... The *kindred blood* which flows in the veins of American citizens, the *mingled blood* which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies.¹

(James Madison)

That’s right, you’re not from Texas. Texas wants you anyway.²

(Lyle Lovett)

We historians and social scientists have for some years now been congratulating ourselves over our realization that all forms of identity, including national identity, are socially constructed. That is to say, no particular form of identity is innate or genetically inherited, although the capacity to have an identity may be. The ways in which people define who they are, both individually and in relation to one another, are – as we compulsively remind one another – shaped by highly contingent and variable historical, cultural, social, psychological, material, institutional, and political factors. So far, so good; we can all agree with the ultimately banal observation that nurture and nature interact in the formation of social organisms.³ But this insight merely begs some fundamental questions. What sorts of building blocks make for the most enduring forms of social construction? More specifically to our particular area of inquiry, why do some formulations of national identity (e.g. Serb or Croat identity) seem deeply rooted in popular consciousness while others (e.g. Yugoslav) appear to lack widespread or long-lasting emotional resonance? Furthermore, is there a distinct set of independent variables that make devotees of some forms of nationalism particularly prone to outbursts of intolerance and xenophobia?

One of the most useful and influential typological distinctions used to address such questions is that between civic and ethnic forms of national identity. The former term refers to a sense of national identity manifested
in a common loyalty to a territorially defined state and rooted in a set of political rights, duties, and values shared by the citizens of that state, regardless of their ancestry and of the non-political (e.g. linguistic, religious, etc.) aspects of their cultural heritage. The United States, with its shared political identity that is formally separate from the diverse origins and cultural traditions of its citizens, is often referred to as the quintessential civic nation.4

Among ethnic nations, as one might guess, national identity is based on shared ethnicity. That is, the kinship principle is extended to encompass and define the nation. Sharing a myth of common descent, members of the ethnic nation are bound to one another by putative ties of blood, not just by juridical categories or ideological affinities.5 Their sense of kinship is both manifested in and reinforced by distinctive cultural attributes (such as language and/or religion) that they have in common with one another and that mark them apart from those who do not share their national identity. Membership in ethnic nations is ascriptive – that is, it is ascribed to individuals whether they like it or not and, in principle, regardless of whether they display the requisite cultural markers.6 In other words, if their genealogy (real or attributed) places them within the fold of the ethnic nation yet they don’t speak the right language or belong to the right religion, it must be because they are out of touch with their ancestral identity and are in need of reeducation.7 Conversely, suspected aliens can, in theory, be readily identified by their failure to pass culturally.

It is hard to imagine a civic nationalism coming into being outside the context of a preexisting political-territorial unit, insofar as it is the claim to shared sovereignty over, and sentiment of common loyalty to, a state by the population that occupies its territory that constitutes the essence of the phenomenon. Indeed, this form of nationalism is commonly viewed as having arisen within long-established West European polities – whose social, political, and intellectual elites shared a common language and culture – in the course of their modernization, centralization, and transition from monarchic rule to popular sovereignty over the course of the seventeenth to twentieth centuries.

For its part, ethnic nationalism is generally considered to have originated among disaffected intelligentsias and social elites within political-territorial entities (such as the post-1815 German Confederation or the Habsburg Empire) that entered the modern era sorely lacking the administratively, economically, and/or culturally integrated features that allowed the socio-political establishments of countries such as Britain and France to inculcate their newly politicized masses with a sense of loyalty to the preexisting states.
Frustrated and humiliated by the relative weakness of a politically fragmented Germany, nineteenth-century German nationalists looked to cultural commonalities that transcended the borders of their petty principalities as the basis for collective empowerment and national self-determination. The territorial dimensions of a future, unified German nation-state were ideally to be defined by the geographic distribution of identifiably German people rather than by the boundaries of any existing German political entity. For their part, multi-ethnic empires like the Habsburg, Ottoman, and, arguably, Romanov\textsuperscript{8} monarchies could not hope to infuse their subjects with a shared feeling of national identity, as their relatively abrupt, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century encounters with the phenomenon of mass politics played out against a backdrop of radical internal linguistic, religious, and institutional diversity. In the absence of a cohesive sense of popular identity coextensive with the existing polity, claims to territorially bounded popular sovereignty were made in the name of groups that were defined by shared culture rather than shared territory.\textsuperscript{9} This quickly produced tensions among spatially overlapping ethno-cultural communities (e.g. Czechs and Germans, Poles and Ukrainians), whose claims to national self-determination (either within the bounds of reformed empires or as independent nation-states) were in conflict with one another.

In all these cases, the association of people’s identities with ostensibly fixed cultural markers (i.e. hard-to-change attributes acquired in infancy, such as one’s mother-tongue and native accent), rather than with their residence and membership in existing political-territorial units, arguably led directly to the sorts of ascriptive and discriminatory tendencies often associated with ethnic nationalism. These trends were reinforced by the apparent inability or unwillingness of various culturally differentiated populations (e.g. Poles and Danes in German-dominated areas; Jews, Ukrainians, and others in lands claimed by Poles) to assimilate completely into regionally dominant cultures – as well as by the growing fear that whatever assimilation did take place would provide false cover for alien infiltration of the national organism.\textsuperscript{10} Apparently, one was either born into a national culture or one wasn’t. Passed on by parents and family during childhood, a person’s cultural heritage was increasingly looked upon as a mark of his/her lineage and as determinative of his/her sense of national kinship. If culture was conveyed in one’s mother’s milk, and culture was the basis of national identity, then national identity could readily be construed as an inherited quality. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Social Darwinism reinforced the tendency to
think of the nation as a quasi-biological organism, competing with other
nations in a never-ending struggle for survival. As can be inferred from this
discussion, civic nationalism is commonly associated with liberal, tolerant,
inclusive values, because its criteria for membership can theoretically be met by
any resident of a nation-state’s territory; it’s simply a matter of individually
choosing to subscribe to a common set of principles. Civic nationalism does
not in theory impose any requirements for cultural homogeneity beyond the
circumscribed realm of a shared political culture. Ethnic nationalism is
considered intolerant of both individual rights and cultural diversity because
of its preoccupation with ascriptive qualities that can neither be freely acquired
nor voluntarily relinquished, its conception of the nation as an organically
cohesive collective entity, and its understanding of national-cultural
identity as an integrated package in which there can be no distinction
between a public, political-legal arena and a private or associational,
cultural-communal sphere.

These typologies are potentially powerful tools of analysis. But if used
simplistically to place each nation and/or nation-state into one category
or another, they can stand in the way of nuanced insight. Even in the
abstract, these definitions prove self-contradictory, and the examination
of flesh-and-blood examples causes the lines between them to grow blurry.
Yet it is not my intention to try and discard them altogether. The
notions of civic and ethnic nationalism can be used productively if
understood as conceptions that both vie with one another and interact
synergistically in the shaping and evolution of national identities. These
interactions contribute to the production of a variety of ever-shifting
nationalist syntheses that range from the xenophobic and intolerant to the
accommodating and inclusive ends of the political spectrum.

Let us explore the elements of this argument one by one.

**Blurry Theoretical Distinctions**

Even at the theoretical level, a purely ethnic or purely civic nationalism is
a contradiction in terms. Given that nationalism aspires to create or
maintain a state (or sub-state unit) that embodies the identity of a nation,
the institutions and characteristics of statehood are intrinsically important
to any manifestation of nationalism. Therefore, even a nationalism that
emphasizes ethnicity as the basis of the nation’s identity is – if successful
in its goal of achieving national self-determination – bound to attach
some importance to at least the façade of public law and the formality of
citizenship and naturalization procedures, insofar as these constitute standard attributes of a modern state. Some degree of tension will inevitably arise between the idea of a state-governed public domain and the conception of ethno-national identity as an elemental force, shaped by inherited characteristics and unmediated by rule-bound institutions. Even more fundamentally, the stereotypical ethnic-nationalist conflation of culture with kinship is fraught with contradictions. Stressing the importance of shared culture and tradition as the source of collective identity opens the door to the assimilation of non-kinfolk into the ethnic community, while insisting that shared ancestry alone determines national identity obliges the ethnic nation to include in its fold “blood relatives” who have become assimilated into alien cultures.

For its part, a purely civic nationalism would, arguably, not be an example of nationalism at all. As Yael Tamir and others have argued, if the only forces that held a nation-state together were a legal or constitutional apparatus and a set of shared political loyalties and values, then in theory the nation would have to be open to universal membership. The territorial dimension of national identity would melt away as the polity admitted into its ranks all those willing to subscribe to the laws and principles that defined it and as it erased the borders separating it from other nations sharing the same civic principles. As it lost any sense of demographic and territorial specificity, it would cease to be a nation-state. By the same token, to the extent that a civic nationalism did limit the applicability of its principles to the residents of the nation-state’s original bounded space, it would be cultivating an element of cultural-historical specificity and would even be introducing a quasiascriptive factor into the picture. Highlighting a common connection, hence presumably attachment, to a specific land would usher in the forces of irrational emotion and particularistic tradition that civic nationalism is supposed to abjure. Moreover, a person born in the national homeland would likely be considered more unambiguously attached to it and therefore more sincerely devoted to the nation than an immigrant secretly longing for his or her native country; hence the entry through the back door of the ascriptive element supposedly unique to ethnic nationalism.

In any case, it is difficult to imagine how a purely civic nation-state could retain its social and political cohesion in practice, particularly if its political culture was informed exclusively by principles of liberal individualism. A number of political theorists and philosophers have, in recent years, pointed out that liberal democracies are fooling themselves if they think that the free interplay of rationally self-interested individual citizens
is their sole source of cohesion. For any democratic polity to function—particularly at times when it demands personal sacrifices of its citizens—its members must have some sense that they are bound together as a community of fate, not just a club of like-minded individuals. People have died for God and country; no one to my knowledge has ever flung himself into a hail of bullets on behalf of the American Dental Association. The citizens of a polity based on the popular sovereignty principle must feel that the state is the public expression of who they are. In other words, even the civic nation-state must straddle the line distinguishing the sphere of public, political culture from the zone of personal and communal identity if it is to be regarded as legitimate by the individuals who are its citizens. And in so doing, it ceases to be a purely civic nation-state.\(^\text{18}\)

Once again, pointing to the contradictions inherent in these analytical categories is not intended to suggest that they have no utility. On the contrary, exploring such paradoxes is one way of illuminating some of the existential dilemmas that are intrinsic to nationalism in all its forms. In practice, one can reasonably distinguish among versions of nationalism that are closer to the ethnic end of the spectrum (e.g. Serbian nationalism) and those that more nearly approximate the civic model (such as American nationalism). More interesting, perhaps, are the ways in which ethnic and civic elements interact with one another in shaping political debates and agendas within the great majority of nationalist movements and nation-states on either end of this spectrum.

THE CIVIC ELEMENT IN ETHNIC-LEANING NATIONS

The myth of sharing a distinctive set of common ancestors is regarded as a salient characteristic of ethnic nationalism. To the extent that endogamous marriage is practiced by members of an ethnic group, such self-perceptions may become self-fulfilling over time.\(^\text{19}\) Yet, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, even among cases regarded as prototypical examples of ethnicity, the nature of the group’s claims about the relationship between lineage and identity proves more complex upon closer inspection.\(^\text{20}\)

At the level of the most basic human kinship unit—the family—common parentage is not the exclusive criterion for membership. In most if not all cultures, adoption of orphaned or abandoned children into the family is an accepted institution. Marriage outside the boundaries of the extended family or clan—common in many societies—also stands in the way of any purely biological definition of what constitutes kinship,
insofar as the marriage partner comes to be accepted as part of his or her spouse’s family. Analogous exceptions and intricacies complicate the self-definition of ethnic groups and ethnic nations.

The biblical story of their common origins is central to Jews’ sense of common ethno-national identity and unique destiny. Their religious tradition literally defines them as the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Israel), and therefore as heirs to the Covenant that God first concluded with those forefathers and later renewed and elaborated upon with the Children of Israel in Sinai. (See the discussion in Chapter 4.) Yet even as it defines the national-religious implications of Jewish kinship, the idea of the Covenant is in tension with the kinship principle. In so far as the Covenant is regarded as the legitimizing basis for a national-territorial state, does it or does it not encompass residents of the state’s territory who are not descended from Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob? And what should be the status of aliens who volunteer to sign on to the Covenant, so to speak?

With regard to the former category, the traditional approach is ambiguous. In commanding the Israelites to treat the aliens in their midst kindly, on the grounds that the Israelites themselves had experienced the hardship of alien status in Egypt (see Chapter 3), the Torah seems to recognize the permanence of the line separating members of the Israelite descent community from those falling outside it while at the same time insisting that the boundaries of ethno-national identity do not define the limits of moral obligation. On the other hand, biblical texts emphasizing the sacredness of “all the land” of Israel might be interpreted to mean that the law of the land was considered uniformly binding on all who dwelled within the national kingdom’s territorial boundaries.

As to those ethnic aliens volunteering to subscribe in full to the Israelite Covenant, Jewish tradition evolved to provide for a form of religious conversion designed to erase any lines of ethnic differentiation between those who have inherited their Covenantal obligations and those who choose to assume their burden. Whereas a “native-born” Jew is referred to on legal documents and ceremonial occasions by his/her Hebrew name and his/her father’s Hebrew name (e.g. “Joseph son of Gabriel”), a convert is customarily referred to by a newly conferred Hebrew name and as son or daughter of “our father Abraham” (or “of our father Abraham and our mother Sarah”). In other words, the convert is adopted not only into the civic fold of the Covenant but also into the associated ethnic-kinship circle, becoming notionally the offspring of all Jews’ common ancestors.

Edward Cohen has convincingly argued that ancient Athens was also not as literal in its application of an ethnicized conception of national
identity as is often supposed. It is true that the Athenians claimed to be an autochthonous people, rooted in their native Attic soil since time immemorial. But the very attractiveness of this tradition was the illusion of organic cohesiveness and historical continuity that it maintained for an Athenian nation that was undergoing rapid and far-reaching demographic, economic and political transformations in the course of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. As a major commercial emporium and a Mediterranean economic, military, and quasi-imperial power with a huge (in the hundreds of thousands) urban population, fifth-century Athens had to adapt to the presence in its midst of tens of thousands of immigrants and their descendants. Through a process of acculturation and socialization, many of Athens’ resident aliens (metics) came to be regarded as locals (astoï) rather than strangers (xeni). The Periclean legislation of 451/450 BCE which limited enfranchisement to men both of whose parents were considered astoi, was therefore itself more inclusive of people of non-Athenian origin than has generally been recognized. In any event, it represented an unsustainable nativist backlash against ultimately irreversible trends; following an initial wave of zealous enforcement, Pericles’ citizenship law was largely ignored and ultimately gutted. The most important function of Athens’ ethno-national myths was to serve as cultural props for its civic-national realities.24

Turning our attention from classical antiquity to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has been the standard view – as noted above – that modern ethnic nationalism was born in Central and Eastern Europe and that it became established as the characteristic form of nationalism in this part of the world. While there is certainly a great deal of truth to this, the story is more complicated than overly simplistic pigeon-holing might suggest. Many of the intellectuals, publicists, and activists whose dreams and visions laid the ideological groundwork for the nation-states that eventually arose in the lands of the Rhine, Danube, Vltava, and Vistula originally sought to create structures of identity that incorporated both ethnic and civic elements. Most obviously, countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were, by definition, conceived of as polities that encompassed more than one ethnic group within their nationalizing frameworks.25

The founding father of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Masaryk, himself half-Czech and half-Slovak by parentage, certainly saw the linguistic affinity and geographical propinquity of Czechs and Slovaks as providing a common ethno-cultural foundation for the forging of a union between the two peoples. But at the same time, this new nation-state was not
supposed to serve merely as a protective sphere for the cultivation of unchanging ethnic traditions passed on from one generation to the next. It was intended to function as the mold for a new and improved national identity that would both transcend the ethnic distinction between Czechs and Slovaks and shift the cultural and ideological orientation of Czechs and Slovaks alike away from the Russophile tradition of pan-Slavism and towards the liberal-democratic values of the West. Masaryk and his disciples hoped to legitimize this civic-nationalist aspect of their program by linking it to what they depicted as a long-suppressed tradition of early modern Czech humanism and by presenting the Czech language as a historically favored vehicle for the articulation and propagation of enlightened ideals. This approach soon backfired, as we shall see below, but the point is that the very existence of the state in the first place was predicated on a vision of national identity that was far more complex than the label “ethnic nationalism” would lead one to expect.  

Among the South Slavs as well, in the years leading up to the First World War, it was the interplay of ethnic and civic visions of self-determination that shaped the development of nationalist ideologies and movements. In Habsburg-ruled Croatia, advocates of a chauvinistic Croat ethnic nationalism that looked upon Serbs as little better than Croats suffering from false consciousness were challenged by liberal-democratic opponents who forged a Serb-Croat political coalition in the last years before the outbreak of the First World War. The members of the Croat urban intelligentsia who embraced the Yugoslav vision saw themselves as bearers of a Western, liberal-democratic, humanistic tradition that could both draw strength from and offset what they saw as the tradition of Serb peasant-warrior brawn in a political marriage of the two, linguistically almost identical, peoples. The two groups, alongside the Slovenes, would forge a new national and political identity that would draw inspiration from their respective cultural and historic legacies without completely displacing them.

Likewise, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Polish nationalist movement was riven by conflict between the left-leaning ideological heirs to the proto-civic-nationalist tradition of the early modern, multi-ethnic Polish Commonwealth (partitioned by its avaricious neighbors in the late eighteenth century) and the advocates of a new form of Polish identity that was focused on the alleged biological basis of national solidarity and that unabashedly espoused a virulently racial anti-Semitism as a central tenet of its creed.

In these and other cases, it was the sudden, crisis-ridden transition to political independence in 1918 that decisively shaped the evolution and
repercussions of such ideological battles. Born or territorially reshaped amidst the violent circumstances of World War I and its chaotic aftermath, the would-be nation-states that sought to build new political structures amidst the ruins of the Habsburg and Romanov Empires were hard pressed to find a ready-to-hand basis for mass mobilization and political legitimization as they struggled to assert their authority in the face of internal dissension and as they fought with one another and negotiated with the Allied and Associated Powers over the definition of their international boundaries. As we saw in Chapter 4, elaborate and inherently fragile systems of cultural tolerance and interethnic cooperation or compromise are liable to break down under the impact of war and political disorder. The idea of shared blood is thicker than the water of common values and in times of crisis people readily fall back on their sense of ethnic kinship to protect them from the dangers and uncertainties of a violent geopolitical neighborhood. The civic-oriented nationalisms of France and Britain had taken form over many centuries within preexisting political-territorial molds. The East European nation-states were either brought suddenly into existence or territorially transfigured in the midst of a world crisis of epic proportions and in an epoch when (as both Wilson and Lenin insisted) the fulfillment of the national self-determination principle was a vital aspect of a state’s legitimacy. There was no opportunity here for the gradual crystallization of a finely balanced ethno-civic synthesis rooted in a shared historical experience that transcended internal cultural differences. One regime after another in the region ended up tilting the political scales sharply in favor of the ethno-nationalist end of the ideological spectrum – even in cases such as that of Poland, where the dominant political figure of the interwar period, Józef Piłsudski, had earlier been associated with the ideal of a multi-ethnic, federative approach to nation-building.

Tensions between ethnic and civic conceptions of identity are unavoidable under any circumstances, but the way they played out in this region during the interwar years was particularly conducive to instability. Civic-territorial conceptions of nationhood and arguments about early modern historical precedents were deployed to justify claims to extensive lands populated by a multiplicity of ethnic groups. Piłsudski’s invocation of the sixteenth- to eighteenth-century legacy of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, for example, was used to legitimize Poland’s incorporation of sizable eastern territories populated by non-Polish nationalities such as Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, and Jews. To be sure, the presence of ethnic Polish enclaves surrounded by non-Polish rural
populations – such as the city of Lwów (the present-day Ukrainian city of Lviv) in Ukrainian-majority eastern Galicia – would have led to territorial conflicts and anomalies in any event. But the aspiration to reconnect with the tradition of a Polish political-cultural identity that transcended ethnic differences militated in favor of an approach to governance that was intolerant of ethnically based claims to regional autonomy. A similar approach prevailed among other countries in the region, such as Czechoslovakia, where the idea of granting home rule to the Slovaks (as had been promised by Masaryk prior to the creation of the state) was incompatible with the project of forging a new, enlightened, Czechoslovak identity. Such states’ political elites saw it as their task not just to provide for the self-determination of existing ethnic groups, but to use the language and culture of a dominant ethnic group – claimed to be the bearer of a civilizing tradition – as the instrument for integrating a diverse population into a unitary nation-state on the model of France or Britain. But because little or no tradition of interethnic coalition building existed in these just-formed polities, whose disputed borders had been determined by military force and/or Great Power fiat rather than by commonly accepted historical precedent, such programs provoked deep resistance among ethnic minorities. Ukrainians in eastern Galicia fought a low-grade guerrilla campaign against the Polish authorities for much of the interwar period. To most Slovaks, the Masarykian agenda promoted by the government in Prague smacked of Czech cultural imperialism, and the country’s large ethnic-German minority was left feeling politically marginalized. The resultant tensions were readily exploited by Nazi Germany, whose divide-and-rule tactics facilitated its dismemberment of the first Czechoslovak republic in 1938–39. In Yugoslavia, erstwhile Croat proponents of South Slav cooperation felt that their enlightened ideal had been hijacked by an expansionist Belgrade regime that ran the new country more as an extension of the Serbian monarchy than as a genuine union of equals.

Again, this neo-absolutist attachment to a conception of state sovereignty as irreducible and indivisible was not a peculiarity of East European nationalism. It was modeled on the example of the successful, centralized, culturally (ostensibly) homogenized West European nation-state, the French republic serving as a particularly influential model. Indeed, especially in light of their fears over Bolshevism on the one hand and a possibly revanchist Germany on the other, the Allied and Associated Powers at the Paris Peace Conference encouraged the consolidation of control in Eastern Europe by powerful, centralized states. To be sure,
they forced the new states to sign treaties protecting the civil rights and cultural freedom of minorities, but international enforcement mechanisms were weak and provisions for territorial autonomy – which represented the minimal demand for many nationalities – were the exception rather than the rule.\textsuperscript{33}

The problem was that this rigid approach was ill-suited to newly formed or expanded states that encompassed such a diversity of languages and ethnic identities. Given the circumstances, it was inevitable that the ideal of supraethnic national unity would be seen by many as a tool employed cynically and hypocritically to promote the interests of one ethnic group at the expense of others. The more resistance such policies provoked, the more tempted nationalist regimes themselves were to fall back on unabashed appeals to ethnic solidarity and on the related traditions of violation and martyrdom as they struggled to mobilize their core populations against the restive peripheries. Compounded by the multiple, global and European, economic, ideological, and geopolitical stressors of the interwar period, this approach was a recipe for political instability and the rise of authoritarianism (a political phenomenon to which Czechoslovakia alone in this region remained resistant during these years).

In the course of the Second World War and its aftermath, Eastern Europe underwent horrific experiences of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and territorial reapportionment. It is a sad irony that the successful establishment of liberal democracy in many East European states following the end of the Cold War was to some extent an indirect consequence of these devastating mid-century events, which left many of these countries far more linguistically and culturally homogeneous than before.\textsuperscript{34} It was precisely in the country with the most complex intermixture of ethnocultural identities – Yugoslavia – that the transition away from Communism turned into a violent affair. Pluralistic values, it seems, are much easier to embrace in the absence of diversity.

The dilemmas faced by the regimes and peoples of twentieth-century Eastern Europe are not unique. Many of the world’s so-called nation-states gained independence as a result of the relatively sudden collapse of overarching imperial structures – whether it be the overseas empires of Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the aftermath of World War II or the territorially contiguous Soviet empire at the end of the Cold War. The populations of many of these young states are even more diverse than were those of interwar Eastern Europe. And not unlike their early twentieth-century East European counterparts, many of these
countries’ ruling establishments formally espouse a civic-territorial conception of national identity that dismisses internal ethnic differences as legacies of primitive tribalism, or of imperial divide-and-rule tactics, or both. Yet, particularly in the case of most African states, the only tongue common to members of the educated elites is the language of the former colonial power and one of the sole political traditions uniting them is that of the struggle against that power. Using English or French as the language of official business in Nigeria or Ivory Coast may be a wisely neutral choice, but it makes it hard to present the state as the embodiment of popular identity and indigenous tradition. And indeed, in the absence of a deeply rooted sense of shared political culture and historical destiny, kinship bonds and ethnic ties shape the dynamics of deal-making and power-brokering behind the supraethnic façades of many of these polities.\footnote{Clifford Geertz famously argued that, in fact, the transition to independence accelerated the politicization of ethnicity begun by imperial regimes in many Asian and African countries. Hitherto localized kinship groups and cultural communities found that they could wield influence and defend their interests more effectively on the suddenly all-important playing field of “national” politics by building territorially and demographically extensive networks of trust and cooperation based on the idea of shared ethnicity.\footnote{While political establishments and opposition forces alike in such countries pay lip service to the principles of civic nationhood, everyone knows that ethnic politics is the name of the game.}}

To conclude that ethnic politics is simply an evil to be suppressed at all costs is to miss the point. It is precisely the denial of an official role for ethnic identity that promotes the proliferation of unofficial, and potentially disruptive, roles for ethnicity in states marked by deep cultural cleavages. As Donald Horowitz has emphasized in his magisterial comparative overview of modern ethnic conflicts, it would be foolish to suggest that there exists one formula that can manage, let alone resolve, all such problems.\footnote{But for a government to restrict itself to promoting a civic-territorial identity that manifestly fails to strike a resonant chord among political elites and popular masses alike seems like an empty gesture and a recipe for political alienation and internecine conflict. Better in such cases to concede to ethnic groups a place on the public stage – be it in the form of a designated share of power at the central level, a provision for territorial autonomy on a regional basis, or some combination of these and other approaches. Such flexibility, in turn, requires a willingness to define and distribute the attributes of sovereignty in ways that defy the classic, neo-absolutist ideal of the sovereign state as a strictly}
unitary institution wielding its power in an undifferentiated manner throughout its territory. Ideally, such imaginative compromises may, in turn, allow supraethnic, civic spheres of national identity to gain in substance over time. Alternatively, where ethnic groups are concentrated in clearly defined and economically viable territories, outright partition – as in the case of the peaceful Czech–Slovak split of 1993 – may be an acceptable outcome.

Of course, no modern nation-state, however small, is completely or permanently devoid of ethnic diversity, and no amount of subdivision and partition will eliminate for all time the need to address the tension between an institutionally dominant ethnic identity and the sentiments of minority groups. But I would argue that an avowedly ethnic nation-state that is aware of its potential alienation of minority groups and is willing to find various ways of accommodating or compensating them, while simultaneously upholding the civil rights of all individual citizens regardless of ethnicity, is preferable to a state that actively suppresses minority cultures in the name of a supraethnic ideal.

Lest it be thought that those nation-states classically seen as dominated by ethnic politics are the only ones to face such paradoxes and dilemmas, let us examine the role of kinship imagery and cultural particularism in so-called civic nations.

MINGLED BLOOD: KINSHIP IMAGERY IN CIVIC FRAMEWORKS OF NATIONHOOD

The quotation from James Madison that opens this chapter is suggestive of the ambiguities and contradictions that lie just beneath the surface of the most civic constructions of national identity. In this founding father’s words, American citizens were said to be joined by kindred blood; in the early days of the republic, when people of British ancestry still formed nearly 80% of the country’s non-slave population, it made sense to invoke the theme of stemming from common stock as part of an appeal on behalf of a proposed constitution that would lend coherent institutional form to the nation. As with the Chosen People of Israel, kinship could form the foundation for a covenant that would lend substance, meaning, and purpose to collective identity.

Yet Madison hastened to add that American blood was more than just kindred – it was mingled. By shedding their blood in common on the battlefields of the War of Independence, those wounded or killed in the struggle had concretized and added new layers of meaning to the idea of
shared bloodlines. Implicit here, moreover, was the notion that those soldiers who were not literally one another’s kin had become blood brothers by jointly risking and/or sacrificing their lives for their new nation.

In some ways, such a figurative form of kinship carries more emotional power than the literal one. After all, Americans of British extraction shared common bloodlines with the British themselves as well as with one another. It was through shared sacrifice in the common cause against its overseas kin that the nation had become a distinctive familial community of its own. It would be sacrilege for the bearers and beneficiaries of that sacrifice to turn their backs on the fraternal bonds that had thus been forged.

Of course, as we saw in Chapter 3, martyrdom myths play important roles in virtually all nations, not least those with a strongly ethnic sense of identity. What is noteworthy here is how significant the familial associations and implications of battlefield sacrifice and brotherhood in arms have been in fostering a sense of nationhood among the members of such a paradigmatically civic nation as the United States. Over time, America’s development as a land of immigrants (intermittent nativist backlashes notwithstanding) made it harder and harder to think of the nation as being literally of common ancestry. More elastic conceptions of kinship were vital to maintaining a cohesive national consciousness in the face of such rapid ethno-demographic change. Gary Gerstle has documented how vital such variations on kinship imagery were to Theodore Roosevelt’s influential form of nationalist ideology around the turn of the twentieth century. Roosevelt presented the Rough Riders cavalry regiment which he led to victory at the Battle of San Juan Hill during the Spanish–American War as a microcosm of a new American society. The Rough Riders hailed not only from both North and South of the post-Civil War United States, but included volunteers from a variety of European ethnic backgrounds – Southern and Eastern Europeans fighting alongside those of Anglo-Saxon stock. Roosevelt pointed to this as a model demonstration of how combining the offspring of diverse European peoples and races in a disciplined, common effort could produce noble and inspiring results.43

Like James Madison, Teddy Roosevelt linked the themes of kindred blood and mingled blood. But for Roosevelt, the mingled blood of the battlefield anticipated the kindred blood of future American generations; the nation’s familial unity was to be found not in his generation’s unrelated ancestors but in its common descendants. Nineteenth-century
America had been forged, according to Roosevelt, through the admixture of Anglo-Saxon with other Northern European races. The same formula, extended to the new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, could lend the nation strength and unity in the twentieth century. His Rough Riders had shown what a voluntaristic association of Americans of diverse European origins could achieve when animated by a common ideal. In Roosevelt’s vision, such brotherhood in arms could serve as a model and inspiration for the eventual establishment of literal fraternity among what he considered the best elements in the nation. How much stronger the American people as a whole would grow if the various immigrant communities his volunteers had sprung from became culturally integrated into the nation through common schooling and other forcefully progressive programs of assimilation. This, in turn, would facilitate the creation of a new biological synthesis through intermarriage over the course of coming generations. The strength of the United States’ civic union would once again be reinforced by ties of actual kinship. Moreover, this synthesis would combine the best qualities of the nation’s founding group – Anglo-Americans – with those of Irish, Italian, Jewish, and other European immigrants to produce a new hybrid race that would be stronger and healthier than any single one of its components. In his words, “we are making a new race, a new type, in this country.” He anticipated that white ethnic groups sharing cultural commonalities such as religious denomination would first merge with one another:

When the Catholic Germans learn to speak English as their home tongue, they intermarry more or less with the Irish; and they will doubtless intermarry with the Slavonians and Italians under like conditions, when the latter begin to move upward in the social scale.

After a few generations, “complete intermixture” among white immigrant communities would result. Roosevelt even encouraged the racial assimilation of American Indians into the national mainstream, having made a point of including a few Indians in the ranks of the volunteers he led in Cuba.

The extent to which the mingled blood of the battlefield should be accepted as equivalent to, or a foundation for, the inherited link of kindred blood has often been a pivotal issue around which debates between advocates of ethnicized/racialized and civic definitions of national identity have revolved. In Roosevelt’s case, the circle of inclusiveness was restricted to those of European descent, with the possible
exception of Indians. His acknowledgment of the role of Black regiments in clinching the victory at San Juan Hill was muted. No African-Americans were allowed into the Rough Riders themselves, and Roosevelt’s vision of racial hybridization had no place in it for Blacks. In fact, it was not until after the Second World War that the US Army was fully and officially desegregated and not until 1965 that national origins immigration quotas dating to the 1920s and designed to prevent further shifts away from Anglo-Protestant domination of the population’s ethnoreligious and racial composition were abolished as part of the broader trend towards civil-rights legislation and the de-ethnicization of American national identity. American citizens of Japanese ancestry were notoriously confined in internment camps as suspected security threats during World War II even as many of their sons and brothers served in the country’s armed forces. But at the same time, it was precisely the incongruity between the image of trans-ethnic, wartime brotherhood in arms and the persistence of ethnic and racial discrimination that highlighted the injustices of the latter and helped catalyze efforts at reform – first within the army itself, and then throughout civil society. In this ostensibly most civic of polities, the tension between common ancestry and common bloodshed as criteria for full inclusion in the national covenant has been a defining theme of the country’s history, and its legacy continues to shape national debates about public policy and political identity.

In many European countries at the turn of the twentieth century, the claim that the army should serve as “the school of the nation” was an influential idea among strategic thinkers and military planners. The processes of technological innovation, industrial modernization, and economic globalization that were transforming the international balance of power in the years leading up to the First World War were also challenging domestic political equilibria as ever-growing sectors of the popular masses became urbanized and politicized. In the eyes of military planners this presented a potential threat in the form of class conflict and challenges to social and political authority, but also a potential opportunity for forging large, cohesive and highly motivated, mass-conscription national armies. At the same time, the army could take peasants as yet unsullied by the pernicious influence of urban culture and channel their loyalties in healthy directions. The popular masses were so much raw material waiting to be forged into a disciplined fighting force that could both project the nation’s power on the international stage and serve as a model for, and source of, internal socio-political cohesion.
National armies would not just defend the nation – they would shape the nation.

Such ideas caught on among the officer corps and general staffs of powers such as Germany, France, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire (dominated by Young Turk nationalists after 1908). They were linked to an even more broadly influential, Social Darwinist idealization of war as a forge of national character, reflected in Theodore Roosevelt’s ideas outlined above. As with Roosevelt’s Rough Riders model, the implications of construing the army as the school of the nation were ambiguous. On the one hand, this approach held the potential for some strongly civic-nationalist ramifications. The modern, mass-conscription army has in fact been commonly turned to as an instrument of supraethnic, national integration. Under the French Third Republic (1871–1940), it arguably played a role second in importance only to the school system in taking peasants and workers as well as bourgeois from all corners of the country, speaking all manner of dialects or languages, and inculcating in them a common conception of, and attachment to, France. In Germany, despite the country’s ever stronger ethnic-nationalist leanings, many assimilated Jews hoped and expected that their loyal service in the military during the First World War would help them complete the process of gaining acceptance as fully fledged members of the German nation who happened to be of “Mosaic faith.” Some tsarist military officers thought the army could serve as a crucible for the creation of loyalty to state and tsar that would transcend the ethno-cultural and linguistic divisions of the Romanovs’ multinational empire.

On the other hand, the nature of the causal relationship between the cohesiveness and motivation of a mass-conscription army and the homogeneity of the nation was the subject of obsessive chicken-and-egg debates at the highest military and political levels. Many military planners felt that the creation of a citizen-soldier ready and willing to shed his blood on behalf of the homeland was contingent on an a priori sense of kinship with his co-nationals. In the case of Russia, as Peter Holquist has discovered, military textbooks published in the final years before the First World War came to include doctrinaire statements such as: “The ethnic composition of the population has primary significance . . . in a military sense . . . An ideal population is a monoethnic population, with one language.” In turn-of-the-century France, the highest military officials, enjoying the backing of powerful social, religious, and political forces, for years resisted reopening the case of Captain Dreyfus, the Jewish officer framed for the passing of military secrets to the German enemy. Better to
associate the stain of treachery with someone who could be portrayed as existentially alien to France than to impugn the honor of the army as a national institution. The ultimately unsuccessful anti-Dreyfusard movement became a rallying point for the diverse opponents of the liberal-democratic republic and its culturally assimilationist approach to the cultivation of French identity. In the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turk officers who came to power on the eve of World War I nominally espoused a supraethnic, “Ottomanist” vision for political reform and popular empowerment. In secret, they saw the army as, above all, a school for the Turkish nation, whose ethno-cultural solidarity could be cultivated and tapped into as a new source of cohesive strength and power-projection for the declining empire. In Germany during the First World War, the Prussian war ministry conducted a notorious Judenzählung – a “Jew count” designed to document the purported underrepresentation of the nation’s Jewish population in its fighting forces, apparently with the intention of exposing German Jews as dyed-in-the-wool shirkers. When the investigation’s statistical conclusions contradicted its premise, the results were duly classified. In later years, as Hitler erased any lingering vestiges of German civic nationalism, decorated Jewish veterans discovered that their demonstrated willingness to shed their blood for the nation during the Great War did not exempt them from being murderously cut out of the nation’s body politic under the new ideological dispensation.

Such ethnic-nationalist and/or racist backlashes against the idea of mingled blood underline the usefulness of the image as a way of recasting our understanding of civic nationalism and of exploring its intersections and tensions with ethnic nationalism. To recapitulate, civic nationalism can be said to emphasize figurative notions of kinship as a way of binding together people of diverse lineages. This tendency manifests itself very obviously in the widespread American use of stock phrases such as “Founding Fathers” to describe the ideological ancestors that all citizens are said to have in common regardless of their actual ancestry. Metaphorical kinship trumps literal kinship in the civic-nationalist worldview; Washington, Jefferson, and Madison are deemed the forefathers of all Americans no less than Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are the progenitors of all Jews, be they native-born or converts. Civic nationalism’s emphasis on figurative kinship finds expression in a fascination with the idea of blood ties that it shares with ethnic nationalism, but in civic nationalism’s case, the focus of this fascination is on the joint shedding of blood in the nation’s defense and/or the convergence of the nation’s heterogeneous blood lines in the veins of future generations.
In any concrete example, civic images of mingled blood are both intricately intertwined and in tension with ethnic esteem for kindred blood. Efforts to promote the civic approach almost invariably either generate an ethnic-nationalist backlash (e.g. the Dreyfus Affair) or reveal latent limitations to the inclusiveness of the civic ideal itself (as in the exclusion of African-Americans from Teddy Roosevelt’s racial-hybridization scenario). The proponents of mingling national blood have time and again been confronted by fears over the tainting of kindred blood. Yet this is not to say that the balance of power between literal and figurative ideas of national kinship cannot shift over time, as it most certainly has in the United States.61 By the same token, the ideal of mingled blood can itself be associated with a culturally or ideologically coercive approach to national integration that is in conflict with liberal respect for diversity.

LIMITS TO CIVIC TOLERANCE AND DILEMMAS OF LIBERAL INCLUSIVENESS

As we have noted, civic nationalism is commonly seen as open to the world and tolerant of internal diversity. Freed of the ethnic-nationalist obsession with the preservation of supposedly timeless ancestral cultures and traditions, this is a form of nationalism that can embrace humanity as a whole. Yet upon closer inspection, this distinction also proves more complicated and problematic than first impressions would lead one to believe.

An indirect insight into civic nationalism’s potential for militant intolerance is offered by a recent critique of received opinion about Western Europe’s liberal-nationalist tradition. Pointing to the roots of West European national identities in the bloody religious schisms, persecutions, and wars of the early modern period, Anthony Marx conflates what he terms “exclusionary” nationalism with ethnic nationalism, concluding that at their time of origin British and French nationalisms included strong ethnic elements, just as Central and East European nationalisms were to do in modern times.62 This argument reveals the extent to which civic and ethnic nationalisms have been uncritically identified with tolerance and intolerance, respectively: Anthony Marx assumes that an intolerant nationalism cannot be civic, and is therefore, by default, to be labeled ethnic. To my mind, Marx’s analysis calls into question not the civic foundations of West European nationalism, but the simplistic equation of civic nationalism with tolerance.63 As Jonathan
Wyrtzen has observed, the early modern religious wars and persecutions can in fact more readily be seen as the original breeding grounds for the civic elements in British, French, Dutch, and other West European national identities. After all, one of the chief objects of these campaigns was to prevent the faithful from converting to “heretical” forms of Christianity and to terrorize the misguided into returning to the fold of their polity’s established faith (be it Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Anglican, etc.). In the context of these conflicts, people were by and large categorized as belonging within or without the proto-national pale on the basis of their religious beliefs and choices rather than on the basis of their parentage. (To be sure, there were racialized aspects to some religious persecutions, as in the Spanish Inquisition’s obsessive distinction between Christians of pure blood and those of Jewish or Muslim extraction.) In secularized form, the people’s subscription to a common creed has remained central to the self-definition of nations such as France and Britain, and Britain’s American offshoot, and this is precisely the ingredient that both lends them their civic quality and has the potential to lead them down the path of intolerance, as Yael Tamir has pointed out. The centrality of political creed to national identity in the United States, and the ambiguity of its implications, is reflected in the peculiar linguistic usage of labeling ideas one does not like as “un-American” – a practice that became most notoriously abusive during the McCarthyism of the early 1950s, but that has not disappeared from the nation’s political vocabulary.

It is important to note that the civic aspects of modern nationalisms do often revolve around shared beliefs in liberal-democratic principles of tolerance and human rights that represent the hard-learned lessons of the religious and ideological wars of earlier generations. Yet to the extent that full membership in the modern, civic polity remains contingent on subscribing to a specific set of values and loyalties linked to a figurative sense of shared kinship, radical non-conformity is bound to present a challenging problem even to the most flexible configurations of national identity.

Inclusiveness vs. tolerance: the French and Israeli cases

The metaphorical and descendant-oriented conceptions of kinship common to civic nationalisms can clearly be conducive to a politics of inclusiveness. In principle, no one need be denied membership in the nation provided s/he is willing to conduct himself or herself as if s/he felt
part of the national family. By the same token, it may come to be expected of people that they conform to “familial” norms of behavior and mentality if they are to enjoy the privileges associated with national membership. The pressure to assimilate culturally into a civic-leaning nation-state readily comes into conflict with minority communities’ drive for cultural self-preservation. This is very different from the types of pressure likely to be experienced by minorities in ethnically oriented nation-states. For example, France’s recent prohibition on the wearing of head-scarves by girls attending state schools would be unthinkable in the context of the Israeli school system. In the former case, the state draws on a long tradition of actively promoting the assimilation of cultural minorities into a supposedly universalistic French civilization. People can wear what they like in the private sphere, but in a secular, public institution devoted to the inculcation of civic values and national traditions among the young, there can be no tolerance for the flaunting of religious particularism and radical cultural non-conformity. In Israel’s case, the country’s Arab citizens (i.e. those Palestinian Arabs residing within the state’s pre-1967 borders) unquestionably suffer many disadvantages associated with their minority status in a polity defined as embodying the ethno-national identity of Jews. But because there is relatively little effort on the part of the state to foster a supraethnic sense of civic identity, the pressure on Muslim Arabs to abandon or constrain their public observance of customs traditional to their community is relatively minimal. Polygamous marriage as permitted by Islam is forbidden by Israeli law, but the government would not presume to go so far as to ban head-scarves in public schools. Indeed, state schools are segmented along lines of ethno-religious affiliation to begin with, allowing such groups as Orthodox Jews, secular Jews, Muslim Arabs, Druze Arabs, and Arabic-speaking Circassians to reaffirm, reinforce, and reproduce their separate communal/cultural identities within the framework of the state-administered educational system.

Which system is more inclusive? Each is alternately inclusive and exclusive in very different ways. The French civic conception of national identity is, in its current form, arguably more inclusive of individuals regardless of their ethno-religious background than is the Israeli (although the outburst of violence among immigrant communities in France during November 2005 forces one to question what this theoretical inclusiveness really amounts to in practice). But full access to, and participation in, the institutions of the French nation-state (e.g. education in public schools or employment in the civil service) is contingent on citizens’ willingness to
circumscribe the public expression of those elements of their ethno-
religious identities that do not conform to a set of government-defined
norms. Those norms, of course, cannot be viewed as neutrally universalistic,
for they are themselves the outgrowths of a specifically European and French
cultural heritage. The Israeli ethno-national system leaves more public,
state-regulated space open to the cultivation of minority cultures than does
the French approach, while at the same time leaving members of those
minorities feeling that (leaving aside the enormous aggravating factor of the
larger Israeli–Arab conflict) there is no clear path to assimilation into, and
acceptance as full members of, the Israeli nation short of taking on Jewish
ethnic identity through religious conversion.

The limits of American tolerance

Countries subscribing to what one might term the Anglo-Saxon tradition
of civic nationalism have in recent decades evolved towards ever greater
acceptance of public manifestations of ethno-cultural diversity. As Will
Kymlicka has pointed out, turbaned Sikhs are commonly exempted from
North American laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets and
observant Jews are excused from adhering to Sunday business restric-
tions. Indeed, in the American case, as Yossi Shain has documented, the
post-1960s embrace of ethnic heritage as something to be preserved and
“celebrated” rather than discarded in favor of complete assimilation has
contributed to an ever more prominent role for ethnic lobbies in the
shaping of the country’s foreign policy.

But this most dramatic example of ethnic minorities’ “coming into their
own” as publicly recognized components of American national life also
points to some of the limitations on diversity that inevitably come into
play even in the most civic-leaning and inclusive nations. The United
States’ ever more expansive accommodation of ethnic political lobbies is
accompanied by strong socio-political and cultural pressures to adhere to a
somewhat constricting ideological and rhetorical paradigm of American
patriotism. Be they Irish-, Jewish-, Greek-, or Arab-American, ethnic
organizations that celebrate their communities’ cultural heritages or
engage in public advocacy for policies favorable to their overseas home-
lands feel obliged to trumpet their unswerving loyalty to America and their
unshakeable belief in the inherent superiority of the American economic
system and the infinite promise of the American dream of individual self-
reliance and limited government. Thus, in a July 2000 newspaper column
addressing the Democratic Party’s position on the Arab–Israeli conflict,
Dr. James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, made the seemingly irrelevant point of emphasizing Arab-Americans’ “commitment to family, to free enterprise and the creative drive for excellence…”78 And at its 2005 annual conference, in the wake of reports of an FBI investigation into its possible involvement in the passing of classified information to the Israeli government, the American Israel Public Action Committee (AIPAC) made an ostentatious, flag-waving show of its patriotic fervor, even eliminating the traditional singing of the Israeli anthem after the American one.79 In other words, a certain degree of *pro forma* doctrinal and symbolic conformity with perceived national norms is seen as a precondition for reaping the full political benefits of American ethno-racial tolerance.80 Any lobby, let alone an ethnic one, that openly identified itself as socialist in orientation would find it very hard to gain significant political traction on Capitol Hill.

Furthermore, one of the elements that contributes to many ethnic lobbies’ large measure of acceptance as fixtures of the American political scene is precisely the fact that they tend to be concerned with the fate of overseas homelands rather than harboring any dreams of territorial secession from, or political change within, the United States. Advocates for the rights of illegal Mexican immigrants and supporters of bilingual Anglo-Spanish education face considerable hostility to their proposals inasmuch as they speak on behalf of populations whose ethno-cultural identities connect them to the Spanish-speaking world that lies just across the Rio Grande. This awakens fears over the erosion of America’s cultural, linguistic, and demographic boundaries in a way that advocacy for Greek Cypriots, Israelis, or Irish Catholics fails to do. Civic associations have been formed to oppose the extension of social services to illegal aliens and to lobby against bilingual education, and even to engage in vigilante-style “protection” of the nation’s southern border.81

This sort of backlash is not confined to the political fringe. In his 1995 call for the enshrinement of English as the United States’ official language, Republican presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole warned of the dangers of “ethnic separatism.”82 And, writing in the highly respected journal *Foreign Policy*, prominent Harvard University political scientist Samuel Huntington has described the ongoing influx of Mexicans into American states whose territory had once formed part of Mexico as a demographic and socio-cultural *reconquista* (reconquest) that may one day give rise to a secessionist or regional-autonomy movement in the heavily Latino Southwest.83 In stridently alarmist terms, he warns of the broader danger that transforming America into a bilingual country would
pose to the nation’s values and way of life. Drawing selectively on the phraseology of Latino advocates of Hispanic socio-cultural reform, such as Texan businessman Lionel Sosa, Huntington infuses new life into old prejudices by disparaging Hispanic culture as inherently incompatible with positive American qualities such as “initiative, self-reliance, and ambition...” Huntington concludes his piece by categorically dismissing Sosa’s call for the transformation of the allegedly self-defeating elements of the Hispanic ethos into a Latino-inflected variation on the American entrepreneurial dream – what Sosa calls “the Americano dream.” “Sosa is wrong,” writes Huntington. “There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English.” Huntington warns that, faced with the prospect of a large, potentially unassimilable, minority culture becoming permanently established on their nation’s soil, Americans may quickly find their customary tolerance and inclusiveness strained to the breaking point. Sadly, Huntington’s own views are themselves a powerful illustration of how nasty the tone of a nativist backlash can be.

Canada’s quandaries

On the North American continent, though, it is in Canada that a civic-leaning nationalism is most directly being forced to confront the contradictions and limitations of its inclusiveness by an internal ethno-territorial challenge. Québécois nationalism not only threatens the country’s administrative homogeneity and/or political unity, but calls into question Canada’s official self-image as a tolerant, multicultural nation.

Will Kymlicka has distinguished between polyethnic and multinational political systems, each of which seeks to resolve the tension between multiple ethnic identities and overarching civic nationhood in very different ways. Polyethnic systems tolerate the private, communal, and even public cultivation of diverse ethno-cultural traditions as long as these do not serve as the basis for any claims to territorial self-determination. The official national culture remains studiously neutral. By contrast, multinational countries are formally structured as ethno-territorial federations. Contemporary Belgium, with its provision of regional autonomy for Flemish Flanders and Francophone Wallonia (alongside its recognition of linguistic communities whose institutions administer personal, as distinct from territorial, services) is an example of the latter approach. The US, by contrast, exemplifies the polyethnic approach. Officially
bilingual and multicultural Canada uneasily straddles the line between these two systems: the federal government in Ottawa espouses a poly-ethnic ideal for the country as a whole, while realizing that in practice Québec has a special role to play as the political-territorial locus for a distinctive, Francophone identity. The awkwardness of this asymmetrical reality\(^88\) – so out of keeping with the formally symmetrical institutional structure of Canadian federalism – extends to nomenclature. Québec is Québec. But how does one refer to the rest of Canada in aggregate? To call it Anglophone Canada would be to ascribe an English identity to the other provinces that is out of keeping with the bilingualism of federal institutions and the multiculturalism that officially informs public policy throughout the country. As Michael Keating notes, the politically correct term for the rest of Canada is therefore simply – Rest of Canada (ROC).\(^89\) The closest historical analogy is with the situation of the Austrian Empire after the 1867 Compromise (*Ausgleich*) that divided the Habsburg lands between a self-governing Hungary and a rest-of-the-empire which no one was ever quite sure what to call.\(^90\)

Indeed, what is particularly galling to many Canadian patriots (such as the late prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who saw no conflict between his pride in his Francophone background and his support for a united Canada) about Québécois-nationalist demands is precisely their implication that Canada’s official, polyethnic approach is nothing but a fraud, a façade for an Anglophone cultural nationalism that is all the more insidious for not being openly acknowledged as the foundation of Canadian national identity. Québécois nationalists, for their part, are outraged by the other provinces’ refusal to acknowledge that Québec’s history as a victim of English military conquest and socio-cultural subjugation, and its position as an endangered cultural island awash in an Anglophone ocean, entitle it to constitutionally enshrined special protections and exceptional status, if not outright independence.\(^91\)

The result has been an anomalous political stalemate since 1982, when Canada patriated its constitution from the British Parliament and revised and extended its text (most notably, appending a Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Québec alone among the country’s provinces refused to ratify the constitution, on the grounds that it failed to recognize the province as having a special, quasi-national status within the Canadian federation and because the Charter’s predominant emphasis on individual rights threatened to undermine Québec’s institutional and legislative ability to defend the collective identity of its Francophone population. While Canada’s federal government and constitutional court have considered
Québec nonetheless subject to the constitution, they have allowed Québec to maximize its exercise of the wide-reaching autonomy that the constitution allows in principle to all provinces in the Canadian confederation. For instance, Québec is the only province to have its own tax-collection system, separate from the federal bureaucracy. Québec has even been able to use a constitutional loophole to temporarily violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (as interpreted by Canada’s Supreme Court) in its passage and implementation of laws designed to protect and propagate the French language. Where the Québécois have been frustrated is not so much in their quest for functional self-determination as in their desire for symbolic recognition as a “distinct society” within Canada. Negotiated compromises that would have incorporated this wording into the Canadian constitution have been repeatedly rejected by the country’s other provinces, which have been unwilling to grant one of their number a symbolic status denied to the rest.92

Canada thus remains at a constitutional and existential impasse. In the official Canadian view, the country is a federally bilingual, culturally neutral, safe haven for the protection of every individual’s rights and each community’s traditions. From this perspective, it is Québec that violates the spirit of the national covenant by going too far in its use of the power of the provincial government to institutionalize the superiority of Francophone culture within its borders. From a Québécois perspective, such criticism is hypocritical in light of the historic, demographic, and geopolitical hegemony of the English language. If the rest of Canada remains unwilling to bring the confederation’s juridical and constitutional arrangements fully into line with the country’s de facto multinationalism, then, Québec nationalists assert, outright secession may be the only acceptable alternative. Yet it would be simplistic to characterize this as a straightforward conflict between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. Québec has been engaged in a coordinated effort since the late 1970s to assimilate immigrants to the province into the French-speaking community, lest they tip the demographic and political balance against French-speakers by adopting English as their primary language. This has obliged Québécois (especially in heavily multiethnic urban centers such as Montréal) to contemplate the evolution of their own national identity into a civic-oriented version of itself built around a common language and a shared tolerance for a variety of ethno-cultural identities.93 At the same time, this Québécois variant of multiculturalism does nothing to allay the fears of the province’s indigenous minorities, who worry over the erosion of their identities and potential for self-determination within the

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context of a nominally polyethnic Francophone nation no less than the Québécois have traditionally felt threatened by the pressures of Anglophone “civic” nationalism.94

IMAGINATIVE COMMUNITIES

At this juncture, readers may well throw their hands up in despair; if Canada’s minimalist framework of national unity serves as the arena for such bitter accusations and deep-seated fears, what possible hope can there be for the rest of humanity in a world of nation-states? But my point here is not to argue that nationalism in all its forms is equally intolerant or destructive, but rather that all nationalist movements and nation-states, be they oriented towards the ethnic or civic ends of the spectrum, will always be obliged to juggle the conflicting elements of their political and cultural identities. The most multicultural, tolerant, and accommodating environments will unavoidably leave some ethnocultural segments of a population feeling both substantively and symbolically underrepresented in their country’s governing institutions. By the same token, the most integrative visions of cross-cultural and interracial synthesis may be employed in discriminatory and oppressive ways.

The widespread Latin American ideal of mestizaje – the mixing of indigenous and immigrant races and cultures in distinctive national syntheses – was long used as a justification for policies employed by white and mestizo elites to exploit, marginalize, and/or forcibly assimilate indigenous peoples.95 For that matter, the USSR’s political identity can be seen as a form of civic nationalism that severely curtailed all forms of autonomy on the part of individuals as well as of the very ethno-national units whose sovereignty was formally enshrined in the Soviet constitution – all in the name of the international brotherhood of mankind.96

It does stand to reason that civic-leaning forms of nationhood are more likely to be accommodating of ethno-cultural pluralism than are nation-states that officially enshrine the identity of one particular ethnic group. But this is not necessarily the case.97 Moreover, as we have seen, most if not all national polities represent complicated mixes of ethnic and civic elements. Finally, the history, ethno-demography, and geopolitical circumstances of some states and societies do not offer any realistic prospect of sudden conversion from an ethnic-leaning to a civic-oriented model of nationhood even if that were deemed desirable.

Perhaps, then, in addition to exploring the contrast between ethnic and civic forms of nationhood, we need to distinguish between rigid and
flexible approaches to the representation and institutionalization of national identity. Civic- and ethnic-leaning systems alike face a choice between being unbendingly doctrinaire or realistically adaptive in setting the standards for full membership in the nation as well as in dealing with those who fail to meet or refuse to accept those standards. Disaffected regional and/or ethno-cultural minorities would also do well to recognize that their legitimate grievances may be in conflict both with the right to self-determination of yet smaller minority groups within their territory and with the stability, viability, and/or security of the larger polity in which they live. Any single principle taken to its logical conclusion is likely to become a recipe for trouble. To claim that one’s national identity is culturally neutral is to aggravate the resentments of minorities who don’t fit in. To make either an inherited ethnicity or complete assimilation into an officially designated national culture absolute preconditions for citizenship in a nation-state is a recipe for institutionalized intolerance and political oppression. Conversely, proponents of radical multiculturalism need to recognize that some degree of shared identity that cuts across internal divisions is vital for the successful functioning of any polity based on the principle of popular sovereignty. It is difficult to envisage how a functioning democracy lacking any overarching element of national identity could succeed in binding its self-interested citizens and sub-cultures together in a community of shared interest.

In brief, every polity necessarily embodies some element of cultural particularism and every state that is based on a liberal-democratic conception of popular sovereignty faces a contradiction between its role as embodiment of a particular culture and its espousal of equal rights for all. To acknowledge this contradiction does not require a society or government to apologize endlessly for it. But it does carry with it the obligation to negotiate a balance between the conflicting principles that hold the nation-state together and lend it ethical and political legitimacy. The range of potentially helpful formulas varies according to local and historical circumstances. In some cases, what Michael Keating refers to as asymmetrical arrangements may work best, as in the United Kingdom’s recent devolution of self-governing power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland without providing a historically, culturally, demographically, and economically dominant England with home rule of its own. English identity is so closely bound up with the historical development of the monarchic and parliamentary institutions that now govern Britain as a whole that there is no perceived need for a separate arrangement for English self-determination. In other cases, such as those
of Belgium or the former Czechoslovakia, symmetrical partition into autonomous or independent units may provide the smoothest path to peaceful accommodation of ethno-national differences. In yet other contexts, such as that of some multi-ethnic immigrant societies, it may be possible and desirable to maintain the deterritorialization of ethnocultural identities while negotiating compromises over non-territorial issues such as bilingual education.

In general, contemporary Europe offers some of the most promising models for dealing with the tensions and contradictions of the nation-state, both in the form of such individual compromises and in the continent-wide progress towards integration that has made it easier to accommodate demands for regional autonomy without fear of breaking up larger economic units or precipitating all-or-nothing territorial conflicts. Yet here too there are limits, as the rejection of the proposed European Constitution by French and Dutch voters in mid-2005 reminded us. Putting the cart of the federated polity ahead of the national horse arouses the fears and resentments of people who wish to be governed by a state that they see as representing who they are, rather than by a pan-European entity that embodies the rarified ideals of a transnational, technocratic elite.

To suggest that the nation-state will long remain an important fixture of the world scene is not to say that national identities are static and unchanging or that national conflicts are doomed to repeat themselves interminably. Under the impact of global forces of economic integration and changing theories and practices of international law, traditional notions about the irreducible and indivisible qualities of political sovereignty may be giving way to more flexible and nuanced ways of negotiating the relationship between the symbolic representation of identity and the functional exercise of authority. To the extent that the imagined community of the nation can become imaginative in its approach to the contradictions that are inherent to it, it can play a productive role in lending substantive meaning to democratic ideals and in providing people with a sense of belonging and self-determination amidst the often alienating and disorienting pressures of globalization and rapid historical change.

END NOTES
3 For a stimulating collection of articles that actually seek to analyze various aspects of the nature–nurture relationship, see Daedalus, vol. 133, no. 4 (Fall 2004), issue entitled On Human Nature. For a critique of social scientists’ tendency to disregard the role of biological factors in the shaping of human behavior, see also Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Denial of Human Nature and Modern Intellectual Life (New York: Viking, 2002).
4 See, for example, Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), ch. 5.
5 On ethnic nationalism’s (dangerous) tendency to propagate literal understandings of metaphors about blood and family, see Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State, 2nd edn (New York: Routledge, 2003), ch. 5, esp. pp. 113 and 125.
6 See the discussion in Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 57–64.
7 The influential, late nineteenth-century German historian and publicist, Heinrich von Treitschke, argued passionately that Alsatians were objectively German even if their sympathies lay with France. Thomas D. Musgrave, National Self-Determination and National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 11. Similarly, some late nineteenth-century Croat nationalists claimed that Serbs were nothing more than misguided Croats — although they made this argument on the basis of the principle of historic state right and the idea of Croatia as a political nation. Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 86–89.
9 In practice, the picture was much more complex. One of the points of contention both between and within ethnic groups in Central and Eastern Europe was the relative merits of nationalist claims based on historic state rights and those rooted in the affirmation of popular sovereignty and ethnic identity. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), vol. 1, ch. 2; Óscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 292–294; Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923 (London: Routledge, 2001), 14–15. It is precisely because of such intricacies that I go on below to problematize the ethnic–civic distinction.


Friedrich Meinecke distinguished between cultural and political nations while also pointing out how intertwined these categories could be in practice. Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Robert B. Kimber (original German edn, 1907; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 10–18. Over nineteen centuries earlier, Cicero described Roman citizens hailing from once independent cities as having two fatherlands – their native town and the republic, affection for the former being contained


20 “We like to think of birth and choice as mutually exclusive principles of membership, but all institutions are infused with components of both.” Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 55. See also Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

21 On the relationship between kinship and moral community/covenant in the Jewish tradition, see also Anthony Smith, *Chosen Peoples* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 60–64.

22 I am extrapolating from the argument in Grosby, *Biblical Ideas of Nationality*, ch. 3.

23 This is a perfect illustration of Donald Horowitz’s point to the effect that: “The meaningfulness of ethnic identity derives from its birth connection – it came first – or from acceptance by an ethnic group as if born into it.” Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 57.


See also the discussion of Masaryk and Jan Hus in Chapter 2 of the present volume.


29 I develop these ideas more fully in Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism*.


32 On the historic use of ethnic core cultures as the basis for state-promoted national homogenization programs in Western Europe and North America, see Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*; Kaufmann, *Anglo-America*; Kuzio, “Myth of the Civic State,” esp. 31–32.


34 In the Baltic states, though, a new element of complexity was added during their period of incorporation in the USSR, in the form of ethnic Russian immigrants whose status and cultural rights remain a sticky issue in Latvia and Estonia. Moreover, the Roma (Gypsy) minority remains the object of widespread social and institutional prejudice in much of Central and Eastern Europe. See Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, 43–45.


See also Steven Grosby, “The Nation of the United States and the Vision of Ancient Israel,” in R. Michener, ed., *Nationality, Patriotism, and Nationalism* (St. Paul: Paragon, 1993). Eric P. Kaufmann argues that the United States, along with the classic West European models of civic nationhood, came into being as an ethnic nation and only gradually evolved into a truly civic nation. Kaufmann, *Anglo-America*, passim. On the dualistic tension between Anglo-Saxon identity and cosmopolitanism in early American history, see ibid., ch. 3. Of course, the perception of America as in essence a hybrid nation was articulated as early as the 1780s by Crèvecoeur, who wrote: “Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world.” J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, *Letters from An American Farmer and Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America* (1782; New York: Penguin, 1981), 70. On the other hand, Gordon Wood notes that as early as 1788, an ethnic minority was flexing its collective political muscle: in that year’s electoral campaign, Pennsylvanian Germans (one-third of the state’s population), demanded proportional representation on the state’s congressional delegation and electoral-college slate. Many of them subsequently cast their votes along ethnic rather than party lines. Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (1992; New York: Random House, 1993), 260.


46 Ibid.


53 The strongest case for classifying pre-1914 Germany unambiguously in the ethnic-nationalist category, in sharp contrast to the French civic-nationalist model, is made by Rogers Brubaker in his *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). Other scholars have taken issue with Brubaker’s approach, depicting nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany (apart from the Nazi period) as torn between ethnic and civic conceptions of identity. See Brian Vick, *Defining Germany: The 1848 Frankfurt Parliamentarians and National Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgerung und Ausschließung: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), esp. 421–433. (My thanks to Björn Hofmeister for the Gosewinkel reference.) Patrick Weil has reexamined the Brubaker paradigm from the perspective of French legal history, showing that French citizenship and naturalization law has historically incorporated elements of both *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* (i.e. territorial and lineage criteria), and that nineteenth-century German citizenship law was strongly influenced by the French example rather than standing in stark contrast to it. Patrick Weil, *Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution* (Paris: Grasset, 2002). (My thanks to Aron Rodrigue for this reference.)


Peter Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia,” in Suny and Martin, eds., A State of Nations, 115. See also Sanborn, “Family, Fraternity, and Nation-Building in Russia.”


Kaufmann, Anglo-America, ch. 9 and passim.


As a separate matter, a strong case can certainly be made for the claim that West European nationalisms not only included ethnic elements at their origins, but retain strong ethno-cultural undercurrents to this day. But this has little to do with these countries’ histories of religious intolerance, which form the focal point of Anthony Marx’s discussion.
Classroom discussion, graduate colloquium on “Nationalism in Modern History,” Georgetown University, Spring 2004.

Perez Zagorin points out that so-called heretics were also commonly dehumanized in medieval and early modern religious propaganda. Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 43–44. See also A. Marx, *Faith in Nation*, ch. 3.


Cecilia O’Leary has dated the common use of this term to the 1870s or 1880s, when it was directed against trade unions and striking industrial workers. Cecilia O’Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 61. See also Clifford Longley, *Chosen People: The Big Idea that Shapes England and America* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2002), 2.


For an intellectually engaging treatment of such dilemmas and an articulate critique of radical multiculturalism as a viable alternative to liberal nationalism, see D. Miller, *On Nationality*.

Will Kymlicka points out that: “What distinguishes ‘civic’ nations from ‘ethnic’ nations is not the absence of any cultural component to national identity, but rather the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or colour.” Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 24. On the culturally particularistic components of civic nationalism see also Shils, “Nation, Nationality” and Nielsen, “Cultural Nationalism.” On literal and metaphorical understandings of blood and family in the rhetoric of nationalism, see also Herzfeld, *Cultural Intimacy*, ch. 5.

Stephen Shulman points to poll results indicating that East Europeans are more inclined than West Europeans and North Americans to favor state support for the preservation of minority cultures as evidence that, in some respects, the former are more civic minded in their nationalism than the latter. Shulman, “Challenging Civic/Ethnic Dichotomies,” 576–577. I would suggest a rather different conclusion, to the effect that ethnic-leaning nationalism can be more tolerant of segmented cultural pluralism than civic-oriented nationalism; precisely because they wish to see their countries’ dominant ethno-cultural identities preserved intact, members of East European majority cultures prefer to subsidize the cultural autonomy of minorities rather than merge diverse traditions and identities into an amorphous supraethnic synthesis. To be sure, the line separating this form of “separate but equal” tolerance from prejudice can be very blurry.
The commission under the chairmanship of Bernard Stasi, charged with making recommendations regarding the long-festering headscarf issue, was itself composed of members of various cultural backgrounds, including both Jews and Muslims. Jane Kramer has reported that the commission’s proposal to prohibit conspicuous religious symbols or clothes from being worn by students in public schools was part of a broader package of recommendations aimed at facilitating the integration of minority communities into French society, but it was the only one passed into law. Kramer also notes that the commission presented a nuanced justification for its proposed ban on headscarves, arguing that its main concern was the protection of the individual rights of Muslim girls who were coming under strong – occasionally even violent – familial and social pressure to cover their hair in public whether they wanted to or not. It was the role of the public school, the commission argued, to provide them with a space in which they would be protected from such pressures. No such ban was proposed or introduced at the university level, where students are considered adults with the freedom to make their own personal choices about such matters. Jane Kramer, “Taking the Veil,” The New Yorker, vol. 80, no. 36 (22 November 2004), 58–71. However, when asked about the persistence of restrictive dress codes for state functionaries and members of the civil service, a member of the commission defended the policy by claiming that the appearance of public officials must be “neutral.” Of course, what is deemed neutral by a member of the cultural mainstream may be quite loaded for a member of a minority culture. (Present author’s personal conversation with former member of the Stasi commission, to be left unnamed.) For an enlightening ethical-philosophical exploration of the relationship between cultural minorities and the liberal state, see Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship.


For an analytical overview of twentieth-century American approaches to ethnic diversity ranging from Israel Zangwill’s strongly assimilationist conception of the “melting-pot,” to Horace Kallen’s cultural pluralism, to latter-day multiculturalism, see Philip Gleason, Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). Eric Kaufmann argues that the dynamics of contemporary American multiculturalism are actually pointing more towards a fulfillment of the melting-pot vision than the creation of a socio-culturally segmented society. Kaufmann, Anglo-America, ch. 12 and Conclusion. Michael Walzer argues that it is precisely the paradoxical relationship between America’s embrace of ethno-cultural pluralism and its quest for civic cohesion that lends the country its distinct, indeed exceptional, character. Michael Walzer, What it Means to Be an American (New York: Marsilio, 1992), 44–49.

Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 97, 114–115.


Cf. Lieven, America, 47 and ch. 2.


Samuel P. Huntington, “The Hispanic Challenge,” Foreign Policy, no. 141 (March/April 2004), 30–45. On the reconquista, see p. 42.

Ibid., 44. For the critique of Latino culture in its original context, see Lionel Sosa, The Americano Dream: How Latinos Can Achieve Success in Business and in Life (New York: Penguin, 1998), 7.

Huntington, “Hispanic Challenge,” 45; see also his Who Are We?, ch. 9; Lieven, America, 91.

Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, ch. 2.

Keating, Plurinational Democracy, 116.

On symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of federalism, see ibid., esp. ch. 4.

Ibid., 109.

In Robert Musil’s words: “The Austro-Hungarian state . . . did not consist of an Austrian part and a Hungarian part that, as one might expect, complemented each other, but of a whole and a part; that is, of a Hungarian
and an Austro-Hungarian sense of statehood, the latter to be found in Austria, which in a sense left the Austrian sense of statehood with no country of its own.” Robert Musil, *The Man Without Qualities*, trans. Sophie Wilkins (1930–43; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), vol. 1, p. 180.


See the discussion in Sanborn, “Family, Fraternity, and Nation-Building in Russia.”

Andrew Vincent also makes this point in *Nationalism and Particularity*, 106.

Stefan Auer similarly suggests that the distinction between liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism (as competing forces within each society) is more meaningful than that between ethnic and civic identities. Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, 5.

On the possibilities and limitations of multiculturalism, see the essays in Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism*. 
As Stefan Auer puts it, “ethnic diversity can generate situations which cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all competing demands. In many cases, the best one can hope for is the amelioration of conflicts, rather than their elimination ... Liberal nationalists have to accept that what is morally desirable is not always feasible in the political realm.” Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, 171.