William Blattner
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
updated: 1/23/03
From Question 13, Art. 6, of the First Part of the Second Part of Aquinas's Summa (p. 127):
Man does not choose with necessity. The reason for this is that what is possible not to be is not necessary to be. Now the possibility of not choosing or choosing arises from a twofold power in man. For a man can will and not will, or act and not act; he can also will this or that, or do this or that. The reason for this lies in the very power of reason. For whatever reason can apprehend as good, the will can tend to. Now reason can grasp that it is good to will or to act and also that it is good not to will or not to act. Further, in all particular goods, reason can consider the good that is in something and the lack of good in it, that is, which is accounted as evil, and thus it can apprehend any of these goods as something to be chosen or avoided. It is only the perfect good, which is happiness, that reason cannot apprehend as evil or as lacking anything. Accordingly, man wills happiness necessarily, and he cannot will not to be happy, that is, to be miserable. But choice, since it is not about the end but the means, as we have said, is not about the perfect good which is happiness, but about particular goods. Consequently man chooses freely and not with necessity.
From Question 14, Art. 2, of the First Part of the Second Part of Aquinas's Summa (p. 130):
The end in actions is considered as a principle in that the reason for the means is taken from the end. Now a principle cannot be called into question, for principles must be presupposed in any inquiry. Accordingly, since deliberation is an inquiry, it is not about the end, but only about the means. Nevertheless, it can happen that what is an end with respect to some things is ordered to a further end, just as the principle of one demonstration is the conclusion of another. Hence, that which is taken as the end in one inquiry can be taken as a means in another. In this way, there will be deliberation about an end.
From Question 1, Art. 4, of the First Part of the Second Part of Aquinas's Summa (p. 9):
Now there is a twofold order in ends, the order of intention and the order of execution, and in either order there must be something first. That which is first in the order of intention is by way of a principle moving the appetite; hence if this principle be removed desire would not be moved at all. The principle in the order of execution is that from which action begins; hence if this principle be removed, no one would begin doing anything.
Now the principle with respect to intention is the ultimate end; the principle with respect to execution is the first means related to the end. To go on without end with respect to either is therefore impossible, for if there were no ultimate end nothing would be desired, nor would any act be terminated, nor would the intention of the agent ever be at rest; and if there were no first means in relation to the end, no one would begin to do anything and deliberation would never end, but go on infinitely. On the other hand, nothing prevents an infinite series in things which do not have a per se order one to another, but are joined accidentally to each other, for accidental causes are indeterminate. In this case, in fact, there may also be an infinity accidentally in ends and in means to the end.