How difficult is cooperation in world politics? Cooperation -- which is often understood to mean policy coordination to achieve jointly preferable objectives -- is often more common than pessimistic Realists expect, but often more difficult than optimistic Liberals expect. What explains why stable patterns of agreements and collaboration are achieved in some areas, while in others it is difficult for states to work together? This course addresses these questions through a combination of theoretical arguments and substantive case studies. Class time will be divided among lectures and extensive discussions. Efforts will be made to incorporate insights from the political economy, security, and the general international relations literatures.

REQUIRED BOOKS AND OTHER READINGS

Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate (Michigan, 1995)


Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Cornell, 1990)

Janice Stein and Louis Pauly, eds., Choosing to Cooperate (Johns Hopkins, 1993)


Other readings have been placed on reserve at Lauinger, and are designated in the course outline by *.

REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING

You will be asked to write 3 papers of not more than 7 double-spaced pages each, which will each count for 30% of your grade. Papers will be due March 6, April 10, and May 1. Class participation will count for the remaining 10% of your grade. Course grades will be determined jointly by both professors. Feel free to see either or both of us about any issue of concern.
TOPICS AND SCHEDULE

Overview (January 16)

1. The Conflict-Cooperation Spectrum (January 23)
   Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, chapter 1

2. Relative Gains, Realism, and Cooperation (January 30)

3. Strategic Interaction Approaches (I): Strategic Interaction and the Use of Game Theory (February 6)
   Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, chapters 2, 4-7

4. Strategic Interaction Approaches (II): Two-Level Games and Reciprocity (February 13)

5. Strategic Interaction Approaches (III): Discussion of Cases (February 20)

  Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," in Oye, ed.
  John Conybeare, "Trade Wars," in Oye, ed.
  Charles Lipson, "Bankers Dilemmas," in Oye, ed.

*Howard P. Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game," *World Politics* Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992)

6. Psychological Approaches (I): Arguments (February 27)


  Janice Gross Stein, "International Cooperation and Loss Avoidance," in Stein and Pauly, eds., *Choosing to Cooperate*

  Timothy J. McKeown, "Decision Processes and Cooperation in Foreign Policy," in Stein and Pauly, eds., *Choosing to Cooperate*

7. Psychological Approaches (II): Discussion of Cases (March 5)

  Michael Mastanduno, "Framing the Japan Problem," in Stein and Pauly, eds. *Choosing to Cooperate*

  Deborah Spar, "Co-developing the FSX Fighter," in Stein and Pauly, eds. *Choosing to Cooperate*


  David A. Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," in Stein and Pauly, eds., *Choosing to Cooperate*
Louise Richardson, "Avoiding and Incurring Losses," in Stein and Pauly, eds., Choosing to Cooperate

Paper Topic 1

Your first paper is Due on March 6 at 5:00 p.m. in Professor Lepgold's mailbox.

The strategic interaction approach to understanding international cooperation, especially when combined with the substantive assumptions about actors' utilities made by Realists, produces implicit assumptions about actors' abilities to calculate their objectives and strategies. Are these assumptions about political leaders' abilities to reason "realistic," given our understanding of cognitive processes? Given your answer to this question, what are the implications for the prospects for conflict or cooperation?

Your paper should address the following issues:

(a) What assumptions do Realists make about actors' abilities to calculate their utilities and strategies in a situation where cooperation is possible but not guaranteed?

(b) In your judgement, are these assumptions "realistic"? How so or not? And what difference does your answer make?

(c) Use a case (one we have covered or one you know from some other source) to illustrate your argument.

March 12 -- No Class (Spring Break)

8. Institutional Approaches (I): Regimes and Multilateralism (March 19)

*Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987)


*Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as an Intervening Variable," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization


9. Institutional Approaches (II): International Relations as an Institutionally Modified Anarchy (March 26)


*Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, "International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., *International Organization*

10. Knowledge and Expertise Based Approaches (I): Arguments (April 2)


10. Knowledge and Expertise Based Approaches (II): Discussion of Cases (April 9)


Paper Topic 2

Your second paper is due April 10 at 5:00 p.m. in Professor Shambaugh's mailbox.

Rationalists and what Keohane calls "reflectivists" have very different conceptions of the role and impact of international institutions in managing conflict and facilitating cooperation. Yet both see "knowledge" or professional expertise as potentially important in shaping the way issues and options for action are defined. Choose a contemporary international policy issue (not one we have read about) and assess whether or how knowledge or expertise mattered in producing agreement to act together.

Your paper should address the following issues:

(a) Can knowledge or expertise make it easier for international institutions to manage conflict or promote cooperation in your case? If so, how?

(b) Does your case support rationalist or reflectivist assumptions? Why?


Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate (entire)


Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (entire)

13. What Forms Do Agreements Take? (April 30)


Paper Topic 3

Your third paper is due May 1 at 5:00 p.m. in Professor Shambaugh's box. (Both professors will grade a portion of these papers.)

Partly as a response to the Bosnian peacekeeping mission, NATO's relationship with Russia is being redefined as a mix of cooperative and conflictual elements. If you were a policy advisor to President Clinton, how would you advise him to try to structure this relationship for the foreseeable future? Specifically, what elements of the NATO-Russia relationship should be formally structured, and which elements should be
structured informally? What is the reasoning behind your recommendations? Refer explicitly to Lipson, Aust, and our discussion of these works.

Your paper should address the following issues:

(a) What specific substantive issues are likely to arise in the NATO-Russian relationship for the foreseeable future?

(b) What are the benefits and limitations to structuring each of these problem areas formally as opposed to informally?

(c) What are the benefits and limitations to the United States of the alternative approaches?