Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council  

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development Economics 88 (1):1-18.



    Abstract: We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership.

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