JIHAD REVISITED

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ABSTRACT

This article offers an overview of the various formulations of *jihad* during the first six Islamic centuries (7th–13th CE), showing them to be embedded in particular socio-historical contexts. If the essential significance of *jihad* as righteous cause (i.e., action for the sake of a moral order) is shown to have been variously altered according to the needs and conditions of the Muslim community, significant possibilities arise for a contemporary understanding of *jihad* that is relevant to the needs and circumstances of the Muslim community today. Some features of the *jihad* tradition, although specific to a particular period and with little relevance today, continue to inform the current discussion on *jihad*. Discussion of the *jihad* tradition, then, should take care to distinguish the historically incidental features of the tradition from those with an enduring relevancy. By doing so, the *jihad* tradition will be able to contribute to discussions on the relation of religion to the public order and political organization, even those not limited to Islam.

KEY WORDS: *jihad*, politics, scripture, mysticism, war

Our goal here is to consider the diverse conceptions of *jihad* during the first six Islamic centuries—from the rise of Islam in the seventh century CE until the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth. The discussion on *jihad* since 9/11 suggests a good deal of confusion—among Muslim and non-Muslim alike—over the import of the term. It also suggests a desire to understand *jihad* more systematically alongside other notions of warfare, such as just war and holy war. Attention, however, needs to be given to the ever-changing use of the concept of *jihad* according to historical circumstances and the needs of Muslims. What parts of that vast, diverse and historically conditioned tradition remain relevant to their current circumstances and needs? And what parts of that tradition are acceptable to the non-Muslim? Answers to such questions are possible only by understanding the relation between *jihad* and the historical peculiarities at work in each particular formulation of the idea of *jihad*. Tradition, then, need not limit our choices, but can actually enlighten them.

The early and classical literature on *jihad* examined here can be broadly divided into two categories: one which understands *jihad* to serve
Islamic hegemony and another which understands it to serve Islamic society. The former—largely an imperial construct—is framed in political and territorial terms, the latter in religious and communal terms. Implicit in both categories is the Islamic claim to universal validity: Is it to be expressed politically and territorially (via control of the public arena) or religiously and communally (via dialogue with the public arena)? It will be useful to draw a distinction between motivation and cause. If jihad—struggle in the path of God (jihād fī sabīl allāh)—is taken to be struggle for Islamic hegemony (privileging Islam over other religions and the interests of Muslims over non-Muslims within the socio-political order), it will be impossible for non-Muslims to embrace it, and the use of force to establish such hegemony will result in the identification of Islam with violence. (This is not to take from Muslims the right to build up and nurture their religious community and to consider such work a struggle for God’s cause, but rather to recognize that jihad—a concept specific to a particular religious community—is meant to serve a public purpose.) If, alternatively, jihad is taken to be the struggle to form and defend a moral society, it will be possible for the non-Muslim to participate alongside the Muslim in jihad, if the goal is clearly defined as the good, even to the extent of using force to achieve such a goal.

In short, when it comes to jihad, it has to be asked: If the motivation (jihad as struggle) is defined in Islamic terms, must the cause also be? All religious communities face this tension between religious inspiration and religious action. If it is my religion or religious consciousness that inspires me and informs my conception of the world, must my inevitably religiously inspired action be directed to the progress of my religion and religious community alone? The troubled waters that need to be navigated in this global age lie between two shores: Respecting the right and reality of religious conviction and motivation and recognizing the problem of religious action in the pluralistic public square. Can our necessarily communally derived religious motivations inspire us to act publicly for goals which are not only for the benefit of our own religious community?

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The Qur’ān, in its call for struggle in the path of God apart from tribal goals, established the grounds for a conception of jihad as struggle for a godly order apart from communal concerns, even if the motivation was grounded in Islamic revelation.1 A range of terms are used by the Qur’ān

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1 Firestone 1999 suggests that jihad as a struggle for God’s cause was not taken up wholeheartedly by the first followers of the prophet Muhammad in the early seventh century, since it potentially involved fighting against their non-Muslim tribal kinsmen. His study underscores the increasingly volatile nature of the tribal society of the Arabian peninsula immediately prior to the appearance of Muhammad and ascendance of Islam, a
to describe conflict, which may represent a historical record of the tension between the first Muslims and other groups of the Arabian peninsula. Alternatively, they may have been used to heighten the drama narrated by scripture between the forces of good and evil and God’s inevitable intervention on the side of good, a rhetorical tactic to persuade the first Muslims of God’s support and care for them as His chosen community. Such military language is employed in this sense in all scriptural traditions and, although primarily serving a rhetorical purpose, can also be taken literally (Juergensmeyer 2000, 160f.). If it is Islamic scripture that plays the greatest role in the formation of an Islamic consciousness, then an exact understanding of the qur’anic sense of jihad is vital. Islamic extremists have been successful in using scripture, specifically its military language, for a militant agenda. Have they, however, been faithful to the original intent of the Qur’ân as scripture?

What is clear is that the qur’anic declaration of jihad cannot be reduced to armed struggle. Virtually all instances of the root j-h-d speak primarily to the question of true intention and devotion (including, incidentally, those forms referring to oath-taking, for example, Q 5:53, jahda aymânihim). The term in its various forms signifies a divine test (Q 47:31) to distinguish the lukewarm believers (Q 4:95; 9:81, 86) from those who desire God’s satisfaction (Q 60:1) and strive body and soul in His way (Q 9:41, 88). Jihad, regardless of sphere of action, is a means of separating true belief from infidelity (Q 25:52) and of ranking the intention and merit of those who believe (Q 8:72–75). It is the mark of those who take up the mission of God without fear of blame or doubt (Q 5:54)

 volatility marked by a high level of intertribal violence (“greater internecine feuding and wars, which resulted in a heightened insecurity through the peninsula,” Firestone 1999, 25). It was apparently Muhammad’s message that worked to wean tribal peoples away from their traditional motives for conflict (a combination of material interests and tribal glory and prestige; see Donner 1991, 34–36) and direct their loyalty instead to the goals of his supra-tribal movement. As such, his message should be seen as an attempt to broker peace or at least reduce the possibilities of war-making among the feuding factions of his day. This is confirmed by his formulation of the Constitution of Medina, a socio-political framework which aimed to bring diverse communities together under a single banner of law and order. One can conclude, then, that Muhammad and his followers worked to reduce violence by orienting people to a cause greater than their own individual or group interests.

2 Landau-Tasseron n.d. demonstrates that the first Muslims did, when necessary, advocate fighting (qitâl)—understood as a divine command, the fulfillment of which earned merit in God’s eyes—as a way to protect or assert their Islamic identity against other groups in the Arabian peninsula that were perceived to be a threat to the existence of the nascent Muslim community.

3 It is worth remembering that the Qur’ân, as all scripture, aims primarily to invite its audience into an awareness of God’s supporting presence amidst the believing community. The depiction of a cosmic struggle between good and evil thus encourages the choice for God’s cause, a choice signaled by the Qur’ân’s frequent use of correlated terminology: good and evil, belief and unbelief, light and dark, heaven and hell, reward and punishment.
and 49:15). Primarily at stake in the Qur'anic significance of *jihad* is not warfare per se but the degree of devotion to God's cause over concern for worldly affairs (Q 9:19, 24; 60:2). As such, *jihad* merits divine favor and forgiveness (Q 4:95–96; 9:20; 29:6–7), denoting in effect the fundamental element in one's orientation to God (Q 22:78; 29:69; 61:11), which is, however, known only to God in the final analysis (Q 9:16). This orientation is summed up in Q 5:35, which says: “O believers, revere God, seek the way to Him and strive (*jahidū*) in His way that you might prosper.” *Jihad* as true devotion—which witnesses against disbelief and hypocrisy (Q 9:73) after the example of the proto-monotheist Abraham (Q 60:4)—leaves no room for slackers (Q 9:44) nor lack of resolve (Q 3:142; 16:110). In short, *jihad* in the Qur'an implies a total devotion to God through a consecration, dedication and even oblation of oneself to His way.

Within the context of the Qur'an, *jihad*—including but not limited to armed struggle—signifies that one's action is undertaken with the proper intention and is thus worthy of divine reward as a result of the action's conformity to divine command. *Jihad* is thus a means of determining one's merit or standing in holiness. Ultimately, this means a willingness to redeem one's life before God: One of the many Qur'anic instances of this idea is Q 2:207, where the servant of God is described as literally purchasing his life (that is, “himself” [*nafsahu*]) out of a desire for God's satisfaction, an idea which can be conceptually linked to the Qur'anic idea of *jihad* in verses where *jihad* implies readiness to sacrifice both person and wealth for God's cause (for example, Q 9:20, *wa-lladhīna āmanū wa-hājarū wa-jāhadū fī sabīlī llāhi bi-amwālihim wa-anfusihim*). It is in this redemptive sense that the Qur'an can say that *jihad* is indeed for the sake of one's own self (Q 29:6, that is, for one's own ultimate end).

In short, *jihad* in the Qur'an signals not military activity per se but a righteous or right cause before God. What such a righteous or right cause before God exactly meant was envisioned in various ways by Muslims in the centuries subsequent to Islamic revelation according to social commitments and historical circumstances.

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The Qur'anic description of *jihad* was developed early on by the ascetically and mystically minded who saw *jihad*—against the backdrop of an increasingly affluent and comfortable Islamic order—as a struggle not to preserve the Islamic message against non-Muslim hostility but to direct one's own soul away from worldly attachments.4 *Jihad* was thus conceived as a spiritual exercise, including the ascetical discipline of the body, and references to it abound in early and classical Islamic

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4 Certain Qur'anic passages do echo this call to renunciation of the world's allurements for the sake of devotion to God (for example, Q 18:28).
literature. This *jihad* aimed to purify one’s soul of the barrier of self-concern or veil of hypocrisy that might stand in the way of total orientation to God and, ultimately, of a contemplative awareness of His presence in all things. It was thus one’s own soul that was to be slain, since detachment from all save God came about only through the mortification or even annihilation of one’s own evil-inclined soul (Q 12:53). Waging *jihad* on oneself was therefore a temporary but necessary stage to mystical union (Renard 1988).

*Jihad* as a struggle to purify one’s interior state did not mean that ascetics and mystics dispensed with military conceptions of *jihad* (Geoffroy 1997). The inner struggle to subdue the baser elements of one’s own soul were a reflection of the struggle to subdue the baser elements of human society, such as anarchy and injustice. Both soul and society were to be purified of these elements, by force if necessary, for the sake of a life in harmony with God’s will for humanity. In principle, the inner (or greater) *jihad* was a necessary precondition for the outer (or lesser) *jihad*, in order that one might be certain of a righteous or right cause and not a base or disordered motivation in undertaking warfare. The famous report, in which Muhammad is reported to have declared upon return from a military expedition, “We have returned from the lesser *jihad* to embark on the greater *jihad,*” does not undermine the duty to conduct both, a point which the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna’ (d. 1949), was careful to note in his defense of military *jihad* (see al-Banna’ 1978, 155).

There is, however, a very important distinction to be drawn between the ascetic mystic and the ascetic warrior, a well-known figure of early Islamic history who battled the enemy on the frontiers of the Islamic world. The distinction has importance for the light it can shed on religion as a source of both violence and non-violence. Both ascetic mystic and ascetic warrior, as all Muslims, considered Muhammad worthy of

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5 For example, al-Qushayrī (d. 1073) 2001, 54–57, where *jihad* forms one of the basic principles of the mystical path. His work continues to be widely read in the Islamic world today, for example, at al-Azhar in Cairo where it is part of the basic curriculum of religious studies.

6 To uphold a concept of *jihad* which ends in a certain union with God, al-Qushayrī 2001, 54, quotes Q 29:69, “And those who strive in Us (*jāhādā fīnā*) We surely guide in Our paths. Indeed God is with those who do well (*al-muḥšīnīn).*”

7 An anonymous twelfth-century Persian treatise, a compendium of ethical and political advice to the ruling elite (*Bahār al-fawā’id*, see Anonymous 1991, 13–35), underscores this by including in its treatment of *jihad* material on both the inner struggle against one’s soul and the outer one against the non-Muslim enemy (material which is followed by statements on the rewards of martyrdom). This connection between the inner and outer *jihad* does echo the Qur’ānic sense of *jihad* as right cause. Only by first properly ordering one’s soul through acts of devotion could one be sure of a proper intention in waging war for God’s cause.
imitation, since it is his life that serves as touchstone of authentic Islamic religious experience. Control of the soul’s worldly inclinations was a necessary condition for identification with the prophet, but the way in which the prophetic example was adopted differed significantly. The ascetic mystic sought to imitate his closeness to God (Buehler 1998, 17), but the ascetic warrior sought to imitate the military exploits of the prophet and his first companions. *Jihad*—an end in itself for the ascetic warrior seeking to confirm the purity of his soul by his willingness to die—was for the ascetic mystic not an end but a process by which one sought to free oneself of one’s worldly state. Thus, the mystic might view military *jihad* as a worldly activity pursued by those lacking knowledge of the only true reality, knowledge of which was acquired by union with God. War—offensive or defensive—was a sign of spiritual immaturity (hence the lesser *jihad*), indicating failure in the goal of the greater *jihad*, namely removal of the veil of this world’s illusions (Kemper 2002). Despite the common goal of identification with prophetic experience (revelation), the profound difference in the formal appropriation of that revelation resulted in very different conclusions about violence as religious expression. For the mystic, *jihad* was undertaken upon oneself as a prelude to the manifestation of the divine light within; for the warrior, it was undertaken upon another as a means to earn the martyr’s crown.

If the desire for religious sincerity led the ascetic mystic to understand *jihad* as a symbolic martyrdom, the logic of self-sacrifice as proof of personal piety led the ascetic warrior to understand it as an actual martyrdom. During the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries especially, a sub-culture emerged along the frontiers of the Islamic world with the ostensible purpose of military struggle with the non-Islamic world but with no clear political or territorial aim (Bonner 1992, 26–28). The complexity of the frontier culture notwithstanding (especially the significance of the ascetic warrior to pre-Ottoman political thought), it is enough to say here that fighting the enemy—the Byzantine one above all—offered the ascetic warriors a stage on which to demonstrate their singular devotion to God’s cause. Volunteer warriors operating outside the control of the Islamic state and its claim to exclusive control of war-making, these Muslims sought to associate their lives with the military reports of pristine Islam, thereby earning for themselves considerable prestige as self-styled representatives of Islamic revelation. The struggle with the Byzantine adversary was a ritual reproducing the battles and expeditions of the first Muslims against the worldly powers of their day. *Jihad* was not a means of ordering one’s internal state, but a dramatization of it. Death as a proof of piety was the fruit of an extremely idiomatic appropriation of revelation and its reproduction as military exploit, preserved in the writings of such frontier ideologues as Ibn al-Mubārak (d. 797).
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and al-Fazārī (d. 802). It was through such an ideology that they hoped to be a witness—to fellow Muslim and non-Muslim enemy alike—of the power of a life lived for God alone, in that sense comparing what they did to the life of the Christian monk (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 15).

The conception of jihad as a ritualized martyrdom was constructed through qur’ānic citation (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 2) and the reports of the first Muslims (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 62). Pious action, according to the logic of the frontier, went hand-in-hand with martyrdom, since it was only by a readiness to offer one’s life for the Islamic cause that one could be certain of the purity of one’s Islamic intention and thereby the redemptive worth of one’s acts (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 7 and no. 8). The frontier literature frequently raised the question of one’s motive for undertaking armed struggle against the enemy: Was it for worldly gain? Political power? Fame? Or out of a desire for “the face of God” (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 9 and no. 10). Jihad as armed struggle against the powers of the world which had not submitted to the word of God could be acceptable to God only if carried out with the proper intention, as in the performance of any religious duty, such as prayer or almsgiving. Remission of sins and the redemptive merit accruing to the act of martyrdom (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 6 and no. 7) were considered to be contingent upon the intention of the actor (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 124). The manner in which one was killed was thought to be irrelevant so long as one’s intention stood in proper orientation to God’s cause (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 67 and no. 129). As the prophet Muhammad is reported to have said (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 68), “God the blessed and exalted grants rewards according to one’s intention (niyya).”

The ascetic warrior offers an important example for our typology of jihad: the belief that true intention—the criterion of the worth of the martyr’s death—was determinable by imitation of the model of the first Muslims who struggled, literally battled, for the Islamic cause against the worldly powers of their day. This identification of God’s cause in specifically Islamic terms—action as ritually valid (and thus acceptable to God) only in opposition to the non-Muslim world—raises many difficult questions today when frontiers no longer meet locally but globally and technologically regardless of national boundaries or natural barriers. Could the activity of the ascetic warrior of Islam have been imagined in such global terms, even if his inspiration was Islamic? In other words, could the specifically Islamic injunction to struggle for God’s cause have led the ascetic warrior to offer his life in a struggle against non-godly trials facing the human race today, identifiable not with the non-Muslim world but with injustice and ignorance, poverty and persecution? Charity, for example, is surely a display of piety, a witness to one’s faith requiring a certain degree of self-sacrifice. The Qur’ān is replete with exhortation to charity, seeking the good, mercy, kindliness, etc. Why did these warriors
confine their Islamic self-association to the armed struggles of the first Muslims?

It should be mentioned that the frontier literature bears striking similarities to the material on *jihad* in the canonical Ḥadīth collections, which were collected and selected mainly during the course of the third Islamic century (the ninth CE). *Jihad* there, also construed as a military activity, is connected, as in the frontier literature, to other religious duties or merit-earning works (*ʿamal ṣāliḥ*), such as prayer and honoring one’s parents (al-Bukhārī 1998, no. 2782), pilgrimage (al-Bukhārī 1998, no. 2875) and fasting (Ibn Mājah 1998, no. 2766). Intention, likewise, is essential (for example, al-Bukhārī 1998, no. 2783 and al-Nasaʾī 2001, no. 4318), since fighting must be conducted for securing the victory of God’s word alone—the divinely legislated order (al-Nasaʾī 2001, no. 4329). Finally, expiation of sins is the reward of those who fight steadfastly and piously in God’s way (Ibn Mājah 1998, no. 2767 and al-Nasaʾī 2001, no. 4322), the greatest of blessings being reserved for the true martyr (al-Bukhārī 1998, no. 2803).

The close similarity to the frontier literature notwithstanding, it should be remembered that *jihad* material in the Ḥadīth is situated within larger corpuses of literature devoted to the formation of a community’s religious identity, whereas *jihad* forms the focus of the frontier literature. Ḥadīth corpuses, then, are designed to be studied for the sake of shaping a religious identity by which one’s life in all its details could be viewed as an acceptable offering (*qurba*) to God. The ritual regulation of life is not, however, necessarily connected with nor does it inevitably lead to the impulse to religious martyrdom, which requires the addition of an eschatological climate. The Ḥadīth corpuses do conceive of life as a ritual phenomenon and thus religiously defined and controlled, but the climate in which one studies the Ḥadīth is enormously significant—on the frontier in the face of the ungodly enemy or in the urban milieu of the local scholarly institution at the feet of one’s religious guide.9 By

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8 Other chapters include ablution, ritual purity, ritual prayer, funeral rites, pilgrimage, fasting and animal sacrifice as well as what would be considered non-ritual matters such as almsgiving, contracts and commerce, slave-holding, gift-giving, legal testimony, marriage and divorce, religious forms of taxation, dietary rules, acceptable attire and so on.

9 The connection between literature and action is difficult to pinpoint, if there is one at all. It should be remembered that Ḥadīth literature is viewed by Muslims as an extension of Qurʾānic scripture, both serving primarily liturgical and thus identity-shaping purposes (see Heck 2002b). It is thus only with great care that these scriptural sources should be mined for a coherent and operative theory of *jihad*. Simply stated, the military language of Qurʾān and Ḥadīth cannot be taken as incitement to armed struggle any more than apocalyptic literature (for the view that Islamic ethics is not shaped by scriptural language, but by the Muslim community’s sense of God’s purposeful design, see Brown 1999; for a study of the symbolic function of apocalyptic literature, see D. Cook 1995). Scriptural language, including its military examples, is meant to orient the faith identity of the community, its
situating war within a religious framework, the Hadith, no less than the Qurʾān, aims to depict war as something known and controlled—within the arena of divine administration—as all life’s activities. This is not the case with the frontier literature, which situates not war within a religious framework, but religion within a militaristic and eschatological framework.

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If the religious consciousness embodied in scripture and divergently appropriated by mystics and warriors can be called a primary experience of religion, then the application of reason to religious consciousness—whether by theologians and philosophers or state officials—can be called a secondary experience of religion. Moreover, while the theologian seeks a rational and therefore universally communicable understanding of religious consciousness, the philosopher and state official seek to understand it insofar as it conforms to the dictates of the intellect in the case of the former and those of the state in the case of the latter. Reality is not so schematic, of course; religion, intellect and state are never fully separable from one another. All the same, one can speak of points of view on jihad, first that of the philosophers, then that of the state.

Heavily influenced by Greek thought in Arabic translation, al-Fārābī (d. 950) refers to military activity not as jihad but as war (ḥarb), speaking of it in terms of justice and injustice (al-Fārābī 1961, 146): Just wars are those undertaken to attain the good of a nation, to seek a redress of grievances against other nations or to punish them for crimes committed against the nation, but also include those undertaken to civilize other nations and compel them to accept a better life. Unjust wars are those pursued purely for conquest and the enslavement of other nations. In another passage (al-Fārābī 1961, 153), he says that the warrior (here using Islamic terminology, mujāhid) acts in a rational manner, weighing the risk to his own life against the greater good to be served, which is not a display of piety but the goal of a just war, even if that means sacrificing his life for it. He judges that the risk to his own life is outweighed by the benefit to be gained, whether or not he lives to enjoy that benefit. Such a warrior is to be upheld as a moral exemplar for his self-sacrifice for the good of the nation and his bold encounter with death,
which should be measured as a blessing and source of happiness, not a loss to be mourned.10

A fuller attempt to articulate *jihad* in philosophical terms is presented by al-‘Āmīrī (d. 992) in his treatise on the virtues of Islam (al-‘Ilām bi-manāqib al-islām). While he positions his words as a dialogue with other religions, the terms of debate are Islamic in form. He does, however, equate them with certain philosophical categories. For example, he declares (al-‘Āmīrī 1967, 124) that all known religions can be understood in terms of religious duty (*‘ibāda*), divisible into such universal categories as the spiritual (prayer), the physical (fasting), the financial (almsgiving) and the political (*jihad*). His goal is to prove that Islam excels all other religions in these categories of religious duty, but in so doing he conceives of *jihad* in a way that lends itself to both the religious and the philosophical.11 The language used to name this particular type of religious duty (*‘ibāda mulkiyya*) suggests the dual intellectual dispensation upon which he is drawing: both Islamic religious thought and Greco-Hellenistic political thought. *Jihad* is both a religious duty (*‘ibāda*) and a feature of political administration (*mulk*; he later says [al-‘Āmīrī 1967, 156] that it is a duty entrusted to the governors of state for the defense of religion and preservation of the social order). As such, al-‘Āmīrī claims that it is common to all nations (which he understands as other religions: Jews, Christians, Manicheans, etc.) for the preservation of society.12

10 Does such explanation of war represent merely Greek thought in Arabic or is it an attempt to render Islamic ideas of military *jihad* in philosophically recognizable terms? The idea of a civilizing mission and the use of force to achieve it need not be taken as specifically Islamic (Kraemer 1987), as a quick glance at European history demonstrates. Similarly, while the blessed end of a warrior killed in a just cause does echo a report cited by Ibn al-Mubārak (Ibn al-Mubārak 1988, no. 10), that the slain warrior enjoys a resurrection in accordance with the state of his soul (that is, intention) at time of death, the warrior of the philosophers is counted as blessed not for a devotion which he has purified through ritual association with an apostolic or prophetic past but for a devotion which is pure for the goal it seeks, namely the good of the nation and its socio-moral order. What is clear, however, is that the Muslim discussion of war was never monolithic (see Butterworth 1990, 79–80), making al-Fārābī more than an advocate of Greek notions of war in distinction from Islamic ones, but rather a pioneer in the attempt to apply the secondary reflection of philosophical thinking to the religious experience of Islam. However closely his point of view parallels that of Greek philosophy, he does list the ability to wage *jihad* as a requirement of the leader of the ideal nation (al-Fārābī 1961, 137). It is in that sense that al-Fārābī’s work represents an intermediate stage between mere translation of Greek philosophy into Arabic and philosophical reflection on the Islamic tradition itself.

11 In other words, by expounding such particularly Islamic ideas as *jihad* in philosophical terms, he is attempting to demonstrate their universal character and validity. His work—a defense against skepticism—aims to meet philosophy on its own terms and claim for Islam a universal rationality.

12 As he says (al-‘Āmīrī 1967, 147), “Were people of religion (*ahl al-dīn*) not to undertake the defense of their religion by force [lit. by the sword] in order to put down their
This articulation of *jihad* in philosophical or universally comprehensible terms is further pursued in the chapter on political administration. He begins by defining three forms of armed conflict: *jihad*, civil strife (*fitna*) and brigandage (*taṣaʿluk*). Although all three terms could be explained by reference to the Islamic legal tradition (Abou El Fadl 2002b), al-ʿĀmirī chooses to define them according to the tripartite division of the soul known from philosophy. As the soul has as its proper end the dominion of its rational faculty over its baser elements, so armed conflict—in order to be called praiseworthy—must be directed towards its proper end (al-ʿĀmirī 1967, 156), “*Jihad* is that which administrators and governors undertake for the defense of the religion and preservation of the social order. Civil strife occurs among the different nations as a result of tumult and fighting due to national or ethnic chauvinism. Brigandage is that which aims to plunder possessions and pillage property. The first [*jihad*] results from the rational faculty and is praiseworthy in the eyes of the intelligent, while the other two [*civil strife and brigandage*] result from the irascible and appetitive faculties, respectively, both of them being blameworthy in the eyes of the intelligent.” Thus, the criterion for deciding the worth of action, including armed struggle, is its proper end, which amounts to the subordination of the baser elements of the soul and society to its noblest one—a philosophical image with wide currency in classical Islamic thought.

It is this, al-ʿĀmirī concludes, that led the prophet Muhammad to pursue armed conflict against the enemies of religion (al-ʿĀmirī 1967, 156–7), not for the sake of his own pleasure or enjoyment, but by enduring great personal hardship out of complete sincerity to God, obedience to whom people had thrown off for the sake of their own worldly interests and depraved pleasures. It was therefore necessary to use force to bring them back to obedience to their creator, as the physician who looks to the final goal of the patient’s well-being, even if it requires the prescription of bitter medicine. Again, al-ʿĀmirī’s argument assumes that all peoples have a common goal, with the addition that Islam offers the best means for reaching this goal. Despite the prejudice for Islam, he offers an Islamic framework in which action, including armed struggle, is to be judged not for its contribution to specifically Islamic goals but for its conformity to the proper end of the human condition. It would not be impossible in
such a framework for Muslim and non-Muslim to struggle together for a single cause, namely the defense of religion as a moral guide and a necessary element for the preservation of the social order.\footnote{13}

Alongside philosophical reflection on jihad, another strand of thought emerged out of the practical interest of the Islamic state in establishing its political and administrative authority over its subjects and effectively combating its enemies. It is here that an imperial coloring was given to jihad, a coloring that continues to tinge both religious and scholarly conceptions of jihad today. Jihad, then, became a convenient tool for dividing the world neatly into two camps: those under the control of the Islamic state and those not. It has been argued by Khalid Blankinship 1994 that the first Islamic dynasty, the Umayyads (660–750 CE), inaugurated the idea of jihad as conquest in the service of expanding the abode of Islam. As a conglomerate of tribal groups organized militarily under a gradually centralizing state, the Umayyads can be described as a state in perpetual warfare, against both internal opposition and external enemy. The scriptural demand to submit to the rule of God, eventually understood as a commitment to the law of God, was reconstructed into a world geography divided into two mutually hostile camps: the abode of Islam (dār al-islām) under the jurisdiction of the Islamic empire and the abode of war (dār al-ḥarb) beyond its reach. The conception of the Islamic world in territorial and political terms—rather than communal—was, then, an imperial construct.\footnote{14} There is no Qur'ānic basis for such a division.

\footnote{13}{This philosophical conception of jihad did not disappear, but was integrated with other material on jihad in later works, such as the Fürstenspiegel work attributed to al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Naṣīḥat al-mulāk, in which the author claims at the beginning of the section entitled “governance of enemies and criminals” (al-Mawardi 1983, 251ff.) that God has made life sacred, permitting the spilling of blood only for the sake of a greater good. As examples, he mentions the prevention of corruption and terror in the polity, the promotion of the common good or a benefit to be realized for the entire community of believers, and, finally, the support of the religion. He illustrates the rationale behind this use of force for a greater good with the example of a kindly doctor who prescribes the amputation of a limb to ensure the survival of the rest of the patient’s body and that of a skilled gardener who out of vigilance for the prosperity of his garden roots out noxious weeds. From there, the author proceeds (al-Mawardi 1983, 252ff.) in more specifically Islamic terms, listing those against whom God has made the use of force licit: polytheists, rebels and highway robbers or brigands. Jihad would be the term to describe the force to be used against the first group (that is, non-Muslim polities).

\footnote{14}{This reformulation of scripture to serve imperial goals also meant that no validity could be awarded to non-Islamic legal systems. Non-Muslim minorities did have a legally enshrined place in Islam, but the law of non-Muslim states beyond the abode of Islam was not recognized. Thus, at least in theory if not in practice, only temporary treaties with non-Muslim powers were tolerated (when the enemy had the edge in battle, making it morally binding to preserve Muslim life through the conclusion of a truce), since ultimately all creation was destined to submit to God’s word as embodied in Islamic law (li-takun kalimat allāh hiya al-‘ulyā, “that God’s word might be highest,” a common idea in classical Islamic...
\textit{Jihad} therefore became subservient to a raison d’état, the maintenance and expansion of Umayyad control and authority.\textsuperscript{15} Umayyad soldiers were not volunteers; hence their motive to fight was mainly financial, not religious. At the same time, the Umayyad state was legitimized by an Islamic dispensation that formed the cosmological matrix in which the rulers made sense of their conquests. This combination of state goals and religious language in Umayyad terms is evident in a famous letter composed by a state official, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd (d. 750), in the name of the last Umayyad ruler, Marwān b. Muḥammad (r. 744–750), and addressed to his son and designated successor whom he had commissioned to fight “the enemies of God.” A long section is devoted to armed struggle against insurgents within the realm (‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, 1988 234f.).

Using the term \textit{jihad} to describe the struggle, the opening words are highly religious, emphasizing piety (\textit{taqwā}) and obedience to God’s way (\textit{sunna}), while cautioning against transgressing His sanctions (\textit{ḥudūd}) and laws (\textit{sharā‘i}). Again, the Umayyad claim to rule depended not merely upon the ability to expand and provide spoils for the troops, but on God’s providential choice of the Umayyad caliphs as agents of His will on earth (see al-Qāḍī 1994, 248f.). While Islamic symbols may have provided much of the language of the letter, its main concern is the cohesion of the militarily organized Umayyad state and the discipline of a salaried army through a defined hierarchy of order and command (for example, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd 1988, 251). To mobilize the troops, officers were to be instructed to encourage them with the promise of martyrdom (‘Abd al-Ḥamīd 1988, 264), “Let there be in your camp [designated] people who proclaim ‘God is great!’ the day and night before the battle and a group designated to urge [the troops] to fight, encouraging them against the enemy by describing the ranks of martyrs [in paradise] and their reward and reminding them of the garden [that is, paradise], its places and the blessedness of its peoples and inhabitants.”

This appeal to the religious sentiments of the troops was not meant to promote their religious consciousness for its own sake, but rather to set them in motion against the enemy for the defense of the state. The

\textsuperscript{15} This is not the place to discuss the details of the rise and fall of the Umayyad dynasty. Concerted efforts were made to construct a dynastic state apart from religious and tribal interests (epitomized by the Umayyad governor of Iraq, al-Ḥajjāj [d. 714]). Evidence for a state-building program exists in the Umayyad architectural program (for example, the Dome of the Rock), the introduction of Arabic (including scriptural citation; see al-Qāḍī 1993) as the language of official correspondence and administrative record-keeping, and the reformulation of Islamic forms of taxation (\textit{zakāt} and \textit{ṣadaqa}) as state imposts.

\textsuperscript{16} Literature on \textit{jihad} but actually an empire-driven revision of the original purport of Q 9:40). Recognition of non-Islamic legal systems might have been possible if the abode of Islam had been defined communally along religious lines rather than territorially and politically along imperial lines.
Umayyad logic of state had profound and lasting effects on the Islamic conception of *jihad*: *Jihad* as the tool of a state oriented towards expansion became itself conceived as a tool in the service of territorial expansion, rather than a religious struggle at the level of devotion to God's cause. For the sake of its state-building goals, Umayyad ideology defined the dynasty's opponents as enemies of God, whether non-Muslim powers at the frontier or the rebellious subjects within Islamic territory. Thus, political opposition, construed as disobedience to God, was to be purged. The abode of Islam, and indeed the entire world, was to be cleansed of any elements which refused to submit to Umayyad sovereignty. This Umayyad employment of *jihad* in the service of their particular logic of state transplanted *jihad* from the realm of religious experience to that of conquest of opponents who did not submit to the Islamic rule of the Umayyad state. This is a use of *jihad* not simply for the sake of Islamic hegemony, but the hegemony of a particular group, and hardly can be said to represent a struggle for the cause of Islam, let alone the cause of God, and yet it is this Umayyad construction of a religious concept in territorial and political terms that poses a stumbling block to a contemporary definition of *jihad*.

There is no doubt of Umayyad-Abbasid continuity in terms of the administrative goals of empire. The so-called classical form of the doctrine of *jihad* was hammered out during the early Abbasid period by jurists in the service of the state. Was, then, the classical doctrine shaped by imperial interests? And if so, can it be said to have any relevance to discussions of *jihad* today? The messianic currents surrounding the revolution that transferred Islamic rule to the Abbasid dynasty (750–1258 CE) were eventually suppressed. Once in power, the Abbasids took a more pragmatic approach to rule, only developing and not altering the Umayyad construction of a world divided into obedient and disobedient camps (with the infidel latter to be subdued by the faithful former) and using law for that purpose (co-opting legal institutions and patronizing the production of legal literature). This is not to say that state-sponsored jurists were free of the constraints of jurisprudence and scripture, but it simply cannot be gainsaid that the socio-political framework in which the legal theory of *jihad* was formulated was a decidedly imperial one; this was the case at least in matters concerning public law (including the laws of *jihad*, apostasy, rebellion, brigandage, the treatment of non-Muslim subjects of the empire, etc.—a corpus of literature classifiable as state literature; cf. Heck 2002a, chapter 4), if not also in those related to ritual or communal law. At the very least, scholars today working on the classical doctrine of *jihad* should be cautious in considering it without reference to its context.

One noticeable development in early Abbasid times was the fact that territorial expansion largely ceased. It was this failure to expand in
Umayyad fashion that may have partially contributed to the rise of the frontier sub-culture of ascetic warriors. This pursuit of jihad apart from state control and management posed a threat to the Abbasid goals of centralizing their administrative and political authority. This is not to give undue weight to the role played by ascetic warriors in the larger Abbasid imperial framework, but to show how different conceptions of jihad emerged over competition among state and non-state actors for control of the conduct of jihad. As part of a concerted policy to reign in these ascetic warriors, the Abbasid state sought to tighten its administrative control over the frontier areas (Bonner 1996, 69–106): They replaced the volunteer warriors with troops of their own who were to carry out raids into Byzantine territory according to a bureaucratic timetable (see Qudama b. Ja’far 1986, 147) and styled themselves as warrior-caliphs (ghāzi, for example, Hārūn al-Rashīd [r. 786–808] and al-Ma’mūn [r. 813–833]) in the hope of diverting to the state the religious prestige enjoyed by the pious-minded scholars of the frontier whose teachings associated authority exclusively with the prophetic tradition and model at the expense of the authority of the state (Ibn al-Mubārak, for example, had little interest in obedience to the caliph and the issue of state permission to conduct jihad; Bonner 1992, 25). It is this concern for imperial prestige that is actually at play in the juridical discourse, especially its insistence that jihad be conducted under a duly acknowledged authority.

The legal literature on jihad is an attempt to assert state control over military activity against those conducting it in the name of prophetic authority. Certainly, other concerns were brought to bear on the production of this Abbasid-sponsored literature. It was not simply a manipulation of the tradition to the detriment of the frontier warriors. Jurists certainly worked within the parameters of a developing system of jurisprudence, Legal discussion of jihad was certainly pursued not only out of a logic of state. The great jurist, al-Shāfī’ī (d. 820), mentions the merit of waging jihad only to elaborate a point of law. His treatment of the topic falls under the heading of the poll tax on non-Muslims living under Islamic rule, which may indicate an interest in associating the topic of war with a recognizable legal category. In any case, al-Shāfī’ī’s main interest is legal harmony. Who is legally bound to wage jihad and who is legally excused? While he does affirm that jihad is the vehicle by which Islam is to prevail over other religions (al-Shāfī’ī 1973, vol. 4, 171), martyrdom is not his focus. His concern is understanding scriptural reference to battle, with the conclusion that it is fulfilled if the number of Muslims waging jihad is sufficient (al-kīfīya min al-mujāhidīn) to achieve its goals. Thus, when it comes to the discussion of facing the enemy, the focus is neither ritual reenactment of salvation history nor the mobilization of troops, but a technical question of law in pursuit of the Qur’ānic command not to turn one’s back in flight from the enemy: Under what conditions is this revealed injunction legally binding? When the enemy is double the number of Muslims, more than double or less than double? The legal analysis starts with citation of the verse in question (Q 8:15), but is preceded by mention of other verses (Q 8:65 and 8:66) which al-Shāfī’ī uses to interpret his discussion of the legal import of Q 8:15. In other words, he is
but it would be naïve to consider the Hanafi architects of the classical doctrine of *jihad* to be independent of state concerns. This literature never describes *jihad* in reference to martyrdom or with the language of ascetical piety, since doing so would play into the logic of the non-state actors. This fact alone should cause us to take notice, since it suggests that the Abbasid state, by seeking to wrest the prestige of *jihad* from the ascetic warriors, undertook to limit the scope of *jihad*. In contrast, non-state actors’ emphasis on *jihad* as a means to win redemption through martyrdom led to the escalation of violence and its identification with Muslim piety.

It is significant that the jurists did work to limit the violence of war, even if doing so in the interest of state (for a modern example of Islamic law as a check on military violence, see Kelsay 1993, 43–45). *Jihad* in its classical form can thus be understood as an instrument of foreign policy embedded in the conception of a religious struggle to carry out the divine mission on earth entrusted by God to Islam. As such, *jihad* became defined—in contrast to pre-Abbasid Islam—largely as struggle against non-Muslim territory and only secondarily as subdual of

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17 It should be mentioned that the categories of volunteer warriors and martyrdom work their way into the legal literature on *jihad* only as a function of state interest. For example, in a treatise summarizing the constitution and institutions of Islamic governance (*al-Ahkām al-sultāniyya*), al-Māwāridī’s examination of *jihad* speaks mainly to state concerns (al-Māwāridī n.d., 43f.). He does speak of two kinds of warriors, salaried professionals and volunteers (al-Māwāridī n.d., 44), apparently leaving room for both state administration of *jihad* and pious enthusiasm for ritualized warfare. This discussion is, however, limited to the different financial sources upon which the two categories of soldiers draw: The professionals were to receive their payment from the state treasury whereas volunteers were to be supported by alms. In another passage (al-Māwāridī n.d., 46), he discusses the legal conditions according to which attack is permissible. Can one take the enemy by surprise? It may be more effective, but fails to fulfill the condition of summoning the enemy to Islam before fighting. A commander who allows such an illegal attack must guarantee blood money to compensate for lost enemy lives. In another passage, al-Māwāridī offers anecdotal advice on the wisdom of engaging in single combat (al-Māwāridī n.d., 49–50). Although framed as a legal discussion, the matter does not ultimately rest on jurisprudence, but courage and discretion. In the same passage, reference is made to martyrdom, which is permitted to mobilize troops: Only those who desire martyrdom are to be incited to it; it will provoke other soldiers on the Muslim side to fight out of zeal for the martyr and cause the polytheist enemy to despair in the face of such acts of courage for the sake of God’s cause. Martyrdom here, as we saw in the Umayyad letter of ‘Abd al-Hamīd, is a tool of military strategy. At the same time, al-Māwāridī does recognize the redemptive value of martyrdom, acknowledging (al-Māwāridī n.d., 53) that *jihad* can offer two rewards, the spoils of victory in this world and paradise in the next.
rebellious subjects, to whom an entirely different category of law was applied (**ahlāk am al-bughāt**, “the laws of rebellion,” see Abou El Fadl 1990 and 2002b). The world was accordingly divided into two categories, that of Islam and that which was not yet Islam, the latter being the object of war for the sake of bringing it into conformity with the divine plan for humankind. In principle, non-Islamic territory, falling outside the domain of God’s revealed law, enjoyed no legal status (for a modern-day fundamentalist equivalent of this, see Abou El Fadl 2002a, 14). Legal recognition could only be granted by acknowledgment of Islamic law and self-annexation to the Islamic polity, which did not require conversion to Islam, but admission of Islamic hegemony. Acknowledging Islamic law ensured Islamic protection to non-Muslims in exchange for the payment of a poll-tax as a dissenting minority within the Islamic polity.18 It was the collective duty of the Muslim community and the individual duty of the Muslim leader to undertake campaigns against the enemy at least once annually. The enemy was to be fought only after refusing the summons either to convert to Islam or submit to Islamic hegemony and pay the poll-tax.19

The literature articulating this classical theory of *jihad*—attributed to the great Ḥanafi jurists, Abū Yūsuf (d. 798) and al-Shaybānī (d. 805)—thus represents a pre-modern attempt to define an international order. The border between states may have been demarcated, but the balance of power was kept by a combination of diplomatic missions and periodic excursions—a show of strength—into enemy territory. Boundaries were preserved by a permanent, if inactive, war between neighboring states: The absence of military activity did not mean that the enemy could be trusted to respect the border. Rather, strikes—doing what could be done to destroy the enemy’s war-making potential—was one way the state preserved its security. It is in that sense that we should understand the Islamic assumption that the state—either in the person of the caliph or a delegated commander—conduct *jihad* once a year, “so that the enemy not become attracted to Muslim lands” (see Anonymous 1991, 28). It is

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18 Islamic law did grant security to subjects of non-Muslim rule who traveled to the abode of Islam for trade or other purposes; this security was recognized even when granted by a single Muslim individual.

19 Such was the theory, reiterated through the classical period (for example, the great philosopher, Ibn Rushd [Averroes, d. 1189], in his legal work, *Bidāyat al-mujtahid* [Ibn Rushd 1971, vol. 1, 307–328]. What did *jihad* as war mean to the Abbasid state? We do possess a corpus of literature from this period—advice literature to rulers (*Fürstenspiegel*)—which includes chapters on the art of war (see Ibn Qutayba [d. 889] 1986, vol. 1, 185–323 and Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi [d. 940] 1940–42, vol. 1, 94–224). When it came to the topic of war, the advice took the form of anecdotal lore on military strategy and entertaining tales of courage in battle. A combined product of translation of Persian didactic works and stories from Arabo-Islamic history itself, such literature did not make a clear connection to the theory of *jihad*. 
also in that sense that one ought to read discussions on the permissibility of killing male prisoners of war (if it is not decided that enslaving them or exchanging them for Muslims is of greater benefit to the Muslim side) as well as discussions on either the impermissibility of killing women, children, elderly men, monks, etc. or the permissibility of killing women and elderly men known to have abetted the enemy. These discussions should not be seen as an odd twist on the categories of combatants and non-combatants, soldiers and civilians, but rather as a real concern to debilitate the enemy’s capacity for attacking in the future and upsetting the frontier line or balance of power between neighboring states.

If *jihad* for the Abbasid state was largely tantamount to security concerns within a pre-modern international order, is it possible to understand the classical formulation of *jihad* within the same framework as just war? Such a question can be fairly answered only by removing the imperial context in which the classical formulation of *jihad* was articulated. If we were to place the concerns of the classical formulation of *jihad* alongside the categories of just war (for a brief history of the theory of just war, see Adeney 1988), we would see that, while showing a certain harmony with concerns of *ius in bello* (Muslim jurists through the centuries debated the finer points of proper conduct in war), they do not align with categories of *ius ad bellum*, which—in the early Abbasid context—was understood to be the extension of Islamic law in political and territorial terms: True peace could only be achieved under Islamic law; a just cause could be assumed in any action advancing the sway of the Islamic legal order; to establish the just cause, a certain purification of one’s inner attitude or intention was necessary, to verify that war was waged not simply for a godly cause broadly understood but for the wider implementation of God’s revelation in Islamic terms; and the only leader under which war could be waged legitimately was the Muslim caliph or his delegated commander. Still, despite the fact that the Abbasid formulation of *jihad* was oriented, at least in theory, to the extension of Islamic law, it can also be argued that the Abbasids understood *jihad* as part of the purpose of any state, whether modern or pre-modern: the creation of a stable society by means of force (professional and salaried police and military) with the duty of quelling internal unrest and rebellion and securing frontier zones.

As inherited from their Umayyad forebears, *jihad* for the Abbasids denoted state action aiming not simply at the preservation and extension of political mastery, but also the security and prosperity of the polity. These goals, if stripped of the imperial program of hegemony and mastery of others, do have ethical value and can be incorporated into modern theories of sovereignty and even the democratic expression of public order. The classical formulation of *jihad* therefore offers both challenge and possibility. Our discussion suggests that Ḥanafī jurisprudence—including its
treatment of *jihad*—was put to the service of early Abbasid state goals. This is not to suggest that the state simply “bought” the leading jurists of the day, but that the Islamic framework in which these jurists worked was primarily an imperial one. Simply put, in such a context, politics was not subordinate to religion, but stood on its own grounds. The same state orientation can be noticed in early Ḥanafī discussions of apostasy (*ridda*), where political insubordination was defined as grounds for exclusion from participation in the religious ritual. (This political definition of apostasy has not been retained by Islam today.) At the same time, these Ḥanafī jurists located their discussion of *jihad* within an Islamic heritage of moral and legal principles meant to embody and support the common good of society. The pressing question, then, is what exactly should be or even can be a contemporary appropriation of the classical formulation of *jihad*: its state orientation or its service of the common good? And how might that be spelled out?

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The conceptions of *jihad* outlined thus far were variously combined and construed through the early classical period without significant innovation (see the references to al-Māwardī’s works in footnotes 13 and 17). It was only when the abode of Islam faced a threat to its political and territorial integrity that the classical conceptions of *jihad* were reexamined, beginning with the Crusades at the end of the eleventh century and climaxing with the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth. The Crusades amounted to only a minor encroachment upon the abode of Islam, but the Mongol invasions were so devastating that some Muslims at the time wondered whether it was the end of Islam. And it was, at least as Islam had largely been understood up to that time, as a single nation with a political and territorial integrity that—despite its divisions of rule—found its coherence by a common commitment to Islamic law and its unity in the symbolic leadership of the Abbasid caliphate. While previous invaders of the abode of Islam had always been quick to recognize Islamic law and acknowledge the religious authority of the caliph, Crusaders and Mongols both had their own traditions of universal order. It was, then, not the invasion of the abode of Islam that was so soul-wrenching, but its subordination to a non-Islamic social order. Was Islam not God’s plan for human prosperity?

The experience of the Crusades ultimately led to a greater appreciation of *jihad* as a defense of the legal integrity of the Islamic order, but an order still conceived of in political and territorial terms.20 While the

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20 This appreciation emerged partly from the attempt to understand how invasion of the abode of Islam had been possible in the first place. The conclusions were unanimous: Muslim weakness was due to internal divisions and the failure of Muslim leaders—too
actual response to the Crusades ranged from accommodation to hostility (Hillenbrand 1999 and Sivan 1968), our concern here is the development of the theory of *jihad* that the Crusades stimulated. The stress was increasingly given to *jihad* not as a means of bringing new territory under divine jurisdiction, but as defense against outside aggression (Hillenbrand 1999, 246).21

The writings on *jihad* of the period suggest a shift from the traditional emphasis on *jihad* as a collective duty (*fard kifāya*, fulfilled as long as a sufficient number of Muslims participated to ensure the goal of annual incursion into enemy territory, in principle for the purpose of expansion of the abode of Islam, but perhaps actually to stabilize the border, as suggested above; see the discussion of al-Shāfī‘ī in footnote 16). What was now given greater attention was *jihad* as an individual duty (*fard ‘ayn*). Jurists in the early Abbasid period do speak of *jihad* in terms of both collective and individual duty, but they do not give serious consideration to the possibility of *jihad* as defensive (against the contraction of the abode of Islam) and frame the cause of war mainly as expansion of the divine order under Islamic rule.

In contrast, the Crusades—the first major and lasting incursion into Islamic territory of a power unwilling to recognize Islamic authority—gave a heightened meaning to *jihad* as a duty of every individual. It

busy bickering among themselves in the fashion of local warlords for economic and political control—to live up to the expectations of Islamic rule, especially that of supervising the annual *jihad*, a practice that had fallen into desuetude, causing the frontiers to be exposed to enemy encroachment (see Sivan 1966; although the Hamdanid dynasty [tenth century] had cultivated the rhetoric of *jihad* against the Byzantine foe, military activity in the Syro-Palestinian region at the time of the Crusades was largely an intra-Muslim affair; see Hillenbrand 1999, 101–102). There were calls to admit communal infidelity and sinfulness as the cause of defeat, calls for reform, for greater obedience to God and for good deeds. Defeat at the hands of the infidel was construed as a divine test of the purity of Muslim devotion. As a result, blame was directed at the heterodox forms of Islam, accused of having failed in that regard (a theme taken up and considerably developed by Ibn Ṭaymiyya).

21 In keeping with the essential idea of *jihad* as struggle for God’s cause, it was necessary that Muslim unity be invoked as a prelude to *jihad* in defense of Islam behind the community’s leaders, first the Zengid Nur al-Dīn (d. 1174) and then the Ayyubid Ṣālāḥ al-Dīn (d. 1193). To conform to the religious consciousness underlying *jihad* (namely that it must be pursued with pure intention for God’s cause alone), these two warlords had to be fashioned into the image of ideal rulers of impeccable Islamic orthodoxy (for a discussion of the honor the two above-mentioned leaders have in Muslim memory, see Hillenbrand 1999, 132–141, 180–188 and 193–195). In other words, the entire community was to be purified of its wayward passions symbolically through its leaders since *jihad* was possible only when Muslim leaders were understood to be free of worldly interest or concern for personal power. The intention of the political leaders had to be pure for the conceptual standards of *jihad* to be met, a project carried out not only via panegyric poetry, theological treatises and the production of dynastic histories, but also in building programs and inscriptions—mosques, religious schools and the like (Hillenbrand 1999, 171–255).
was imagined that all Muslims participate in the struggle against the invading enemy or at least all those in the vicinity of the attack. Vicinity indicated not only the territory immediately exposed to the attack, but the regions adjacent to it if the number of Muslims in the immediately exposed territory was not sufficient to repel the attack (Sivan 1966), which could gradually include all Muslims if necessary.

If the Crusades heightened the rhetorical significance of jihad as defense of the political and territorial integrity of the abode of Islam, the same cannot be said of the Mongol invasions, which were simply too extensive to make such concerns meaningful. What was at stake was not Islam in the political and territorial terms of empire, but Islam in the ritual and communal terms of religion. The Mongol removal of the caliphate ushered in an altered conception of Islamic identity and, as well, of jihad. The Ilkhanid dynasty, although eventually converting to Islam, did not define itself within the religious authority of the caliphate, which was no more, nor were they committed exclusively to Islamic law apart from their own Mongol legal heritage. This is not to suggest that Muslims no longer made religious assumptions about public order, but rather that the relation of Islam to public order became framed more in terms of communal identity and less in terms of political control: Islam as an essential if not defining factor of civil society. It is the name of Ibn Taymiyya above all that is associated with post-Abbasid conceptions of Islamic identity, not in terms of political authority but ritual and communal coherence (see Sonn 1990, 134–135, who highlights the Ḥanbalī emphasis of doctrinal unity over political control). What was the effect of the new Islamic social reality on Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of jihad?

The letters and sermons of Ibn Taymiyya aim to give an Islamic meaning to the social crisis engendered by the Mongol invasions. His rhetoric can be summed up in a passage from one of his letters (Ibn Taymiyya 1993, 53f.). There, his assessment of the Mongol invasions is linked to his firm conviction in God’s providence: The demise of Islamic order is actually a test sent by God acting to purify the Muslim community of its faint-hearted and less-than-convinced members, just as God tested the

22 There was little left to defend once the Mongols swept through the Muslim world. With their suppression of the office of caliph along with their conquest of the formerly central Islamic lands (that is, today’s Middle East, Central Asia and eastern parts of Asia Minor), the Mongols forever altered the perception of the abode of Islam. Islamic dominion was partially preserved in Egypt and parts of the Levant under Mamluk rule (r. 1250–1517), and the Ilkhanid dynasty (the branch of the Mongol empire ruling over formerly Islamic domains) eventually converted to Islam (well before Ibn Taymiyya emerged on the scene), but these facts did nothing to prevent the emergence of a fundamentally new social matrix for Islam.
first Muslims by non-Muslim hostility in order to separate hypocrites from true believers, “as they will be separated on judgment day.”

Behind the malaise, then, is the absence of Islamic unity, not political unity, but ritual unity. Ibn Taymiyya’s ultimate concern was not Mongol conquest and rule, but the validity of the religion which, for him, was threatened by ritual heterodoxy. He saw the Mongol victory not as a loss, but part of the divine plan to expose those heterodox sects within Islam given to legal innovation (bid’ā, a term used to cast suspicion on one’s adherence to prophetic precedent) in their assessment of the ritual obligations of Islam. Ibn Taymiyya counted this religious laxness a mask over the actual desire of certain Muslims to support and collaborate with Mongol rule (Ibn Taymiyya 1992, 102), which did not recognize the duties demanded by Islamic law (a delight to the heterodox, Ibn Taymiyya claims, meaning the Nuṣayrī branch of Islam in Syria and Mesopotamia [see Halm 1960]; for his juridical ruling [fatwā] which issued a blanket condemnation of the Nuṣayriyya, see Guyard 1871). He attempts to expose these false Muslims: hypocrites, heretics, doubters, who have somehow infiltrated every level of society: philosophers, astronomers, physicians, mystics and even jurists and military commanders. Their disposition to innovation (ahl al-bida’) aims to pervert the religion for their twofold goal of ingratiating themselves with the Mongol overlords and relieving themselves of the demands of the law.

It is this concern for heterodoxy that Ibn Taymiyya brought to bear on the arena of law, thereby broadening the legal scope of jihad. His treatise on public law gives unprecedented praise to jihad (Ibn Taymiyya 1951, 130f.), calling it better than any other religious duty, including prayer and pilgrimage (cf. Ibn Taymiyya 2002, 30–31, where jihad on the frontier [meaning, again, struggle against the heterodox in general—the term used is rawāfid—and the Nuṣayriyya in particular] is described as more meritorious than residence in Mecca, the site of the house of God [bayt allāh]). Jihad for Ibn Taymiyya is the height of virtue, encompassing all other religious duties by its expression of a total love for God and

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23 He quotes Q 3:152, “God was true to His promise to you when, by His leave, you defeated them, until you became faint-hearted and argued amongst yourselves over the matter and disobeyed the Prophet after he showed you what you longed for. There were those of you who opted for this world and those who opted for the next life. He allowed you to be defeated so as to test you. God has forgiven you and is bountiful to the believers . . .”

24 It is this admixture of personal interest and belief that must be fought, to purify the Muslim community, thereby unifying it under a single religious system, as Ibn Taymiyya says in the above-quoted letter on jihad (Ibn Taymiyya 1993, 53f.), “There is also in jihad true ascetic indifference to this life and this abode. There is also in it true sincerity, for we are talking about those who conduct jihad for the sake of God, not for the sake of leadership nor money nor personal zeal, and this is not so except for those who fight so that religion be entirely God’s and that the word of God prevail.”
sincere devotion to His way. His commendation of *jihad* ends by equating it almost wholly with what it means to be a Muslim. He claims, almost philosophically, that since creatures must live and die, one ought to put one’s life and death at the service of a goal that will guarantee true happiness, namely *jihad* which rewards one with either a divinely supported victory over unbelief or the prize of martyrdom.

Such rhetoric is easily used by radical Islam today to justify *jihad* against Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Sivan 1983), but one must be careful to make a distinction between (1) their appropriation of Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of *jihad* for their politico-eschatological program of inaugurating the reign of God by warring against the worldly powers of the day and (2) Ibn Taymiyya’s own intention of using it to define Islamic identity in ritual and communal rather than political and territorial terms. It is in that sense that radical Islam today and the work of Ibn Taymiyya represent two forms of religious consciousness. Theirs is eschatological, an abrogation of the restraints placed on war by the classical doctrine of *jihad* and affirmed by Ibn Taymiyya himself in favor of a self-sacrificial violence that dramatizes the anticipated victory of godly over worldly rule. His is a development in the legal theory of *jihad* to account for the post-Mongol social order. Certainly, Islam always knew great diversity, but the Mongol removal of the institution that had previously stood as guarantee of Islamic identity heightened the significance of heterodoxy. Ibn Taymiyya seems to have been keenly aware of the need to find a new basis of Islamic identity, which he located in the ritual uniformity of the Muslim community.

It is for that reason that Ibn Taymiyya understands fellow Muslims who fail to fulfill their ritual duties as legitimate objects of *jihad*, defining them as infidels (*kuffár*, Ibn Taymiyya 1992, 100). Not only are polytheists, rebels and criminals (on these three categories, see Abou El Fadl 2002b) to be subdued, but any Muslim who does not adhere to the divinely legislated order in its entirety, by which Ibn Taymiyya means ritual and communal practice in particular: the prescribed prayers, almsgiving, fasting during Ramadan, refraining from the kinds of food and marriage which the law forbids and so on (Ibn Taymiyya 1951, 131). His concern is not Islamic governance per se, but Islamic identity, which he locates in ritual and communal practice. Those who do not perform the ritual and communal ordinances of Islam must then be treated according to the criteria of *jihad* (Ibn Taymiyya 1951, 131): They are to be summoned to Islam and to be fought if they refuse it. For Ibn Taymiyya, *jihad* is twofold: *jihad* waged against infidels and *jihad* waged against those who refuse to perform even a part of the practice established by revealed law. His focus, again, is heterodox Islam, above all the Nuṣayrīyya of Syria and Mesopotamia. His view of *jihad* is not conditioned by a concern to defend the political and territorial integrity of Islam, as was the
case in the Muslim response to the Crusades, but a concern to defend a religious identity. It had been the caliphate that had previously guaranteed religious identity, and with its fall at the hands of the Mongols, a new touchstone was necessary to determine it.

The intimate connection between identity and uniformity of ritual and communal norms pervades the work of Ibn Taymiyya. Perhaps the single most prominent theme of his writings is that of cohesion (*iṭīmāʿ*) and union (iʿ*ṭilāf*) over against that of difference (i*khtilāf*) and division (i*fīrāqa*). In one letter, he manifests a deep concern that divisions in ritual (ʿ*ibādāt*) cast doubt on the validity of Islamic revelation itself (Ibn Taymiyya 1996, 23). These divisions have nothing to do with the Islamic state and its political and territorial integrity, but the norms of ritual and communal practice (for example, differences of opinion on the manner of calling Muslims to prayer, invoking God’s name, raising the hands during prayer and conjugal relations during pilgrimage to Mecca). Ibn Taymiyya’s main concern was not loss of Islamic hegemony, but a diversity of practice within the religious community itself that had the potential to render Islam suspect as a whole.

In other words, Ibn Taymiyya’s emphasis on ritual and communal action must be seen within the larger history of skepticism within Islamic thought,25 which Muslim thinkers from early on (for example, al-ʿĀmīrī) understood as a product of the pluralistic practice of a single religion and its potential of undermining the significance of ritual and communal action: The strong Islamic emphasis on the connection between religious knowledge (ʿ*ilm*) and action (ʿ*amal*, understood as the performance of the law) was at risk in the face of different expressions of that action. Again, it is a ritual and not a political vision (see Ibn Taymiyya 1997, vol. 1, 17, “The reason for [communal] cohesion and union is the unity of the religion (jāmʿ al-dīn) and the performance of all of it (al-ʿ*amal bihi kullihi*), which is the ritual worship of God (wa-huwa ʿ*ibādat allāh*).”

Ibn Taymiyya is thus very much in line with previous responses to skepticism, claiming (Ibn Taymiyya 1996, 24) that corruption (fāsāda*) in ritual and communal practice generates ignorance (jāl) about revelation, disharmony (zulm, lit. injustice) between Muslims and against God and, finally, argumentation on the basis of conjectural thought (zann) and caprice (hawā*) rather than a commitment to the clear rulings of the revealed law. The real problem is not a securely religious character of the state but the fact that some Muslims refuse to pray with others (Ibn Taymiyya 1996, 25). The only relation his program has to the caliphate is that its absence has offered an opportunity for highlighting the true source of Islamic identity, namely Islamic scripture:

25 A vast topic which I intend to treat elsewhere.
the Qurʾān and Sunna (or the precedent-establishing life of the prophet recorded in the canonical Ḥadīth collections). Even when discussing the deployment of troops on the frontier for jihad, the focus is not the non-Muslim world but the heresy (bidʿa) of Muslims who (unjustifiably in Ibn Taymiyya’s eyes) claim an Islamic faith (īmān) without a commitment to the ritual and communal action at the heart of Islamic revelation (Ibn Taymiyya 2002, 81, “Good work [al-ʿamal al-sāliḥ, the performance of the ordinances of the law] is the revealed order [al-mashrūṭ]”). It is the life of the prophet that is normative for Islamic identity, and those who make light of it simply cannot be considered part of Islam (Ibn Taymiyya 2002, 73 where the prophetic statement is cited, “Whoever has a distaste for my precedent (sunna) has no relation to me.”) Similarly, in a letter to the Mamluk ruler al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (r. 1310–1341), Ibn Taymiyya’s overriding concern in encouraging the sultan to jihad is not the danger posed to Islamic political and territorial integrity by Mongol rule or the Byzantine enemy, but those who have abandoned the practice of Islamic law even if claiming to be Muslims (Ibn Taymiyya 1976, 12, “…those who have parted from the revealed law of Islam [ṣharīʿat al-islām], although uttering the two testimonies [that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger—the statement declaring one’s embrace of Islam]”).

The Islamic order, until the Mongol invasions, had largely been understood to be validated by the presence of the caliphate (for example, the letter of the Umayyad caliph, Walīd II [r. 743–744] in al-Ṭabarī 1989; 106–115, which claims that without the office of caliph, the Islamic order—the law—would be suspended; see also al-Ghazālī 1993, 105, which makes the same claim). Despite the many forms of governance appearing in the Islamic world through its first seven centuries and despite the attempts to dismiss the close connection between caliphate and Islamic order (see Hallaq 1984), it was the person of the caliph that guaranteed an Islamic identity. Its removal by the Mongols, casting doubt on the validity of all aspects of Islamic life, made it necessary to call upon another aspect

26 It is in that sense that Ibn Taymiyya draws on scripture so profusely in all his sources (cf. the opening rulings in his collection of legal rulings, Ibn Taymiyya 1997, vol. 1, 3f., where the Sunna is placed on equal footing with the Qurʾān [Ibn Taymiyya 1997, vol. 1, 7] and Islamic authority and felicity are rooted entirely in imitating the life of the prophet; this emphasis is, of course, hardly new in Islamic history, but Ibn Taymiyya raises it with greater cogency in the absence of the caliphate). His intensely if not exclusively scriptural epistemology (see B. Jokisch 1997) stands in contrast to the power of human reason (which can result in an individual rather than communal religiosity and thereby in social confusion. It is thus one of Ibn Taymiyya’s goals to define human rationality as a function of prophetic guidance, for example, Ibn Taymiyya 1997, vol. 1, 6, “As the eye cannot see without the appearance of light before it, so the [human] intellect [ʿaql] is not rightly guided without the sun of the prophetic message.”)
of the Islamic heritage as guarantee of identity. Ibn Taymiyya saw the
Mongol presence not as the end of Islam, but as part of a divine plan to
force Muslims to atone for their sins (cf. Ibn Taymiyya 1976, 12, takfīr
min al-khatā‘ayā‘), sins which he defined as the failure of heretics to fulfill
the obligations of the law.

It was thus heresy above all that had to be struggled against—hence
Ibn Taymiyya’s reformulation of jihād to include his lapsed fellow Mus-
lims. In focusing his intellectual energy on this challenge, Ibn Taymiyya
actually conceived of an Islamic identity that could survive the caliphate.
Accordingly, Islamic law was in need of even greater protection in the ab-
sence of its guaranteeing institution, the office of caliph, who had always
been theoretically defined as a mujtahid (that is, a legal authority with
the competence to interpret the law) in order to maintain the important
pre-Mongol connection between the caliphate and revealed law. In the
absence of that institution, religious variation, which had existed before,
became a more pronounced threat to Islamic identity by jeopardizing the
stability of the law and even the religion itself. Ibn Taymiyya was driven
to respond not to the reality of a Mongol rule that marginalized Islam
in circles of power, but primarily to a religious crisis without an author-
itative institution to define it. In the end, he chose to emphasize ritual
homogeneity as a way to counter the crisis. This distinction between an
Islamic identity defined politically and one defined ritually is essential
to understand the focus of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought.

Ibn Taymiyya did indeed promote an Islamic public order where those
holding state office would be worthy of such public trust (in terms of both
piety and competence) and where criminals would be punished accord-
ing to the dictates of the revealed law (Ibn Taymiyya 1951).27 There were
other figures from this period who understood jihād primarily as a vehi-
cle for annihilating the enemies of God and purifying the earth of their

27 There is, however, no room for revolution in Ibn Taymiyya’s political thought, even
when state officials fail to be paragons of Islamic virtue. In discussing the appointment
of state officials, such as military commanders and judges, Ibn Taymiyya admits that
circumstances may make competence preferable to piety as criterion of appointment—for
example, a competent even if wanton (fājir) judge—if there is no one with both qualities.
He argues elsewhere in the same work (1951, 172–180) that political office (wilāya) is
a religious necessity, since in its absence there would be social chaos and the precepts
of religion could not be carried out. He supports his position philosophically, however,
claiming that only via human congregation (ijtima‘) can the common good be attained,
since humans are mutually dependent for their survival, and that human congregation
serves the good only when ordered under political leadership (Ibn Taymiyya 1951, 172–
173). Ibn Taymiyya thus offers theoretical grounds for the justification of human rule even
when not in complete conformity to the religious dimensions of Islamic rule. His model of
political rule, then, while aspiring to justice as demonstrated by the Qur’ān and Sunna
(al-‘adl alladhi dalla ‘alayhi al-kitāb wa-l-sunna, Ibn Taymiyya 1951, 13), is not based on
revelation alone but actually leaves space for human judgment.
presence for the sake of Muslim possession of their lands and wealth (see al-Sulamī [d. 1262] 1986, 53). Ibn Taymiyya, however, concedes the end of the caliphate and thus any formal link between the political order and the revealed law. He does not tie the governing organs of state to any eschatological purpose (for example, the kingdom of God, a reign which radical Islamic groups today want to inaugurate), but quite emphatically defines the relation of the religion to those organs as one of advice or counsel (nāṣīḥā, a concept that runs deep in Islamic thought; see Ibn Taymiyya 1997, vol. 1, 12f. and Ibn Taymiyya 1951, 1).

In short, Ibn Taymiyya—on very sound religious grounds—conceives of the political order as Islamic to the extent that Islam is in dialogue with it and not in control of it, a shift in thinking about Islamic order reflecting the post-Mongol social reality. He certainly does believe that Islam is the best vehicle for achieving the goal of politics, namely social harmony, but such harmony is something that can be achieved apart from the piety of the state (see footnote 27). If he had equated Islamic legitimacy with Islamic control, he would presumably have had to deny the Islamic identity of the large number of Muslims living under Mongol rule, not to mention Mamluk rule. He does, however, demand that certain standards of ritual and communal action be maintained as criteria for Islamic membership. It was ironically Ibn Taymiyya’s focus on ritual and communal heterodoxy and his call for its suppression that created the possibility for envisioning religious identity without reference to political power—again an understanding of Islam as a religious order which is in dialogue with but not in control of the public order.

Ibn Taymiyya’s thought, which some have dismissed as irrational or fanatic (see, for example, Little 1975), actually raises fundamental issues relevant to today’s context. How is Islamic identity to be understood? In political or communal terms? The conclusion to be drawn from recent experiments in Islamic political hegemony is that Islamic identity is itself thrown into jeopardy when its boundaries are equated with the state and its governing institutions and norms (for example, Iran; M. Sadri 2001). This is not to deny to Islam its claim of being an integrated way of life in which belief inspires and shapes action in the public arena. Rather, one can say—despite the use and abuse of Ibn Taymiyya by radical Islam—that it was he who insisted that such an integrated way of life depends not on politics and political power but on the vigor of a religion’s ritual and communal life. The extent to which such vigor requires uniformity of practice and the suppression of dissent or deviation from religious norms is not as clear today as it was for Ibn Taymiyya, but it remains true, now as then, that heterodoxy poses challenges, both constructive and destructive, to religious identity. A religious community, such as the Muslim one, can be expected to demand certain standards of belief and practice from those who claim to belong to and thus represent Islam, but
in a way that does not require socio-political hegemony. Ibn Taymiyya’s insight is a keen one: religious vigor has nothing to do with political power but depends primarily on communal worship. This vigor in turn can be translated into contemporary terms as *jihad* (in other words, a more relevant and perhaps more accurate appropriation of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought is possible and yet to be fully made), meaning a struggle for the social and moral formation of the public order by bringing advice or counsel (*naṣīḥa*)—perhaps religiously inspired and energetically lobbied—to those holding the trust of public office (*amāna*). Any further explanation of *jihad* as political revolution or a means to inaugurate the reign of God simply cannot be attributed to Ibn Taymiyya.

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It is clear from the foregoing that *jihad* as a struggle for a godly cause has been diversely interwoven into Islamic history. Most significantly, the conception of *jihad* has been shown to vary according to the conception of Islamic self-understanding: mystical, eschatological, legal, philosophical and imperial as well as ritual and communal. Islam is now an international phenomenon irreducible to territory or political allegiance, and so, at the heart of the contemporary renewal of *jihad* thinking is the following question: What is the Islamic world? In what terms is the abode of Islam to be understood today? How does the Muslim community desire to understand itself in the current global order? It is in answering this question that greater clarity will be given to the relevance of the *jihad* tradition within the reality of the Islamic world today.

Certainly, concepts of *jihad* have not been static since Ibn Taymiyya, but have developed in response to European colonial domination, as a symbol of social and intellectual reform in the post-colonial period and as a pretext for terrorism (for *jihad* in the colonial and post-colonial period, see Peters 1979 and Rahman 1983). From this wide and variant tradition, what is it that the Muslim community today finds translatable to their current needs, hopes, and desires? Certainly, one needs to ask exactly what aspects of *jihad* as formulated within an imperial context continue to be relevant to the non-imperial context of Islam today. The Qurʾān, of course, will remain the touchstone for any reformulation of the conception and doctrine of *jihad*. There, *jihad* is the basic criterion for any struggle considered to be godly against the forces of unbelief, which is understood not only as a denial or truth but also as a threat to religion and public order. For, according to Islam, denial of the transcendent authority of God results in social and moral decay—indifference to the serious public issues of the day and withdrawal into one’s own private world of pleasures and interests. It is in that sense that *jihad* is envisioned by the Qurʾān as the tool by which not to convert or dominate but to defend and extend a moral society—in qurʾānic terms, eradicating
corruption on earth (al-fasād fī l-ard) and enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (al-amr bi-l-ma‘rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar; see M. Cook 2000, 13f.).

If the goal of jihad in the Qur‘ān is ultimately the moral life of the private and public order through the lens of faith, it is not so clear that this moral order be understood as a religiously defined state or even state implementation of Islamic law. Jihad in the Qur‘ān, however, does emphasize the relation of religion to the moral life of the polity. This is an extremely fertile topic, exploration of which will benefit Muslim and non-Muslim alike. In that sense, current discussion of jihad should be focused not so much on the arena of war-making, but the preservation of a moral order, to which religion has a contribution to make. If jihad at heart has always had a fundamental relation to the question of moral order, then other notions of jihad which were meaningful to a particular historical moment may no longer be meaningful. It is in anticipation of such a discussion that jihad can be rescued from its atavistic use by terrorists and from the terror with which it is so commonly associated by non-Muslims.

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