Sharing Values

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Claims about sharing values are common in contemporary political discourse: Democratic societies value freedom and equality; The Marines value loyalty, fidelity, and faithfulness, and the Zapatistas of Chiapas value indigenous practices of walking together. In each of these cases, people treat particular activities, entities, or practices as worthwhile or essential to what they do together. And in each of these cases, group members have the standing to demand compliance with any values they share, and to criticize one another for failures to act in accordance with these values. For example, Marines take themselves to have privileged standing to criticize other Marine's for acts of disloyalty, and Zapatistas take themselves to have privileged standing to criticize other Zapatistas who fail to cultivate practices of dignity and community.

In this paper, we consider the ways in which valuing is shared, and we examine the reasons why shared valuing is normatively significant. We begin by providing a brief sketch of Margaret Gilbert's claim that sharing values provides individuals with a distinctive normative standing to criticize one another for failures to live up to the values they share, and to demand compliance with those values. We think she is right to identify this standing as integral to shared forms of valuing. Indeed, we contend that this feature is an essential element of shared valuing that calls for further justification. The central question we consider in this investigation is: what processes can reliably provide normative grounding for the standing to rebuke others for their failures to treat something as valuable.

First, we argue that that shared identities provide a conditional form of normative standing, even where people have not made explicit joint commitments to shared forms of valuing with one another. We then consider how more robust, non-conditional forms of this normative standing require much more work to justify. In more structured groups in which shared valuing plays a role in the pursuit of collective actions, however, problems with grounding this normative standing arise, as it is unclear how shared valuing is actively produced and maintained in well-organized groups and why shared valuing binds group members together in ways that can sustain the collective pursuit of shared ends. Responding to this difficulty is no easy task, since doing so requires demonstrating that the standing to call on one's fellow participants because of shared forms of valuing is not merely a side effect of members calling on their fellow participants to do their fair share. This is, to the best of our knowledge, a problem that the sparse literature on shared valuing has yet to consider. In fact, this problem may help to explain the paucity of literature on shared valuing in the first place.

We argue that the best way to address this difficulty is to consider the real-world complexity of how forms of valuing come to be shared within well-structured collectives, and how members internalize the evaluative tendencies that sustain shared valuing. To accomplish those ends, we examine two different ways that shared valuing is cultivated within well-structured groups, and the

corresponding ways that members internalize forms of valuing; specifically, we examine differences between forms of valuing that are passed downward from the top of a group, as they are in the U.S. Military, and forms of valuing that bubble-up through local patterns of interaction, as they do among the Zapatistas of Chiapas. Our primary aim is to clarify the differences in normative standing to demand and criticize, and to highlight the factors that allow people to adopt ways of valuing that are crafted by others, or to create communities where people shared forms of valuing remain genuinely their own. In light of these discussions, we close by considering how an analysis of what practices of shared valuing ought to be, given a set of collective ends, can further illuminate important elements about the nature of shared valuing.

1. Shared valuing

The literature on social ontology includes numerous discussions of the normative considerations that arise when agents intend to do things together often in contexts where they also share interests (e.g., Bratman 2014; Gilbert 2000; List & Pettit 2011). But questions about shared forms of valuing have been addressed far less frequently. One approach to consider any questions regarding sharing values would be to extend resources that have been developed in the context of sharing intentions—and indeed, this has been the dominant approach in the sparse literature on shared valuing (e.g., Bratman 2004; Gilbert 2005). An alternative approach, one which we adopt here, is to move from a general understanding of valuing to a an examination of the the normative phenomena that appear to be constitutive of shared valuing that are not present in cases of individual valuing.[1]

We can begin to motivate that approach by noting that normative questions about sharing values are at least partially distinct from the more common areas of inquiry in social ontology. When someone values an activity, an entity, or a practice, they treat it as something that is worth pursuing. They will also be motivated to act on their evaluation; and when they fall short of achieving something they treat as valuable, they will often experience feelings of discomfort. For example, valuing clarity in writing typically leads an author not only to view clear writing a certain way, but also to strive for clarity, and to feel uncomfortable when they learn that their paper is unclear. And an activist who values equality will usually be motivated to challenge perceived injustice, and to feel uncomfortable when they can't make the world a better place. Moreover, many of these forms of valuing seem to be held in common. Americans value freedom from state interference in religion, and the Teamsters value craft seniority. In these cases, as many others besides, shared valuing seems to

[1] While there will be things that can be learned by an analysis that moves from sharing intentions to sharing values out of sharing intentions, we suspect that an analysis that moves from valuing to sharing values will be more fruitful. Unfortunately, a satisfactory argument for this suspicion would take us too far afield of the present analysis.

motivate particular ways of thinking and acting together; they unify people, bind them together, and provide "them with the standing to intervene in one another's lives" (Gilbert 2005, 45). Yet it often becomes difficult to specify what precisely is shared in contexts of shared valuing.[2]

Margaret Gilbert (2005) has identified three ontological frameworks for delineating shared values from individual ones: an *aggregative* framework, where a value is shared because most members of a collectivity possess it; a *common knowledge* framework, where a value is shared because most members of a collectivity possess it and are aware of that fact; and a *joint commitment* framework, where a value is shared if and only if the members of a plural subject jointly commit to it (Gilbert 2005, 27-33). Gilbert argues that both the aggregate framework and the common knowledge framework fail to explain the standing to demand compliance with and criticize one another for failures to live up to shared values.[3] After all, merely valuing the same things does not give people the standing to meddle in one another's affairs, nor can simply being aware of valuing the same things (Gilbert 2005, 29-33). Consequently, she claims that the aggregate framework and the common knowledge framework fail to explain the distinctive standing that members possess to demand compliance shared forms of valuing, and to criticize one another for failures to act in accordance with them. This suggests that shared valuing involves some kind of normative relationship that is stronger than one bound by mere epistemology.

We believe that Gilbert (2005) has isolated a necessary condition of shared valuing: the distinctive normative standing that members possess to demand compliance with shared forms of valuing, and to criticize one another for failures to live up to them.[4] And in the remainder of this paper, we shall assume that shared valuing requires a number of individuals who (1) treat something as valuable, and (2) possess the standing to call upon one another to treat that thing

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[2] Whenever possible, we use the terminology 'sharing values,' 'shared valuing,' and 'values that are shared,' and we avoid referring to them as 'collective values' or even 'shared values' in hopes of avoiding more robust ontological disputes. Whatever one's position with respect to debates over collective intentionality, we maintain that there's no *a priori* reason why the source of that standing requires (or would be antithetical to) a collective itself to possess the capacity to value (see redacted for blind review).

[3] The normative significance of the standing to demand compliance of others and to criticize their failures is an important domain of inquiry in its own right. While we assume that such standings exist, we remain agnostic about the normative significance of second-personal exchanges, and about the differences between these standings and obligations to generic members of the moral community. If a reader has a preferred analysis of these standings, we encourage them to assume it. For readers interested in this debate, see Darwall (2006); Thomson (1990); Wallace (2007); Kukla & Lance (2009); Gilbert (2000); [redacted for blind review].

[4] Gilbert argues that this standing is an essential consequence of shared values; we are assuming that the standing also exists when agents engage in less ontologically robust forms of sharing values. If anyone believes that this move from shared values to more minimally shared forms of valuing renders Gilbert's arguments moot, they can view the contention that when agents sharing values they possess the normative standing to call on one another to treat something as valuable as an assumption that we seek to justify in the remainder of this paper.

as valuable. Like Gilbert, we believe these elements are essential to the activity of shared valuing. Rather than simply repeating or supplementing Gilbert's arguments, however, our primary aim is to investigate the grounding for this distinctive normative standing members possess to call on others to treat something as valuable. While we are less sanguine than some about specifying the possibility of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for shared valuing—in part because we suspect that focusing on joint commitments and plural subjects (or on questions of ontology more generally) is likely to obscure some interesting forms of shared valuing—at the very least, a framework like Gilbert's would benefit from a more robust account of how, in complex real world cases, agents acquire the standing to demand compliance with shared forms of valuing, and to criticize one another for failures to act in accordance with evaluative commitments that are shared. [5]

2. Shared valuing without collective actors: Conditional standing

To consider how individuals can appropriately call on one another to treat something as valuable, we begin by noting that whereas collective intentions will influence collective action, shared valuing can exist without yielding such effects. In fact, shared valuing need not be associated with a collective actor or plural subject at all in order for people to have some standing to make demands of one another and to criticize noncompliance with forms of valuing that are shared. For example, committed liberals can sometimes criticize one another for failures to take free speech seriously, and academics can sometimes criticize one another for engaging in sloppy scholarship. Moreover, liberals are more likely to acknowledge criticisms from other liberals, and academics are more likely to acknowledge the criticisms of other academics. In these cases, the standing to engage in normative practices appears to derive from the fact that forms of valuing are shared by the members of these unstructured groups, even though they have not explicitly committed to one another to do so. So, the question remains: Under what minimal conditions would individuals correctly come to treat one another as possessing this kind of normative standing?

In answering this question, we can draw upon a rapidly expanding consensus in cognitive science that motivationally salient evaluations are produced by error-driven learning mechanisms, which evolved to provide us with an intuitive sense of what we *should* want, and what we *should* pursue (Crockett 2013; Cushman 2013; [redacted for blind review]; Railton 2014; Seligman et al

[5] Those who are more optimistic about the prospects of an approach like Gilbert's can read this paper as an attempt to provide a more robust account the activities that constitute making a joint commitment to value something together in real world cases. Those who share our skepticism regarding the importance of joint commitments in these cases can read it as providing a Gilbert-inspired analysis of how we come to possess the normative standing to demand compliance with shared forms of valuing, and to criticize one another for failures to act in accordance with shared evaluative practices, even in the absence of joint commitments.

2016). But what does it take for a form of valuing to be shared? To begin with, individuals must be aware that others treat the same things that they do as valuable, and they must be aware that others treat these forms of valuing as a reason for action. This seems like a rather high bar to clear. However, the evaluative learning mechanisms that allow us to attune to risks, rewards, and opportunities also allow us to learn about dominant social norms, by treating conformity with in-groups as rewarding, and deviance as an error to be corrected (Klucharev et al 2009, 2011; Milgram & Sabini 1978; Montague 2006). Consequently, people will come to *see themselves*, and to see one another, as possessing the standing to demand compliance with forms of shared valuing; and this will be true even where such expectations and assumptions are not grounded in the kinds of joint commitments that yield group-based rights and duties.[6] Those people who inhabit similar environments will tend to develop similar evaluative tendencies, while people who inhabit different environments will tend to develop at least some tendencies to treat different things as valuable. But just as importantly, since people treat conformity with in-groups as valuable, they will come to *expect* that others who belong to the same collectivity will have the similar kinds of evaluative responses, and will treat them as worth pursuing. This point should seem obvious, but keeping it in mind helps to clarify a minimal form of shared valuing, which is obscured by Gilbert's focus on *joint commitments*.

Consider the divergent forms of valuing that have recently evoked disputes over land-use in Yellowstone National Park and the surrounding areas (*The Economist* 2015). Cattle ranchers who want to protect the safety and stability of their herd have clashed with ecologists who want to restore ecological stability through the reintroduction of gray wolves as apex predators. Snowmobilers who want unfettered access to public roads have clashed with animal activists who are concerned with the negative impacts of noise and exhaust pollution on wildlife. And cattle ranchers who want to prevent the spread of brucellosis through their herd have clashed with environmentalists over the preservation of the roaming rights of the remaining herds of American bison. Valuing has a different character within each of these demographics, and these disputes are driven by conflicts over evaluations, or differences in the weighting of particular values. Environmentalists and ecologists tend to privilege ecological diversity and stability in their reasoning, even when these factors conflict with the economic interests of cattle ranchers, or with the snowmobilers' interests in access to public space. Animal activists typically privilege animal welfare and the preservation of natural habitats. And ranchers and snowmobilers tend to privilege liberty, property rights, and access to public lands; as a result, they are often suspicious of interventions by the federal government and environmentalists, who are generally regarded as intruders imposing their own values from the outside of a closed community (Farrell 2015: 108-113).

[6] Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing us to clarify this claim.

Where forms of valuing are shared in this way, background regularities play a critical role in structuring individual forms of valuing. Ranchers raise cattle under varying economic conditions, with varying levels of access to common resources, so they tend to converge on similar assumptions about what is valuable, which will sustain their livelihood. Likewise, snowmobilers are not drawn to the sport because they value access to public lands, but those forms of valuing emerge because they need wide open spaces to enjoy their chosen hobby. This allows forms of valuing things to become pervasive within in a social group, while still leaving some room for individual differences in valuing. A rancher could abandon their resistance to gray wolves without ceasing to be a rancher, for example. And where this happens, others need not, and are not likely to follow their lead. Similarly, environmentalists and ranchers alike can dismiss an environmentalist rancher as a statistical anomaly, without altering their understanding of what it means to be a rancher.

These forms of shared valuing are not, however, merely epiphenomenal, nor are they simply the effects of aggregating individual evaluative states. The locus of the valuing is the individual, but what they treat as valuable is socially crafted. To begin with, anomalous forms of valuing can affect the distribution of evaluative tendencies, as people begin to see new ways of valuing as available alternatives (compare Shotwell 2009; Bicchieri 2016). And through a process of social diffusion, this kind of process can eventually cause shifts in the prevalence and distribution of individual practices of valuing. As cultural learners we tend to preferentially imitate in-group members whose beliefs are backed up by 'credibility enhancing displays'; and, when the people who belong to the same groups or demographics as us dedicate time and effort to acting in accordance with particular forms of valuing, we tend to see their behavior as an honest signal that we should also treat these things as valuable (Henrich 2009; Norenzayan & Gervais 2013). So, while one can engage in ranching without developing shared forms of valuing with other ranchers, and while one can repeatedly partake in the relevant activities without endorsing the evaluative practices of other ranchers, when ranching becomes part of a person's identity, it will shape shared forms of valuing. For someone who identifies as a rancher, it is possible to reject any particular form of valuing that is typically possessed by ranchers, but it is difficult—and perhaps impossible—to reject all forms of valuing that are constitutive of ranching while maintaining this identity.

This kind of shared valuing opens space for a minimal sort of normative authority: ranchers can call upon one another *qua* ranchers to be responsive to forms of valuing that are shared by fellow ranchers. The normative force of such calls will derive primarily from attempts to maintain one's practical identity (Doris 2015). But this form of shared valuing can shape social practices, affect individual patterns of action and deliberation, and frame the way that members of particular demographics perceive salient features of the world. It does so by guiding the behavior of group members *qua* group members (cf., Phelan, Arico, & Nichols 2013; Ludwig 2017). And while this kind of shared valuing emerges in the absence of a collective actor, individuals with similar identities possess some

standing to demand compliance, and to criticize failures, because they give one another the normative power to hold one another in their identities. The standing to make demands and to criticize in this way is, of course, conditional. A rancher will only have this normative standing if other ranchers see them as members of their demographic. Put differently, where people see one another as sources of shared knowledge and shared understanding, they can confer standing on one another to shape a shared identity (Echterhoff et al 2009). But unlike more familiar cases where an agent's identity exerts normative force on only their own actions, the normative force inherent in a social identity has an other-directing component. Fellow snowmobilers, ranchers, or environmentalists have authority over what the constitutive forms of valuing are for snowmobilers, ranchers, or environmentalists. Together, the members of these loosely aggregated groups constitute these social identities, and together they can shape what they want this identity to be. The demand to comply with shared forms of valuing will thereby misfire only if it relies on a mistaken assumption about what the target agent treats as valuable, or if the evaluative tendency, while common between the agent demanding compliance and the target of that demand, is not a part of an identity they have in common. This fact allows shared valuing to take on a life of its own.

In such contexts, changes in background conditions can influence individual forms of valuing, and endorsing shared forms of valuing can reinforce one's identity as a group member. Once in place, shared valuing can even provide structure for future activities. So even when valuing is shared in this modest way, it can come to have a greater significance than analogous individual valuing. Assumptions about shared valuing can play a significant role in the coordination of many kinds of individual behavior, as well as the allocation of common pool resources. And where forms of valuing are likely to diverge, a better understanding of these patterns of divergence can sometimes foster increased empathy in political debates, as well as more successful concessions across divergent demographics. Finally, because we attune to the behaviors of people around us, shared valuing can influence background regularities rather than merely being influenced by them. By acting in ways that converge with the actions of other group members, we therefore drive the entrenchment of shared valuing and increase its pervasiveness; and this pattern of reinforcement can make it harder to diverge from shared forms of valuing (Bicchieri 2016). Recognizing this fact demonstrates a limitation of overly restrictive analysis of shared valuing: they obscure the importance of shared forms of valuing that occur in the absence of a collective agent.

Just as importantly, because shared valuing can arise in the absence of any structured collective action, and since the individual remains the sole and only possible locus of valuation, these forms of shared valuing are difficult to revise. The only way to change them is by modifying the structural conditions that give rise to them, or by generating a large-scale shift among the individuals that happen to share them (Bicchieri 2016). Unfortunately, the patterns of reciprocal feedback between individual evaluations and structural regularities make such

changes exceedingly unlikely. This can be a problem when morally troubling forms of valuing are inculcated in large groups that lack a central decision making procedure, and this problem can become exacerbated when such values become more ingrained within individuals because valuing is shared with others. This suggests that even this form of shared valuing is more than the effect of aggregating individual forms of valuing, and that it has a force that is more robust than would come about as a result of common knowledge.

3. Shared valuing and acting together: A problem of standing

As we have argued thus far, there are good reasons to expand the scope of shared valuing beyond cases involving joint commitments and collective intentional actors. Nonetheless, as we argue in this section, the organizational structure of a group often generates further normative expectations through norms of constitutive membership. Members of a group decide to punish patterns of deviance from shared valuing, either by engaging in forms of active social shaming, or by excluding those who fail to give uptake to those forms of valuing. These factors allow shared valuing to play a constitutive role in guiding the behavior of individuals *qua* group members. And as long as a group continues to view a form of valuing as constitutive of group membership, sanctions are likely to play an important role in coordinating collective decision making, and sustaining the norms governing membership (Henrich & Boyd 2001). Yet, we argue that any analysis of shared valuing must acknowledge that it is often unclear what people share in contexts of shared valuing, and that this vagueness always threatens to undermine the standing to rebuke or to make demands of one another in well structured collectives.

To begin with, shared valuing can be tightly coupled to a group's identity, and can thereby frame potential courses of collective action. For example, when a diversity committee is convened at a university, we should be able to predict with a high degree of certainty that the members of this committee will treat the valuing of curricular diversity as essential to group membership. Such predictions should also be highly robust, as people who abandon this form of valuing should be unlikely to remain members of this committee, and the centrality of this form of valuing to group membership should explain why new members will generally share it. Patterns of interpersonal feedback and criticism that are established by the orienting goals and commitments of this committee should make it difficult to modify the centrality of this form of valuing without radically changing the nature of the group, or perhaps even dissolving it.

Shared valuing can also influence collective action more directly. Consider, for example, an academic department that treats intellectual and ideological diversity as valuable (redacted for blind review). Each department member might research different cultural traditions, develop strategies for making their courses less colonialist, and discuss their discipline with people who have been trained outside of the Anglo-European tradition. These practices may then ground syllabus design and affect individual teaching strategies. But beyond the

similar evaluative tendencies among the individual faculty members, shared forms of valuing can emerge that both influence, and are influenced by, department-relevant decisions that are not straightforwardly reducible to the decisions of individual group members (cf., List & Pettit 2011). This can occur either because department members expect one another to make particular kinds of decisions, or because people who deviate from shared practices are excluded from future decision making. But once these shared forms of valuing are in place, they can underwrite hiring plans as well as course offerings, and their impact will play an ongoing role in shaping the department. For example, job candidates will have to evaluate their willingness to adopt this form of valuing, treat it as a reason for acting, and perhaps even abandon antecedent conflicting assumptions about what is valuable. And this will be because the shared valuing of intellectual and ideological diversity influences the collective actions of the department.

Forms of value-shaping can also occur in ways that affect dynamic patterns of collective action. For example, a roller derby team might decide to treat defensive fundamentals as valuable above all else. The coaches on this team might influence the team's behavior by taking these forms of valuing into account as they create practice agendas, provide feedback to skaters, and create competitive line-ups. As a result, individual skaters will internalize forms of valuing that privilege defensive fundamentals. Once the prevalence of these new forms of valuing became common knowledge, the members of the team will adjust their priorities in light of the things that their teammates treat as valuable. Through the endorsement of shared forms of valuing, group members will begin to play a more robust role in stabilizing the forms of valuing that guide joint-activities. As a result, the psychological pressures to preserve interpersonal consistency will increase in ways that sustain forms of means-end coherence that are structured around group-relevant activities (Bratman 2014; Pacherie 2012). Valuing can thus become shared because of the role it takes in the guidance of team behavior. On a more individualized level, this might mean that team members reliably privilege shared forms of valuing when considering individual team-related behavior, such as whether to spend a free night devoted to their fitness, focusing on their skating skills, or watching footage of future opponents. But more robustly, these forms of valuing can also influence how the team practices, what plays are called, and how team members play together in ways that are responsive to real-time variations on the track (This difference becomes particularly salient in this example, since roller derby is one of the only sports where both teams play offense and defense simultaneously). The upshot is that shared valuing can often provide normative standards against which individuals calibrate their own patterns of valuing, and it can thereby influence both individual and collective action. This yields the ability to demand compliance with shared forms of valuing, and to criticize one another for failures to live up to them.

Unfortunately, there is an underlying difficulty for grounding the standing members possess to call on one another to treat something as valuable when

they are also acting together: In accounting for the distinctive kinds of normative standing that emerge through shared valuing, one must be able to demonstrate that the standing to call on one's fellow participants is not merely a side effect of members calling on their fellow participants to do their fair share. After all, acting within a well-structured collective generates robust duties to fellow participants, even in cases where group members do not share forms of valuing (Gilbert 2000; Rawls 1999). So, sometimes the standing to demand compliance with shared forms of valuing takes on an instrumental character, as participants in a collective endeavor call upon one another to live up to a shared value merely as an indirect way to call on another to do their fair share. If participants in a collective endeavor are to possess the standing to make demands of one another and to criticize one another *because* there are shared forms of valuing, there must be some *further* reason why it is inapt to reject or dismiss such a call. Importantly, that reason cannot be that participants have jointly committed to valuing something together, because it is often unclear precisely what people share when they share forms of valuing, and this vagueness threatens to undermine the standing people possess to make demands of one another, and to criticize one another.

Such concerns are not exclusive to shared valuing. When we make promises, there is often room for reasonable disagreement about whether a particular action fulfills the promise. Likewise, when we make plans with others, there is often room for disagreement about whether a particular action counts as abandoning that plan. But this vagueness is compounded where forms of valuing are shared tacitly, and where they are shared explicitly but imprecisely. This worry is most pronounced where shared forms of valuing emerge in the absence of explicit joint commitments. But even when agents make explicit commitments to shared valuing within a well-structured collective, the demand to treat something as valuable can often be met with replies that undercut its normative force. It is almost always possible to say, "I am committed to our shared goal, and I value the same ends as you—but not in a way that requires *that* action." The questions in these cases are about *what precisely* they have committed to valuing together, and what doing so requires. While participants often have a pretty good sense of what action would be required to fulfil a promise or to follow through on a plan, it is often difficult to say what is required for someone to express that they value freedom, equality, fidelity, or faithfulness in any particular case. Our promises typically specify particular actions, or classes of actions, that must be carried out; by contrast, the sharing of values tends to require internalized dispositions to treat something as valuable, and to do so in a way that can guide both action, and the motivation to act.[7] Moreover, unlike calls to fulfill one's promises, calls to act in accordance with shared forms of valuing are often a way in which members attempt specify precisely what they are valuing

[7] We suspect the same goes for collective intentions—vagueness is the exception to the rule—but considering that suspicion would take us too far afield from the scope of the current investigation.

together.[8] With promising, vagueness is the exception to the rule; with shared valuing, vagueness is the rule, and clarity is the (perhaps never fully realized) exception.

In light of these considerations, we contend that focusing on joint commitments as the normatively significant events that ground shared forms of valuing risks misidentifying the source of the normative standing to make demands and to criticize one another. Much like the standing friends have to call on one another to act in accordance with the dictates of their friendship, the standing to call upon others to act in accordance with shared forms of valuing develops over time—whether that standing develops among individuals or among members of a collective. Of course, in some cases gaining such standing may *seem* rather instantaneous. If the members of a collective value something, and someone joins that collective, we may be able to isolate the moment at which one individual gains the standing to call upon others to act in accordance with shared forms of valuing—the particular moment when they are seen as a member of that group. In this case, the relevant standing already exists, and is taken up by committing to become a member. But this case merely pushes the requirement for etiological account of shared valuing back a step. For it is still not clear how members of the collective *qua* members of the collective gain the standing to call on one another to act in accordance with shared forms of valuing. Whatever standing people possess with respect to shared forms of valuing will depend upon the particular way in which forms of valuing are internalized as well as the means of internalizing that form of valuing. In other words, for the standing to call upon others to act in accordance with shared forms of valuing to have any normative bite, there must be a shared history that ensures that people *share the same form of valuing, in the same way*, a requirement that necessitates an analysis of the way in which valuing comes to be shared *over time*.

4. Etiology and normative status

Clarifying the precise content of practices of shared valuing in real-world organizations is no easy task, but we believe the best way to address this issue is to consider the real-world complexity of how shared forms of valuing emerge within well-structured collectives, and how members come to internalize forms of valuing. It is through exploring those questions, we contend, that the theoretical and empirical complexities of sharing values begin to emerge, complexities that are generally ignored when the ontologically-laden *shared values* or *collective values* are treated as normatively distinct states. We realize that some will find this type of investigation to be more useful considered merely as a descriptive task about agents' psychological states and patterns of valuing. However, we

[8] This fact opens up intriguing possibilities which we explore in more detail in Section 4.

contend that such an approach also generates normative claims to call upon one another to treat something as valuable.[9]

We thus turn to questions about how forms of valuing come to be internalized over time in real world case, in the hopes that doing so can provide insights about what is required for shared valuing. More specifically, we consider two paradigmatic ways for values to be shaped and shared. The first is exemplified by the U.S. Military, where forms of valuing are adopted by a leader or leaders (e.g., the department head, the college dean, or the provost), and are passed down to group members through centrally organized patterns of training and criticism. The second is exemplified by the Zapatistas of Chiapas, who rely on forms of interpersonal communication, criticism, and mutual adjustment to entrench new forms of valuing through forms of social learning. Obviously, these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and any real world group will use both strategies to greater or lesser extents. Nonetheless, to clarify how shared valuing emerges and becomes stable, it is useful to consider a somewhat idealized version of each approach.

4.1 Top-down control over values: The U.S. military

There is perhaps no better example of how valuing is propagated in a hierarchically organized, top-down structure than the U.S. Military. In fact, there are very few institutions that talk about values as much as military organizations. To cite just a few examples, West Point preaches "Duty, Honor, Country" (Ambrose 1999); the U.S. Army has codified the values of "Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage" (Kusch 2011); the U.S. Navy proclaims core values of "Honor, Courage, and Commitment" (Core Values Charter 2007); the U.S. Air Force has instantiated the core values of "Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do" (Little Blue Book 1997); and perhaps most famously of all, the Marine motto "*Semper Fidelis"* [always faithful] expresses a shared value as well.

Service members share some forms of valuing only minimally, at least initially. For example, people in the military tend to treat things like honesty and integrity as valuable. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the presence of these forms of valuing is not entirely contingent. The military focuses recruitment efforts on individuals that antecedently treat these things as valuable, as military missions often require actions that align with these values. But more importantly, the military stresses the significance of valuing these things by embedding these values in forms of drilling, training, and explicit evaluative education. These forms of valuing are thus set out explicitly, and passed downward through forms of training and teaching; and this allows new recruits to rapidly and reliably acquire

[9] Whether one takes such an investigation as an alternative to Gilbert's framework or merely a further analysis of what a joint commitment to value something together looks like in more complicated real-world cases depends upon how one interprets Gilbert's joint commitment framework. Regardless, however, such interpretative questions are beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

evaluative capacities that can play a role in coordinating behavior in situations that induce high levels of stress and enormous cognitive loads. Moreover, since we tend to act habitually in situations of high stress and high cognitive load, these deeply entrenched forms of evaluative cognition must be generated to sustain high-stress forms of coordination and cooperation (Crockett 2013; Schwabe & Wolf 2013). Furthermore, habits that would prove problematic in these situations must be overwritten, so training must occur in a way that prevents the trainees from backsliding into previously accepted forms of valuing. Whatever one thinks about the flaws of the training that one finds in the U.S. Military, it provides one of the few examples of a highly controlled environment where forms of valuing can successfully be inculcated into group members in a rapid and reliable fashion.

Shared valuing often displays another collective aspect when explicitly articulated values are contravened. In recent memory, for example, Army Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair was accused of sexual assaulting a subordinate and threatening to kill her (Zucchino 2014), a contractor in Southeast Asia bribed scores of Naval Officers in order to increase his own business interest (Whitlock 2016), and Air Force missiliers were caught texting each other answers to proficiency exams (Cooper 2014). After such incidents, individuals are held accountable for their misdeeds, and leadership typically promises a re-dedication to shared valuing and to ethics (Wong & Gerras 2015). This re-dedication often takes the form of an increased focus on rectifying the deficiencies of individual forms of valuing, through shifts in patterns of recruitment, retention, and training. In light of our arguments above, the reason for this should be clear: The military takes these failures to reveal problems with individually-held, but nonetheless shared forms of valuing. Where the relevant evaluative practices are lacking, this reveals either an individual failure, or a failure of the training regimen that should have cultivated the appropriate forms of valuing. And with values like honesty, fidelity, and commitment, the U.S. military acts to manage the things that individuals treat as valuable from the top-down. Perhaps ironically, doing so makes these shared forms of valuing more collective, as individual forms of valuing are further shaped by the collective practices in which they operate. While honesty and fidelity are typically valued by individual members of the military, these evaluative tendencies are intentionally cultivated shaped, and entrenched through a training program that is subject to group level pressures; and this is significant, as these training programs can be altered when empirical evidence indicates that members aren't treating the right things as valuable. As the military tries to assess training programs and alter them to properly inculcate the desired results, forms of valuing become integrated into ongoing collective efforts, and thereby become more actively shared.

For three mutually reinforcing reasons, the response to the contravening of these values also demonstrates a more robust form of shared valuing. First, the fact that an agent can feel the force of correction for deviation demonstrates that they share a form of valuing. But this is not a matter of sheer conformity;

where people are working together to cultivate shared forms of valuing, reminders of how actions violate evaluative expectations can be a powerful and productive force; so long as we see each other as cooperative partners, this form of 'calling in' can help us to adjust our behavior and our evaluative assumptions in light of shared goals or values (cf., Trần 2016). Second, actions that pull an agent away from shared valuing are typically experienced first personally as a wrong to be corrected by shifting one's own behavior, rather than by changing the structure of the group. Finally, more active forms of shared valuing are generally tied to the group's larger aims; so where revision does occur, it is because the members of a group are trying to shape their actions in accordance with the forms of valuing and with the interests they share *qua* group members.

In the case of the U.S. military, these forms of valuing become even more robustly shared when leadership takes an interest in shaping background conditions so that individual actions are more likely to be aligned with the values they share. Consider, for example, difficulties with Iraqi Security Forces as U.S. forces have tried to transition out of that country. While the exact number of desertions, defections, and outright refusals to fight remains unclear, there are several documented cases where thousands of Iraqi Security Personnel either refused to fight or abandoned their post (*e.g.,* in the Battle for Bashra in 2008 (Cordsmen & Mausner 2009, 24) and fights with Daesh forces in Mosul in 2014 (Fahim and Al-Salhy 2014)). Regardless of whether the problem involves some deficiency of individual virtue, it would be incredibly shortsighted of leaders not to seek out the systemic conditions that made such displays more likely. In fact, in the wake of these incidents, military leaders concluded that it is almost impossible to separate questions about individual courage and fidelity from questions about planning, training, leadership, and the background conditions in which courage and fidelity must be displayed (Cordsmen and Mausner 2009, 25-26). The valuing of courage is thereby more robustly shared because failures lead not only to a change in training and recruitment, but also a change in collective behavior in an attempt to make such failures less frequent.

Finally, shared valuing can become fully collective when top-down structural mechanisms make collective action in alignment with particular values more likely. The structural mechanisms that guide and sustain the valuing of strategic thinking serve as a great example on this score. Individuals are responsible for knowledge of doctrine and for valuing strategy; and individual service members are routinely reminded of the importance of the knowing doctrine and precepts of strategy. In the United States, for instance, both are stressed heavily as part of the education at Senior Service Schools (Joint Pub 1 2013). In addition, however, there are structural requirements that ensure that the organization *itself* will possess these values. In large military bureaucracies, the ability to align individual actions with the overarching strategy and doctrine is paramount. Military doctrine thereby explicitly requires strategic thinking that is integrated with, and unified across, individual actors as well as across different subgroups within the larger collective endeavor (JP 3-0 I-8).

4.2 Bottom-up control over values: El Movimiento Zapatista

While there is a military presence among the Zapatistas of Chiapas, their theoretical and practical orientation towards valuing couldn't be more different from what we find in the US Military. There is perhaps no better example of how valuing is propagated upward in a decentralized system than we find among the Zapatistas. They rely upon radically democratic processes to cultivate and entrench robust forms of shared valuing that are continually reinforced through patterns of mutual aid and mutual support (Starr et al 2011, 103). Generally, the Zapatistas see themselves as participants in a shared struggle to entrench shared valuing through democratic practices that require consulting everyone who is affected by a decision or a policy (Marcos 1996a/2001, 118). And over the past twenty years, they have developed a relational understanding of autonomy, grounded in the expression of dignity (Holloway 1998; Lynd & Grubacic 2008; Mora 2003).

Among the Zapatistas, valuing dignity is something that is learned through practices of democratic engagement, and through forms of prefigurative practice designed to decolonialize individual psychologies, and to entrench novel forms of self-respect that help them (individually and collectively) to see one another as normative equals (Harvey 2016; Marcos 1995/2001, 269). The key thing to notice, here, is the bi-directional flow of information between democratic practices and the valuing of dignity: neither can exist without the other, and each sustains the possibility of the other. Individuals treat dignity as valuable, and this sustains collective practices; likewise, the resulting collective practices are grounded on the pursuit of social equality and the cultivation of deeply shared goals and shared forms of valuing. As with the case of honesty and integrity among members of the US military, the valuing of dignity is able to be internalized because it is grounded in shared background assumptions, as well as locally prevalent normative practices. But valuing dignity is not something that can be studied abstractly, "you live it or it dies, it aches inside you and teaches you how to walk" (Marcos 1995/2001, 269). This happens through a process of social learning and internalization. In attempting to characterize this process, Subcomandante Marcos (1996b/2001, 11) asks us to imagine a woman who "struggles for democracy, liberty and justice, the same as the Zapatistas" but who is not yet recognized—by herself or by anyone else—as a Zapatista; day after day, she struggles for equality and dignity within her family and her culture. Her struggle is her own. But as she struggles, she eventually sees that the Zapatista's treat the same things that she does as valuable, and she begins to see the significance of shared forms of valuing (Marcos 1996b/2001, 11). Importantly, this form of shared valuing does not require the emergence of new values—by recognizing that forms of valuing are shared, and by recognizing that she is part of a *shared struggle* against structural exclusion and marginalization, she comes to see the Zapatista movement as a "mirror of her rebellion, of her hope" (Marcos 1996b/2001, 11).

Shared valuing among the Zapatistas is, however, typically managed by communal forms of social control, mutual support, and mutual aid. The core mechanism for the cultivation of shared valuing derives from the sense that other Zapatistas are to be trusted, as they share similar values and commitments (Starr et al 2011, 114). And within these groups where members trust one another and listen to one another, backward-looking forms of punishment have been replaced with forward-looking forms of sanction that serve to deepen, rather than compromise group membership. Put differently, they retain the communicative and exhortative function of blame as constitutive of forward-looking practices of behavior-shaping and value-shaping; but they set aside the appraisal functions of blame that tend to dominate contemporary liberal approaches to responsibility (cf. Zheng 2016). Consequently, even the most robust forms of punishment are designed to highlight the shared ways of valuing of equality and dignity. 'Punishment' typically takes the form of increased contributions to the community (e.g., by planting trees, building schools, or working on material infrastructure that is necessary for community flourishing); and these forms of 'punishment' are temporary and followed by a full return to community membership without a criminal record (though in extreme cases, permanent expulsion from the community can occur; see Starr et al 2011, 106).

Like the top-down control over valuing by the military, this form of bottom-up control can yield highly robust forms of shared valuing. Moreover, the democratic cultivation of valuing appears to foster a deep feeling of ownership over the values that are shared (Cuninghame & Corona 1998; Esteva 1999). The reason for this is simple. The Zapatistas engage in practices that are designed to shift the relevant background regularities in ways that inculcate the valuing of equality and democracy. For example, they have built new schools to shift what people can be expected to know, they have banned alcohol (after recognizing that alcohol consumption has a negative impact on public health), and they have worked to ensure that women have equal access to resources and to practices of shared deliberation. In this context, a process of social learning, based on patterns of feedback between individual valuing and collective practices then allows individual Zapatistas to recognize that they have a right to create a better world *together with other Zapatistas,* by struggling to entrench shared ideals of democracy, liberty, and justice. Across a variety of interactions, ranging from *escuelita* to public communiques, from local deliberations to interactions with the Mexican government, the Zapatistas strive to cultivate ways of valuing dignity and equality, as well as a corresponding willingness to listen to others, which makes this kind of social learning possible (Lynd & Grubacic 2008). In fact, they frequently argue that these forms of valuing are the only plausible foundation upon which democratic practices can be built (Cuninghame & Corona 1998). Shared valuing thus helps to undergird these practices, and it is explicitly understood as constitutive of group membership, even though the specification of what is valuable—*i.e.* what it means to respect dignity and equality—always emerges from the bottom and percolates up through patterns of mutual engagement to yield patterns of ongoing and coordinated activity. In each case,

shared valuing emerges from a desire to maintain local control over available resources, and to do so in ways that unseat neoliberal ideology (Esteva 1999).

4.3 Changing forms of valuing

Despite numerous differences in the forms of valuing that we find in the U.S. Military and the forms of valuing that arise among the Zapatistas, we contend that the conditions under which novel practices of valuing emerge are similar in these groups. As we argued earlier the groups to which we belong often provide us with reasons to treat particular things as valuable; and the groups to which we belong often provide an environment where we can cultivate novel forms of shared valuing. In each of these cases, shared valuing builds upon a foundation of existing patterns of evaluative reasoning. And in each case, a form of social learning operates through feedback relations. In light of the considerations we have raised thus far, we suggest that changing what people treat as valuable generally requires: 1) a foundation to build upon (e.g., antecedently shared goals, interests, or activities), 2) a way of discovering points where new forms of valuing should be cultivated, and 3) a method for integrating new forms of valuing into ongoing group behavior. Unsurprisingly, differently structured groups tend to satisfy these constraints in different ways.

As the Zapatista movement has evolved, for instance, it has had to adapt to changes in the economic and political landscape of Mexico that would have been unpredictable when the movement went public in 1994. The Zapatistas have constantly worked to find novel ways of sustaining local forms of power and challenging the psychological and social forces that entrench neoliberal attitudes (Harvey 2016). We see this most explicitly in the ongoing attempts to foster robust forms of democratic control over shared practices. Attendance at community consultations is compulsory, and participation in community governance rotates through the community (Starr et al 2011, 113). Since everyone plays a role in shared decision-making at every level, community members come to understand precisely what is at stake in ongoing self-governance. Consequently, the bottom-up strategies for evaluative learning that we find among the Zapatistas allow for enhanced feelings of ownership over new forms of valuing that emerge, and it increases sensitivity to local patterns of variation. Everyone feels like group decisions are their own; and by cultivating deeply democratic values, the Zapatistas have opened up space for a process of social learning through emergent consensus.

Through processes of mutual deliberation, the Zapatistas continually enhance shared forms of valuing in light of the specific needs and interests of particular community members (this is why it is hard to specify precisely what Zapatistas treat as valuable beyond dignity and equality: their more specific forms of valuing are constantly changing). This is possible, in part, because Zapatistas treat listening to one another as valuable, and they work to cultivate observable tendencies to listen to one another in public deliberations (Starr et al 2011, 108). Where disagreements arise, most of us try to call attention to the

mistakes others have made, or to the errors in their assumptions. Familiarly, this practice often backfires, generating forms of gridlock that become insuperable because of divergent assumptions about what is valuable (the cases we discuss in Section 1 are paradigmatic examples of this phenomenon). The Zapatistas provide an alternative practice for navigating evaluative disagreements, yielding a form of evaluative-shaping that allows group members to move past initial disagreements, and toward shared commitments that can underwrite the guidance of shared actions. Drawing on resources from liberation theology (Freire 1970), and from practices of walking together in struggle (Lynd 2012), they suggest that evaluative learning should always proceed by 1) listening, 2) getting clear about why others treat the things they do as valuable, and 3) coming to a shared understanding of why others have the concerns that matter to them. This process requires treating others as normative equals, with equal power, and with their own experiences that can shed light on shared problems and shared commitments. And significantly, discussions made in this context can often open up possibilities that were not previously acknowledged (redacted for blind review). The reason for this is simple: This context provides a firm foundation for constructing and maintaining forms of valuing that are consistent with the needs and interests of everyone involved. Where this process is successful, it can create shared forms of valuing that are novel and sensitive to the diversity of previously operative values.

Top-down hierarchical structures like those found in the US Military, by contrast, allow for more rapid and targeted forms of control over the revision, interpretation, and specification of shared forms of valuing. Since each decision about shared valuing is made by a person (or a small group of people) in a position of power, there is substantially less variation regarding which forms of valuing are to be pursued, as well as less variation in judgments about how to implement the cultivation of shared valuing. Moreover, since revisions are guided by centralized decisions, they can be made without recourse to local patterns of variation that might otherwise stand in the way of instituting new forms of valuing. Consequently, in this context, shared valuing can, and often does, change quickly when that becomes necessary.

Consider the policy transition that took place after two decades of ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’ (DADT). DADT was the official U.S. military policy from 1994 to 2011 regarding service by gay, lesbian, and bisexual personal. The policy ended the military’s previous practice of requiring (on penalty of perjury) incoming service members to affirm they were not gay, lesbian, or bisexual, but did not allow them to do anything that would affirm the fact that they were, in fact, gay, lesbian, or bisexual. The repeal of DADT involved a large-scale change in valuing, an acceptance of behavior that had been banned, and a move away from the temporary—and at the time novel—value that DADT had put in place: that a military member’s personal life was not the concern of her fellow service members. Despite significant concerns—Senator John McCain famously worried about the grave damage to the morale and readiness of U.S. forces—the repeal of this policy is now viewed by many, including many who were opposed to the

decision, as a near non-event with no impact on readiness or overall morale (Belkin et. al 2012, 10-14). Indeed, many officers report that removing DADT has helped them to better ensure troop readiness because Commanders had felt reticent to ask personal questions, lest they learn something they would have to report (Belkin et. al 2012, 14-15).

The reason the change (once it was finally implemented) was so seamless lies partly with the fact that these new forms of valuing were revised from the top-down, and integrated with existing, and widely-accepted forms of shared valuing. In the Marine Corps, for example, the policy change was accompanied by a message from the Commandant General Amos, which placed these forms of valuing within a larger framework antecedently embraced by Marines: “As we implement repeal, I want all leaders at all levels to reemphasize the importance of maintaining *dignity* and *respect* for one another throughout our force. We are Marines. We care for and respect *all those* who wear this uniform” (emphasis original) (O’Keefe 2011). Importantly, this was not merely an assertion made from the top, the change was immediately coordinated into training and education, which were designed to entrench a change in shared valuing. Indeed, there is no way that such a change in shared valuing could be so broad in scope and so immediate were it not driven from the top-down, placed within a larger set of previously accepted values, and incorporated into training and education. As a Navy SEAL who personally opposed repeal put it: “We’re professionals; we’ll do what we’ve done in the past” (Belkin et al 2012, 12). By placing this change in valuing within an existing practice of shared valuing, leaders were successful (more often than not) in ensuring that even if members rejected the reasoning behind the change in valuing *qua* individual, they accepted it as it was presented to them *qua* Marine, *qua* soldier, etc.

While the differences between these groups are significant, the similarities in how valuing is modified is even more striking. Perhaps most importantly, in both cases, particular forms of valuing are modified against a background of consistent, and broadly accepted forms of valuing. Both groups thereby found a way to carry out forms of creative adaptation, which allowed them to move forward and to develop new ways of being Zapatistas and new ways of being Marines. The results involve shifts in which normative expectations are perceived as legitimate by the members of the groups themselves (cf., Andrighetto et al 2015). Direct forms of sanction by peers may sometimes play a role in evoking such changes, but direct punishment is surprisingly rare in real-world groups (Guala, 2012). It is more likely that changes like these arise as group members form evaluative expectations about what other group members treat as valuable, or what the group itself believes to be worth pursuing. The Zapatistas strive to cultivate a situation where the evaluative expectations of other Zapatistas are immediately perceived as legitimate, and as worth attending to. As a result, points of evaluative consensus become sources of new values. Members of the military tend to perceive military policy, as well as the evaluative expectations of commanding officers, as legitimate. As a result, they find it easier to accept top-down commands as grounds for evaluative revision. In both cases,

these changes are placed within the context of shared valuing, and the changes are advanced as useful—perhaps, in some cases, even necessary—for the continued success of the collective endeavors in which members are engaged together.

5. The normative significance of shared valuing

Both of the strategies for cultivating shared valuing also have distinctive limitations. When individuals reason as team members, they consider the coordinated set of actions that would bring about a team's goal, and they see themselves as making a contribution against this frame (Gold 2012). In such contexts, coordination arises because participants see themselves as participants in a shared project; they see the group's ends *in some way* driving each individual's ends (c.f., Bacharach 2006; Sugden 2003). We believe something similar often drives shared valuing. And by considering questions about shared valuing from a similar perspective, we hope to shift the discussion from questions about what shared forms of valuing *are* to questions about what they *ought to be*, given our collective ends. Considering these questions can, we contend, help further illuminate important aspects of shared valuing.

When valuing is passed down from the top of a group, what is treated as valuable is, almost by definition, decided by a few people. These people are often separated from the larger set of a group's membership, and this yields several related concerns about the content of novel values. To begin with, we cannot assume that a leader will always choose the appropriate forms of valuing, in whatever way one might want to disambiguate the term 'appropriate'. In some cases, valuing may be objectively questionable or suboptimal; but more likely, it may simply be inappropriate given the group's larger aims and interests (compare Hayek 1945; Kropotkin 1995; Trotsky 1935). Often, a group's leaders will be unaware of how its membership will respond to a particular change in valuing; and often their information will be out of date by the time they make their decisions about what should be done. This ignorance could, in extreme cases, lead to leaders choosing forms of valuing that are not appropriately situated for members within existing forms of shared valuing, thereby leading to shirking of collective associative responsibilities by those lower in the hierarchical structure, a state of affairs that can ironically lead to a breakdown in the very structures that changes in valuing were meant to protect (Feaver 2005).

Top-down control over shared valuing also requires robust patterns of drilling and training to ensure that group-relevant assignments of value will continue to be sufficiently central that they are not overridden by contrasting individual assumptions about what is valuable. But we cannot assume that the patterns of drilling and training will generate the precise tendencies to value that are required. This drawback is perhaps less pronounced in well-structured, hierarchical groups. However, even here, resource limitations quickly place limits on the ability for evaluative tendencies to be altered from the top-down. There are current cases in the Navy, for instance, where individual sailors may be

required to fulfill as many as 1500 hours of mandatory training per year (Commander 2012). Unsurprisingly, in such an environment, training is often marked as "completed" without actually inculcating any new patterns of behavior (Wong & Gerras 2015). (To cite one particularly striking example, one of the authors of this article may or may not have written this sentence while undergoing required Operational Security training). Top-down control over shared valuing also faces difficulties when it comes to ensuring that patterns of interpersonal correction will generate tendencies to value things that accord with the needs and interests of the group. This limitation derives, in part, from the fact that individuals who share evaluative commitments are likely to make similar mistakes and to correct one another in ways that push them back toward practices of valuing that they were trying to overcome. But just as significantly, group membership is rarely pervasive in the lives of group members, and conflicting forms of evaluative learning will often lead to forms of evaluative backsliding, with no stable mechanism to push members back toward the forms of shared valuing they are aiming to cultivate. In short, it is difficult to guarantee that top-down signals for valuing will be taken up and internalized deeply enough to prevent I-framed valuing from dominating decision-making.

These points of failure are *precisely* the points where bottom-up cultivations of shared valuing tend to succeed. By carefully tracking, and dynamically updating in light of the interests of other group members, it is possible to develop and sustain patterns of coordination without a top-down signal. As we noted in the previous section, the bottom-up cultivation of shared valuing occurs as individuals change their own evaluative assumptions and preferences in light of their interactions with other group members. This fact implies that the cultivation of valuing together doesn't necessarily require a we-framing; instead it can occur as individual-frames shift in ways that are context dependent, local, and situation relevant, a situation that yields an alternative form of social learning resulting from a convergence of ongoing cycles of reciprocal updating. Importantly, this feature aligns well with recent models of cooperation that recognize that coordination can arise through these dynamic patterns of updating, even without we-framing (Tummolini & Stirling in prep).

Unfortunately, valuing that is constructed from the bottom-up is often difficult to transfer to similarly situated collective enterprises. For instance, in spite of the normative salience of shared valuing to other similar organizations (e.g., the other groups throughout Mexico that were targeted by *La otra campaña* and the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* in Brazil), it has proven difficult to export Zapatista assumptions about what is valuable to others. We contend that part of the reason for this difficulty stems from the etiology of shared valuing. As we argued above, evaluative updating occurs through changes in individual evaluations. In cases where these changes bubble up from the bottom of a group, they do so as a result of interactions with others who share assumptions about what is valuable. This is not simply a matter of identity, although group identification does arise among the Zapatistas. One of the key benefits of bottom-up structures of value-propagation is that valuing remains

context dependent, local, and changeable; and it does so because social learning allows individual values to converge while continuing to 'ache inside each individual and teach each individual to walk' (Marcos 1995/2001, 269). Simplifying somewhat, we might say that it is through ongoing cycles of reciprocal evaluative updating that stable patterns of valuing emerge (Tummolini & Stirling in prep). Once we recognize this, however, it becomes clear why such patterns of valuing are nearly impossible to export. Since they depend on individual patterns of local updating, which flow upward through a group, any attempt to adjust forms of valuing must begin with the existing patterns of valuing that we find in individuals. Where there are shared struggles, minimal forms of shared valuing can emerge, and this can provide a foundation for cultivating more robust forms of shared valuing. However, unless there are other group members who treat those ways as valuable, who are willing to foster the cultivation of these evaluative assumptions, and who are willing to sanction deviation from those practices of valuing, they are unlikely to stabilize. Because Zapatista forms of valuing depend on Zapatista democracy, and visa-versa, the emergence of converging forms of valuing in a non-Zapatista space becomes increasingly unlikely.

This limitation also suggests that attempts to entrench equality and dignity in social practice, even among the Zapatistas, cannot be successful unless there are ongoing patterns of reciprocal updating to sustain their stability and robustness. And even where changes in what people treat as valuable do emerge, the change is often slow. In part, this is why the Zapatistas sometimes fail to live up to their expressed ideals. For example, "only a quarter to (rarely) half of the *junta* representatives are women, short of the intended gender equity" (Starr et al 2011, 106). There is an ongoing recognition that this is a failing, and many Zapatistas recognize that they need to work harder to confront the structural issues that make it harder for women to play a robust role in the *juntas* (Olivera 2005). There is reason to believe that shared valuing, and corresponding commitments to addressing gender-based inequalities, have had a significant impact on health inequalities in Chiapas (Gallegos & Quinn 2017). But modifying family values from the bottom-up is no easy task. And conflicting forms of valuing persist between family organization and concerns with social justice. Since all evaluative decisions are made from the bottom, the only forms of pressure that can be used to overcome these conflicts are lateral forms of social pressure. But when almost everyone shares male-centered family values, the kinds of social pressures that could be used to disrupt those assumptions about what is valuable become much less likely. These difficulties of changing deeply entrenched practices of valuing by using bottom-up forms of social pressure constitute the second major difficulty for forms of shared valuing that percolate up through the structure of a group.

Given these limitations, we contend that shared valuing could be more stable, context relevant, and experienced as one's own if top-down structures of control were integrated with bottom-up flows of evaluative learning. In other words, valuing would be more stable and effective if it were more *reciprocal*. In

small groups, reciprocal feedback may be relatively easy to generate and maintain. Groups can agree to set out shared goals and values that can serve as top-down signals for evaluative learning, and structures of mutual accountability and mutual identification are often readily available and sufficient to sustain the kinds of interactions necessary for reciprocally reinforced shared valuing (Boehm 2012; Norenzayan 2013; Slingerland 2014). Larger groups, on the other hand, need to cultivate strategies for maintaining and sharing forms of valuing without constant intervention, in order to avoid the difficulties regarding the precise content of shared forms of valuing highlighted in Section 2 (cf., Norenzayan et al 2016, redacted for blind review). However, those strategies would come with a large cost, as robust integration efforts regarding forms of valuing would be required up, down, and across the hierarchal structures. Perhaps unsurprisingly, larger groups therefore generally tend to privilege either forms of valuing that flows from top or forms of valuing that flows from the bottom. This means, perhaps tragically, that in our currently fragmented and fractured world, robustly shared forms of valuing, that are both stable and truly our own, may prove to be quite rare. If one believes that not something is required beyond shared forms of valuing, perhaps having some sway over the precise content of what is treated as valuable, is an important part of being the author and editor of one's own life—that it is only in those cases, to steal a phrase from Rawls that we "cease to be mere fragments"—then this could a very troubling possibility indeed (1999:52).

There may be hints of a way forward, however, a possibility of fusing the benefits of shared valuing inculcated from the top-down with those from the bottom-up—even in the largest of organizations. Consider, for example, the U.N.'s well-known Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to "spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty." (United Nations 2000:4) The MDGs represent a specification of what is valuable. They were put forward and vigorously pursued with the United Nations acting as a responsible, coordinating, and regulative mechanism. In other words, the U.N. provided a framework and a number of "wide-ranging practical steps" to further develop these shared goals together (Millennium Development Goals Report 2015). In effect, The U.N. acted as a hub, providing a novel specification of existing assumptions about what is valuable, an irreducibly collective goal, an explicit plan for coordinating their actions, and an explicit agreement as to the normative standards for evaluating the behavior of group members (cf., Ostrom 2010). Yet these shared forms of valuing were not *merely* driven from the top-down: They also motivated individuals to do their part not only to meet shared goals, but also to further shape ways of valuing (McClean 2015). The MDGs thereby allowed opportunities for all affected parties to participate in the revision process as more information became available, giving members the authority to monitor and correct each other, the ability to use various forms of sanctions (e.g., calling in; gentle nudges; explicit criticism; expulsion), and an accessible low-cost means of dispute resolution that can allow for the further shaping of these forms of valuing—from both the bottom and the top (Ostrom 1990; 2005). In effect, the U.N. put forward

claims about what was valuable that enabled people to modify the forms of valuing they shared at a more local level, thereby allowing for the local generation of new and innovative partnerships required to live together in light of those forms of valuing. The result was “the most successful anti-poverty movement in history…[lifting] more than one billion people out of extreme poverty” (United Nations 2015:3). Perhaps another result is that they can serve as a template for creating ways of valuing that our fully ours—even in a world that too often favors atomization, separation, and mere aggregation.

While it remains an open question to what extent a fully reciprocal practice of shared valuing can be maintained in the modern world, over time, this kind of valuing defeasibly creates a greater motivation to act: greater than mere interests because valuing is a conative state, one that carries with it some motivation to see that what is valued be realized or maintained; greater than similar individual practices of valuing because shared valuing inherently involves an other-directing element, an element that brings with it other-regarding reasons for action; greater than forms of valuing that are inculcated from the top-down, because more reciprocal practices of shared valuing are more likely to be regarded as one’s own; and greater than forms of valuing that are inculcated from the bottom-up, because robustly shared valuing creates more stable tendencies to treat something as valuable. So while shared valuing always depends on the beliefs or attitudes of group members, it also imposes normative constraints on group-relevant forms of practical activity. As Edward Singerland notes:

> the key to getting lots of strangers to work together is not to create an endless stream of new laws or institutions but to create a set of shared values. Laws are something you merely obey. Values are something you feel. Once internalized, values function just like other forms of hot cognition—fast, automatic, unconscious (2014: 176).

This insight seems to us to be an important one about the role that shared valuing plays in collective activity. While valuing is not the mere product of a will (either individual or collective) it is nonetheless cultivated, sculpted, and crafted. This is particularly true of shared valuing. When we act with others, we are faced with the question of what values if any we should develop, given our ends, and how ought we do so.[10] But we have, after the analysis of the second half of the paper, wound up with the opposite insight: Sometimes it is collective intentions (rather than values) that take on an instrumental character, and participants in a collective endeavor do their part *in order to* live up to a shared value. In those

[10] This claim is merely intended as a restatement of one of the problems highlighted at the end of Section 2. Sometimes the standing to demand compliance with shared forms of valuing takes on an instrumental character: Participants in a collective endeavor may call upon one another to live up to a shared value, even though shared valuing does not ground the normative standing to demand compliance and to criticize noncompliance.

cases, the presence of collective intentions does not justify shared valuing; it is instead shared valuing that grounds the motivation to act together.

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