Jesuit seminarians did take philosophy at Georgetown until the 1860s, when the seminary moved to Woodstock, Md. Woodstock faculty were often considered to be Georgetown faculty and the advanced seminarians to be graduate students. As late as the 1940s the bachelor's degrees conferred on the seminarians were Georgetown degrees. In 1833, the Holy See empowered Georgetown to grant pontifical degrees in philosophy and theology. These degrees, called licentiates, could also be earned by the seminarians.
11. *Classical Journal*, 5. This diary of the prefect of studies is in the Georgetown University archives.
12. Ibid., 22.
13. "Philosophy" at this time included "natural" philosophy, that is, various physical sciences, as well as "moral" philosophy, which in the 1820s embraced logic and metaphysics.
14. *Classical Journal*, 60.
15. Ibid., 62.
16. Ibid., 63.
17. *Catalogue of the College, 1850-51*, 5.
18. *Catalogue of the College, 1852-53*, 5.
19. *Catalogue of the College, 1853-54*, 5.
20. *Catalogue of the College, 1850-51*, 5.
21. *Catalogue of the College, 1857-58*, 4.
22. Frederick Copleston, S.J., *A History of Philosophy*, volume 9, part II (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1977), 43-44.
23. Frederick Copleston, S.J., *Aquinas* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1955), 238.
24. *Catalogue of the College, 1862-63*, 31.
25. *Catalogue of the College, 1868-69*, 7.
26. *Catalogue of the College, 1869-70*, 8.
27. Jesse A. Mann, "Neo-scholastic Philosophy in the United States of America in the Nineteenth Century," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1959), 132, note 19. A comparison between Jouin's *Compendium Logicae et Metaphysicae* (1869) and his English compendium, *Logic and Metaphysics* (1897), in which references to Aquinas do appear, is interesting in this regard. In the memorial notice for Jouin we read: "There are many who think that his works on logic, metaphysics, and ethics could be introduced with profit to Yale, Harvard, and Columbia, where the study of mental philosophy is so woefully neglected." See *Woodstock Letters* 29 (1900), 6.
28. Brother Azarias, "Lessons of a Century of Catholic Education," *The Catholic World* 50 (Nov. 1889), 151, 152, quoted in Mann, "Neo-Scholastic Philosophy," 131.
29. *Catalogue of the College, 1920-21*, 83.
30. Joseph Louis Perrier, *The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: The Columbia University Press, 1909), 234, quoted in Mann, "Neo-Scholastic Philosophy," 133, note 22.
31. *Catalogue of the College, 1889-90*, 16.
32. *Catalogue of the College, 1899-1900*, 71-72.
33. Gerald P. Fogarty, S.J., "American Freedom and American Catholic Higher Education: An Historical Analysis," *New Catholic World* 231:1385 (1988), 221.
34. Ibid., 222. Timothy S. Healy, S.J., Georgetown's president, suggested that a key reason why the University seemed to become less Catholic in recent years

is to be found in "the reduction of its philosophy requirement (and its moves away from scholasticism in those that remained)." See "Universitas Fidelium" in *Georgetown Annual Report*, 1987, 1.

35. *Catalogue of the Graduate Division, 1932-33*, 33.

36. Ibid., 34.

37. *Catalogue of the College, 1935-36*, 18.

38. *Catalogue of the College, 1850-51*, 5.

39. *Catalogue of the College, 1935-36*, 18. Electives were not allowed in the required curriculum in philosophy until 1966.

40. Although the term "department" is used off and on in University catalogues as early as the nineteenth century, something resembling the modern departmental structure does not appear until the 1920s (see, for example, the *Catalogue of the College, 1921-22*) and does not mature until the 1950s.

41. *Catalogue of the College, 1959-60*, 83.

42. Copleston, *Aquinas*, 235.

43. Ibid., 250.

44. Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, vol. 9, II, 46.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 48.

47. Terry Pinkard of the Department of Philosophy in conversation observed that as the twentieth century progressed, philosophy *generally*—not just in the form of Thomism and not just at Catholic universities such as Georgetown—lost its cultural role as an integrating force.

48. *Catalogue of the College, 1969-70*, 43.

49. *Catalogue of the College, 1970-71*, 8. In the current catalogue, all of the general education requirements are given a brief justification, but in 1970 this was done only for philosophy and theology.

50. *Classical Journal*, 64.

51. *Graduate Bulletin, 1949-50*, 15. The minutes book of the President and Board of Directors says that Fairclough was the first to receive the M.A. degree "in course."

52. *Catalogue of the College, 1855-56*, 13.

53. *Catalogue of the College, 1906-07*, 6.

54. *Catalogue of the College, 1897-98*, 32-33.

55. Ibid., 31.

56. *Catalogue of the College, 1908-09*, 55-56.

57. Ibid., 56.

58. Information supplied by R. Emmett Curran, S.J.

59. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1924-25*, 50-51.

60. Ibid.

61. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1921-22*, 9.

62. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1925-26*, 36-37.

63. *General Catalogue, 1929-30*, 92.

64. *Catalogue of the Graduate Division, 1932-33*, 33.

65. *Catalogue of the Graduate Division, 1932-33*, 33.

66. Ibid.

67. For a thorough discussion of Scholasticism's integrating function in Catholic academic and intellectual life during this period, see Philip Gleason, "The Search for Unity and Its Sequel," *Keeping the Faith. American Catholicism Past and Present* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 136-51.

68. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1932-33*, 34.

69. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1935-36*, 30.

70. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1944-45*, 30.

71. Ibid.

72. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1945-46*, 30.

73. *University Bulletin, 1974-75*, 7. In 1943, Guthrie admitted women to the Graduate School, it was thought, for the first time. During the 1920s, however, nine sisters from Visitation Convent earned advanced degrees from Georgetown. One of them, Sister Jane Francis Leibell, received her Ph.D. in 1923. Three years later she published *Readings in Ethics*, a work which was widely used for many years.

74. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1946-47*, 33.

75. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1947-48*, 34.

76. Ibid.

77. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1949-50*, 38.

78. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1954-55*, 53.

79. *Graduate School Catalogue, 1956-57*, 59.

80. The School of Foreign Service had its own Department of Philosophy until the late 1950s. This school traditionally had far fewer required courses in philosophy than the College.

81. David Tracy, "Catholicism and Religious Pluralism," Address at Georgetown University, January 26, 1989.

82. Cf. Mark Tushnet's essay in this collection, "Catholic Legal Education at a National Law School: Reflections on the Georgetown Experience."

83. James Hitchcock, "[D]ialogue: how has American Catholic intellectual life changed over the past thirty years?" *U.S. Catholic Historian* 4 (1985), 180.

84. Ibid., 179.