Errors in the English Translations of Works by
Martin Heidegger

On the Essence of Human Freedom (SS 1930), GA 31

So the transcendental freedom of the practical is not situated alongside as the negative, but the practical as the condition of its possibility is prior. Thus the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals bears the subtitle “The Concept of Freedom is the Key to the Explanation of the Autonomy of the Will.”

– The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 18.

So ist die transzendentale Freiheit der praktischen nicht als der negativen nebengeordnet, sondern der praktischen als die Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit vor-geordnet. Daher wird in der “Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten” der dritte Abschnitt eröffnet mit der Überschrift: “Der Begriff der Freiheit ist der Schlüssel zur Erklärung der Autonomie des Willens.”

– Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1982), p. 25.

Phenomenological Interpretaiton of Kant‘s “Critique of Pure Reason” (WS 1927-28), GA 25

Thus by denying things in themselves, one does not deny that they are extant and that we encounter them every day. Rather one denies only that these things are, in addition [to their being everyday extant], objects for a deus faber, for a demiorgos – one denies the philosophical legitimacy and usefulness of such an assumption, which not only does not contribute to our enlightenment but also confuses us, as it becomes clear in Kant.

– Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason,” trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1997), p. 69.

Leugnet man also die Dinge an sich, dann leugnet man nicht das Vorhandensein der Dinge, die wir täglich antreffen, sondern man leugnet nur, daß sie überdies noch Gegenstände eines Deus faber, eines Demiurgen seien; man leugnet das philosophische Recht und den Nutzen einer solchen Annahme, die nicht nur nichts zur Aufklärung beiträgt, sondern verwirrt, wie an Kant deutlich wird.

– Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft,” 3. Ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995), pp. 99-100.

Thus, if one denies things in themselves one does not deny the being-occurrent of things that we daily encounter, but rather one denies only that they are also objects of a deus faber, of a demiurge; one denies the philosophical legitimacy and the uses of such an assumption, which not only contributes nothing to clarification, but is also confusing, as becomes clear in Kant.

Being and Time
identified by Peter Dennis, PhD Student, Univ. of Reading

Now the more unequivocally one maintains that knowing is proximally and really 'inside' and indeed has by no means the same kind of Being as entities which are both physical and psychical, the less one presupposes when one believes that one is making headway in the question of the essence of knowledge and in the clarification of the relationship between subject and object

– Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie & Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 60.

Je eindeutiger man nun festhält, daß das Erkennen zunächst und eigentlich “drinnen” ist, ja überhaupt nichts von der Seinsart eines physischen und psychischen Seienden hat, um so voraussetzungsloser glaubt man in der Frage nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnis und der Aufklärung des Verhaltnisses zwischen Subjekt und Objekt vorzugehen.

– Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemayer, 1979), p. 60.

Now the more unequivocally one holds fast to the idea that cognizing is primarily and usually “in there” and indeed has nothing at all of the sort of being of an entity that is both physical and psychical, the less one takes oneself to presuppose in the question of the essence of cognition and in the clarification of the relationship between subject and object.

– I modified Peter Dennis's original suggestion. So, this is a collaborative result.