Chapter 2

Theoretical Perspectives

Why do some transitions from civil war to civil peace succeed and others fail? Part of the answer can be found in theoretical perspectives on the causes, duration, and termination of civil wars. If the root causes of the war are left untreated, then the risk of war recurrence is significant. By considering what theories of civil war tell us about the structure of civil war risk, we can better understand the strategic environment within which UN peace operations function in postwar transitions.

In this chapter, we consider the implications of theories of civil war for the design and effectiveness of peacebuilding operations. We distinguish between the success of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission and the success of a peace process. In our theory, peacebuilding is a key part of the international capacities for peace that can compensate for the lack of local capacities and mute the residual hostilities of civil war. Combinations of these three dimensions – local and international capacities and hostilities—create different “ecological spaces” for peace – i.e. different opportunity structures within which actors involved in the peace process decide whether to support the peace or return to war. Both peacekeeping and peacemaking are integral parts of peacebuilding as they affect actors’ incentives to support or undermine peace implementation. Here, we engage the literature on peace spoilers and utilize basic insights from game theory to explain the conditions under which different types of peacekeeping intervention can help promote peacemaking and peacebuilding. We see peace as the outcome of a dynamic process, which is shaped partially by the
peacekeepers’ performance and their peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts and partly by the parties’ reactions to those efforts. We propose a model of the interaction between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding and highlight the importance of picking good strategies that develop out of a proper understanding of the conflict at hand. Strategic peacekeeping and peacebuilding, we argue, must match means to ends and fit within the conflict’s “ecology.”

**Internal (Civil) War and Peacebuilding**

As discussed in the previous chapter, the United Nations has evolved generations of peace operations that have shaped its peacebuilding strategy. The political strategy of a peacebuilding mandate is the concept of operations embodied in its design. Just as civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful reconstruction. Peacebuilding is about what needs to happen in between. Civil wars arise when individuals, groups and factions discover that a policeman, judge, soldier or politician no longer speaks and acts for them. Rather than “the local cop on the beat,” the cop becomes “the Croatian, Serb or Muslim cop.” When the disaffected mobilize, acquire the resources needed to risk an armed contest, and judge that they can win, civil war follows.¹

Although we can imagine purely cooperative solutions to domestic peace,² the confusion, “noise,” violence, and changing identification that characterize the onslaught and conduct of civil war do not seem to be promising circumstances for rational cooperation among factions. Instead the establishment of civil peace seems to require addressing directly both the defensive and aggressive incentives that motivate faction leaders (and sometimes their followers). Defensive incentives arise in the domestic “security dilemma.” Under emerging conditions of anarchy (the collapse of central authority) each group/faction seeks to arm itself in order to be protected; but, as in inter-state anarchy, each defensive armament constitutes a threat to other factions.³ Offensive incentives arise because factions and their leaders will want to impose their ideology or culture, to reap the spoils of state power, to seize the property of rivals, or to exploit public resources for private gain, or all of the above. Establishing peace will thus also require the elimination, management or control of “spoilers”⁴ or war entrepreneurs.⁵

Conquest by one faction can solve the problem (but even in this case political and social reconstruction can be vital for longer-term legitimacy and stability). Peace through agreement can employ the separation of populations and territorial partition to address

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² See for example, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining interethnic cooperation,” *American Political Science Review* 90 (December 1996), 715-35; but note that the authors are not, nor do they claim to be, explaining the empirical record of domestic peace. They acknowledge that state power and domestic authority are alternative explanations (see p.731).


war-prone incentives, but partition is often not successful in preventing war recurrence.7 Civil wars can be turned into international wars (as in Eritrea-Ethiopia) or stable and relatively secure international or inter-communal balances of power, as in Cyprus or Somaliland-Somalia.8 To each spoiler, his or her separate pile of spoils. But in many civil wars the contest is over who or what “ideology” controls a single polity. Moreover, in some ethnic wars the costs of ethnic “cleansing” will seem too high, or a common basis for over-arching civic citizenship exists or can be created. Combatants in these circumstances still have continuing disputes over material interests, who or what rules, and safety. They have experienced devastating destruction (though in varying degrees) and both leaders and followers are likely to harbor deep resentment for losses sustained, particularly to family and village members. They also are experiencing the costs of war and may have come to “hurting stalemate,” in which no faction sees that it can win and each is experiencing net costs of continuing strife.9 In these latter circumstances, sustainable peace needs state authority as a starting point to overcome security concerns. Hobbes’s Leviathan – state sovereignty, or authority – fills that role, restoring “legitimate power.”10


10 *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines authority: “right to command,” “power to influence action,” “power over the opinions of others.” An enlightening essay is “What is Authority” (Arendt, 1961) and an
The specific motivations that shape the behavior of combatants are thus complex and varied. The classical, Thucydidean and Hobbesian trinity of motives (fear, honor, interest) are present in modern variations—security dilemmas, ethnic identity and/or ideological fervor, and loot-seeking—and each of them is complicated by potential differences between leaders and followers, and factions and patrons. Thus, the decision to organize or participate in a rebellion and then attempt to achieve a viable peace is not a straight-forward matter and may differ greatly across actors. What each motivated actor shares, however, is a political environment in which success in achieving peace depends on the degree of harm sustained, the resources available for development, and the international assistance to overcome gaps. We map that environment as a function of local capacities, hostility, and international capacities. Low levels of economic development and other deficiencies in local capacities may motivate actors to violence, due to the low opportunity cost of war and the opportunities for private gains from violence. Increased hostility due to the experience of war makes reconciliation more difficult. To achieve peace and reconciliation under these circumstances, I.William Zartman has argued that we need some combination of (1) re-concentrating central power (the powerful must be recognized as legitimate; or the legitimate, made powerful); (2) increasing state legitimacy through participation (elections, power-sharing); and (3) raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace. Given the devastation of insightful treatment of the Hobbesian problem applied to economic development is the concept of the “stationary bandit” (Olson, 1993). See Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority,” in Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking, 1961). 91-141; Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy and Development,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993), 567-76.

civil war; all three generally require (4) external, international assistance or international authority in a transitional period.\textsuperscript{12}

It is this last dimension that is the particular focus of this book. We do not intend to model a specific decision-making framework or to predict where the UN will choose to become involved, but rather explore the determinants of successful and unsuccessful peacebuilding after civil war (while controlling for the factors that might influence the UN’s decision to intervene). What role does external international assistance play in the peace process? How much and of what kind is required? We will argue that the levels of war-related hostility and the pre- and post-war levels of local capacities interact with present international capacities to deliver specific post-conflict outcomes. And, for given levels of local capacity and hostility, we will identify the right form of international assistance to maximize the available space for peace.

\textbf{Theories of Civil War}

The literature on civil war is sizeable and rapidly growing. We review several insights on the causes of civil war and we will later link these to our theory of peacebuilding. We start with a definition of civil war.

\textbf{A Definition of Civil War}

Civil war is an armed conflict that pits the government and national army of an internationally recognized state against one or more armed opposition groups able to

\textsuperscript{12} William I. Zartman, \textit{The Elusive Peace}. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995). Not every country, however, would benefit from external mediation or intervention in its civil war. Some wars, we could
mount effective resistance against the state. The violence must be significant, causing more than a thousand deaths in relatively continual fighting which takes place within the country’s boundaries; and the rebels must recruit mostly locally, controlling some part of the country’s territory.\textsuperscript{13} By our definition, there have been 151 civil wars in the post-World War II period.\textsuperscript{14}

Political-Economic Theories of Civil War Onset

There is an assortment of theories (economic, political, psychological, rational choice, constructivist) that attempt to explain civil war. Important insights can be derived from all of these theories.

To explain the occurrence of these wars, economic theories have focused on the impact of modernization on the political mobilization of ethnic groups or social classes.\textsuperscript{15} Rapid economic change could intensify group competition for the distribution of scarce resources, leading people or groups to support rebellion.\textsuperscript{16} In ethnically divided societies,

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\textsuperscript{13} Our definition is similar to, but more precise than, several others in the literature. The coding guidelines are presented in the appendix and coding decisions and sources for each case are discussed in our online supplement. In brief, we code a new war if a peace treaty is signed and violence stops for 6 months or more, or if one side has achieves victory, leading to regime change. Civil wars can also end if there is a substantial period (at least 2-3 years) with no armed conflict. See our online supplement for details.

\textsuperscript{14} See chapter 4 and the appendix for a detailed discussion of our definition and coding rules and for a Table with all civil wars from 1944-1999.


economic competition might take an ethnic hue particularly where there is professional specialization of ethnic groups, and competition will increase if the state’s commitment to protecting individual and group interests is questioned.

More recent economic theories focus on the opportunity structure for rebellion. For each individual, there exists a tradeoff between productive and appropriative economic behavior. If property rights are not credibly supported by the state, individuals or groups will spend more of their resources to privately provide their security and will challenge the authority of the state. Violent resistance or rebellion is therefore seen as a rational decision, influenced by the economic opportunity costs of war weighed against the war’s net expected utility. War is nevertheless inefficient from a purely Coasian perspective because it is costly and reduces the net value of rents available to the state. Thus, the fact that we observe war must either be due to


20 Bates uses this model to explain patterns of state formation in Europe and Africa. See Bates, *Prosperity and Violence*.

21 This logic underpins the Collier and Hoeffler (2001) model of civil war.

incompatible preferences among key actors, or the inability to credibly commit to a
peaceful settlement of disputes.\(^{23}\)

According to these economic theories, ideology and identity need not explain the
onset of civil war and rebels are indistinguishable from criminals, “bandits,” or
“pirates.”\(^{24}\) This explanation stands in contrast to the view that ethnic divisions and
ideological differences, particularly when met by state repression, create grievances that
lead to rebellion.\(^{25}\) According to these economic theories, for a given a level of
grievance, what determines if there will be a rebellion is the ability to organize and
support an insurgency campaign. Insurgency is less likely when the state is strong\(^{26}\) and
more likely when the country has abundant natural resources that can be used to finance
rebellion,\(^{27}\) or when external support is available to the rebels.\(^{28}\) The greater the amount

\(^{23}\) Skaperdas 2001; James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* 49
(Summer 1995), 379-414. For an insightful explanation of the US civil war along these lines, see Gerald
1974: 915-950. Gunderson uses archival sources to estimate the expected utility of secession (for the
South) or war over secession (for the North) and provides evidence that such calculations took place at the
time and influenced the decision to go to war.

\(^{24}\) Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (December
(April 1999), 267-283, p. 269.

\(^{25}\) See, especially, Gurr 1993; Ted R. Gurr, *Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*
(Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2000). For a discussion of shortcomings in economic theories of
civil war, see Nicholas Sambanis, 2004a, “Expanding Economic Theories of Civil War Using Case

\(^{26}\) This is the main argument in James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, 2003, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and

\(^{27}\) Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that the relationship between natural resources and risk of civil war
should be non-linear: low levels of resources reduce risk by removing incentives to loot the natural
resources; very high levels reduce risk because they provide significant resources to the states to quell the
rebellion.
of resources that can be appropriated, and the lower the opportunity cost of rebellion (i.e. the expected gains from productive economic activity), the greater the available supply of potential rebels.

Despite the apparent clarity of these economic models, it is difficult to see “greed” and “grievance” as competitive explanations of rebellion. In rich countries, the state may be stronger, but the demand for rebellion arising out of conditions of absolute or relative deprivation of groups is also likely to be lower than in poor countries. Economic growth, which increases the opportunity cost of violence, may also help sustain democratic institutions, which may enhance the power of non-violent forms of conflict resolution. Thus, the relationship between economic and political factors is complicated and it is hard to sort out empirically the impact of each factor on the risk of civil war.

Empirical tests of economic theories of civil war have not yet produced a consensus, though some findings do appear robust. In particular, low levels of per capita income (which some authors use as a measure of poverty) exacerbate the risk of civil war. The technology of insurgency (mountainous terrain; external financing) also enhances the rebels’ ability to organize a rebellion. The negative effects of natural resources are more difficult to demonstrate, but certain types of “lootable” resources (oil, 

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28 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis “External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars” *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2433 (September 2000) consider external intervention as a factor that allows even small or relatively weak groups to rebel against a stronger state.


30 Poverty is usually measured in absolute terms (e.g. as income lower than $1 per day). But here, as in the civil war literature, we refer to per capita income as a measure of poverty.
some precious stones) have been linked to civil war. Resource predation is especially important for sustaining rebel organizations once the violence has started, though some authors find that natural resource dependence does not influence civil war duration, which contradicts that hypothesis. Elbadawi and Sambanis find no statistically significant difference in the effects of natural resource dependence on war onset and war continuation. In past research, we have found that countries with a high dependence on natural resources face greater difficulties in post-war peacebuilding.

In contrast to theories that focus on the role of economic variables, political scientists have generally focused on the association between group incentives, capacities, and opportunities for rebellion. Among the key factors influencing group capacities and opportunities for rebellion are regime characteristics and political instability. According to Gurr and Hegre et al., rebellion is the product of political grievance and

31 Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003.

32 Collier and Hoeffler 2001; M. Berdal and D. M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000).


35 Doyle and Sambanis (2000); Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).


37 According to Plato, rebellion would occur only when elites were weakened.
opportunity for organized action. Therefore, the risk of civil war is greatest in so-called anocracies—regimes that are neither democratic enough to reduce grievance nor autocratic enough to suppress the early stages of organization for rebellion in its early phases. Autocracies can effectively repress opposition, while deep democracies can resolve their conflicts peacefully. However, despite this theorizing, the statistical evidence on the relationship between democracy and civil war onset is weak. Some preliminary evidence exists, linking peace to proportional representation systems and systems with significant executive constraints.

A variable at the core of both economic and political theories of civil war is the salience of ethnic identity and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the society. Economists are interested in ethnicity because it can influence the organization of rebellion. Ethnic ties can improve social communication; facilitate the coordination of


40 Marta Reynal-Querol, “Ethnicity, political systems and civil wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002), 29-54


collective action by enhancing group solidarity;\textsuperscript{44} and by increasing trust,\textsuperscript{45} reduce the costs of enforcing social contracts under conditions of uncertainty.\textsuperscript{46} Political scientists focus on ethnicity either as a primordial affiliation that can generate violence,\textsuperscript{47} or as an instrument at the hands of elites who capitalize on the existence of ethnic networks to mobilize public support for violence.\textsuperscript{48} Mirroring the many conflicting theoretical perspectives on ethnicity and violence, there is substantial disagreement in the empirical literature on this topic. While high levels of ethnic fragmentation do not seem to increase the risk of civil war,\textsuperscript{49} they do increase the risk of secessionist war\textsuperscript{50} and of lower-level armed conflict that might escalate to civil war;\textsuperscript{51} and ethnic polarization and dominance typically increase the risk of all civil wars, though there is ambiguity about how to

\textsuperscript{44} Hechter 2001.


\textsuperscript{49} Collier and Hoeffler (2001); Fearon and Laitin (2003).

\textsuperscript{50} Except for ethnic or secessionist war – see Nicholas Sambanis, “Do ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (part 1),” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution} 45, no. 3 (2001), 259-282.

measure dominance and what types of “ethnic” affiliation are more important (linguistic, religious, tribal, etc).\textsuperscript{52} It is harder to discern the conditions under which ethnocultural identity will be more salient than other identities in an individual’s identity repertoire, or when ethnicity will be used to support violence. Inculcation of nationalist ideology through education can explain why ethnic identities are so salient in some parts of the world and why they can be used to support violence.\textsuperscript{53} Actual or expected group-level grievances or past experience of violence can also increase the proneness of ethnopolitical groups to violence.\textsuperscript{54} Such experiences can increase the fear of victimization at the hands of another group, creating motives for preemptive use of violence.\textsuperscript{55} Irreconcilable cultural differences\textsuperscript{56} and the failure of in-group policing\textsuperscript{57} can also exacerbate such tensions. Under those conditions, elites can capitalize on the availability of ethnic networks to induce a coordination process that leads to violence.\textsuperscript{58} Such manipulation can take many forms, ranging from the organization of large-scale civil war, as in the case of

\textsuperscript{52} Collier and Hoeffler 2001.


\textsuperscript{54} Gurr 2000.

\textsuperscript{55} See Posen, 1993; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999. Underlying both these models is a positive probability of victimization at the hands of a perceived hostile group.

\textsuperscript{56} Samuel P. Huntington, “The clash of civilizations?” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 72 (Summer 1993), 22-49.

\textsuperscript{57} Fearon and Laitin 1996.
Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{59} to the tacit support of electoral violence as in the case of India.\textsuperscript{60} These explanations do not view identity as inherently conflictual and focus instead on social interactions and systems and patterns of identity evolution to explain violence.\textsuperscript{61}

Rebellion can be considered as a public good (or a public bad, depending on one’s position toward the state) and is subject to the usual collective action problems associated with public goods provision. Ethnicity is therefore a central concept in the literature because, if ethnic affiliation increases group cohesion, then ethnic fragmentation should decrease the risks of civil war by increasing the coordination costs of rebellion. By contrast, polarized societies—i.e. societies with two or three large groups— are at high risk of war.\textsuperscript{62} In these cases, coordination within each of these large groups is easier and the distribution of the costs of rebellion is more concentrated among members of the group, which also stand to gain more from the rebellion than the excluded group(s).

Secessionist civil war will occur where institutional collapse at the center creates a power vacuum that leaders at the periphery try to fill; where regional inequality creates unmet demand for greater self-determination in a federal or decentralized state; where the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{59} Susan Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War} (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
\end{itemize}
income gains from remaining within the predecessor state are not sufficient to offset the gains from greater self-determination; and where the ethnic makeup of regions is very different, supporting the growth of nationalist ideology. Authors have also suggested that demands for self-determination are more likely to be expressed in countries with ethnic networks exist linking communities that straddle borders; in old empires or post-colonial states with incomplete state-building and nation-building experiences and in regions with high levels of internal migration or “internal colonialism;” in modern states with peripheral *ethnies* that are subordinated to core *ethnies*; in countries with a dependence on territorially concentrated natural resources; in authoritarian states that repress minority rights and cultural practices; in countries with high levels of regional disparities in income; and in regions of “backward” countries occupied by the most

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63 For such a theory, see Hechter 2001; and Nicholas Sambanis and Branko Milanovic, “Explaining the Demand for Sovereignty.” Unpublished manuscript, Yale University (May 2004). Monica Toft, 2002, “Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War.” *Security Studies* 12 (2): 82-119, also makes the argument about greater territorial concentration of groups and civil war.


backward groups of those countries, though secession by “advanced” groups in “backward” states is also possible.\textsuperscript{70}

Those theories taken together suggest to us that in peace transitions, the risk of war recurrence and peacebuilding failure will be particularly high in countries with low levels of local capacities, slow economic growth, high levels of poverty, significant resource-dependence, and in divided societies with many factions engaged in conflict over issues that are important to the definition of each faction’s ethnic or religious identity.

\textbf{International Dimensions of Civil War}

Civil wars are sometimes linked to bad leaders and sometimes to bad neighborhoods or bad external influences by neighboring states or by the major powers. International relations (IR) theories should be able to explain the inter-national dimensions of civil war. However, the skeletal theories of IR—neorealism and neoliberalism—offer poor explanations of civil war.\textsuperscript{71} Neorealism cannot explain why ethnic, religious, or class-based divisions occur or why they may be important causes of civil war, since it assumes that states are unitary actors and outcomes are usually explained as a result of structural changes at the level of the international system. State failure, which is frequently associated with civil war, generates conditions of domestic anarchy that parallel the condition of international anarchy. This makes structural realism (neorealism) tangentially relevant to civil war, given the central role of anarchy in

\textsuperscript{70} Horowitz 1985.

\textsuperscript{71} David 1997.
neorealism. However, anarchy in civil war emerges endogenously and is not a pre-existing (constant) structural condition. Neorealism cannot explain the causes of domestic anarchy (elite-based explanations, ethnic divisions, institutional failure), so it can only be of use in explaining patterns of violence after civil war erupts and once state control collapses.

By contrast, neoliberalism’s focus on domestic political institutions allows it to better explain why civil war occurs in the first place. Neoliberalism also takes into consideration non-state actors (e.g. ethnic networks, crime syndicates, multinational corporations) and can consider their influence on civil war risk. But neoliberalism also has important shortcomings as it cannot explain domestic institutional change or the use of force in ethnic antagonisms, nor can it explain patterns of alliance and conflict among insurgent groups and the government. Thus, the usefulness of mainstream IR theory in analyzing civil war is limited.

The macro-systemic dimensions of civil war – e.g. the effect of the end of the Cold War— are perhaps less important than the narrower regional dimensions of these wars. I.R. theory can be useful in explaining “neighborhood” effects as civil wars can have negative externalities that can be transmitted across borders. An important contribution

72 The literature on the democratic peace focuses on political, legal, and economic democratic institutions and the norms against the use of force they create vis-a-vis other democratic institutions. See Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986), 1151-1169.

was Lake and Rothschild’s exploration of the transmission of civil violence to the neighborhood through diffusion or contagion mechanisms.\textsuperscript{74} We have limited empirical evidence of these mechanisms. Sambanis’s empirical analysis suggests that living in “bad” neighborhoods – i.e. next to countries with civil wars or in countries with authoritarian polities— can triple a country’s chance of having an ethnic war.\textsuperscript{75}

Researchers are studying further the mechanisms through which civil war becomes internationalized. Current evidence suggests that ethnic conflict will spread when ethnic groups straddle borders and the ethnic group is a political or numerical majority in one of the states, as such a group could influence the conduct of foreign policy through nationalist lobbies or other channels.\textsuperscript{76} More research is needed to understand how civil war spreads and to distinguish patterns of contagion from patterns of diffusion.

An important gap in the literature is the lack of analysis of the links between international and internal war. Studies of external intervention in civil war are related to this topic, as intervention is one way in which civil wars become internationalized. However, to date, we do not have an integrated analysis of the regional dimensions of civil war, except in studies that analyze one type of war (i.e. either interstate or intrastate)

\textsuperscript{74} “Diffusion occurs largely through information flows that condition the beliefs of ethnic groups in other societies. Escalation [or contagion] is driven by alliances between transnational kin groups as well as by intentional or unintentional spillovers, … or by predatory states that seek to take advantage of the internal weaknesses of others” (Lake and Rothschild 1998, p. 5)


\textsuperscript{76} Woodwell 2004.
while controlling for the occurrence of the other type of war. There is some evidence that links external and internal conflict and shows they have a joint, negative impact on economic activity. Civil wars have negative economic effects not only in the countries in which they occur, but also in neighboring countries, where they can reduce economic growth and that this effect is proportional to the magnitude of the war. This evidence points to a “conflict trap” that locks poor countries and neighboring regions in a cycle of economic deterioration and recurrent violence.

This brief discussion of international perspectives on civil war suggests that the postwar peacebuilding environment might be different in wars that are highly internationalized, that external impartial intervention by regional or multilateral actors might help promote peace, and that there might be important regional and period effects (e.g. associated with the end of the Cold War) that influence the probability of peacebuilding success.

**Civil War Duration, Termination, and Recurrence**

Once war starts, mistrust and hostility increase and ending the war through negotiation becomes harder. Long civil wars are sustained through the enmity that


violence creates in afflicted populations and by instilling discipline and cohesion in the rebel organization as well as by finding sources of financing that allow continued insurgency. High levels of deaths and displacements of people can generate hatred and fear that make a negotiated settlement unlikely. For given levels of hostility, rebels groups need to find ways to finance their insurgency and looting of natural resources can be one way to support a long rebellion. There are several examples of this, ranging from timber trade by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or diamond trading by UNITA in Angola. External support by the ethnic diaspora is often another key source of rebel financing, as in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, or Kosovo. Finally, rebel cohesion may be greater when rebel groups recruit members of the same ethnic or tribal group, so we might expect ethnic or secessionist wars to be longer-lasting and easier to restart.

All these factors influence the calculations that parties make to support or reject the peace after the fighting ends. Simply put, in a rationalist model, we would observe war-recurrence if the expected utility of a new war is greater than the expected utility of peace. Thus, the logic of war recurrence is similar to the logic of economic models of civil war. As in those models, we also assume that the warring parties are rational though not infallible; that war generates private and public gains and losses which are unevenly distributed among groups; that private gains explain why war may be rational for some groups, while being collectively suboptimal. These assumptions allow analysts to make a series of hypotheses regarding the likelihood of war onset and recurrence. But

the likely results of such a decision-making model would clearly depend heavily on a further set of detailed assumptions.

For example, in divided societies and societies with large power disparities between the government and potential insurgent organizations, civil wars will be unlikely and, if they do occur, they will last only for a short time. In a sense, the first bout of fighting will resolve any misinformation or miscommunication that might have created false expectations of victory on the part of the rebels or the state, leading to a swift end to the war. One way in which civil wars can be protracted even in societies with power asymmetries and fractionalized, incoherent parties, is through external intervention. Such interventions are frequent. Looking at the period from 1944 to 1999, Patrick Regan finds that unilateral interventions occurred in most civil wars and the longer the duration of a war, the greater the chance of an outside power intervening to end it.82 Interestingly, Regan finds that external interventions have the effect of lengthening the expected duration of a conflict and that this effect holds for all interventions, economic and military, partial and impartial. Elbadawi and Sambanis develop this idea further through an elaboration of the Brito and Intriligator insurgency model.83 They argue that external interventions provide a mechanism for long insurgencies even in fractionalized societies, where a narrow social basis of support for the insurgency would otherwise reduce its expected length (if support relied on the size of the social group supporting the rebels).

For a given level of ethnic/social fractionalization, intervention in favor of the rebels lowers the rebels’ expected costs of fighting if it increases the probability of success of the rebellion, thereby attracting more rebel recruits and discouraging defections. Intervention provides a counter-weight to the government’s superior strength, limiting its ability to repress the rebellion at its early stages.84

Empirical evidence to date suggests that the variables that influence civil war onset do not have much explanatory power in duration models.85 This is not altogether surprising, given that war duration is analyzed by definition on a sub-sample that already shares certain characteristics (i.e. all the significant determinants of onset). Moreover, we would expect war duration to be affected by conflict dynamics, the strategy of insurgency, and other variables that are not relevant to onset but arise in the context of an ongoing war. The magnitude of the violence may also be explained by a host of new factors that are not directly applicable to war onset. Stathis Kalyvas has conducted one of few micro-level studies of violence during civil war, presenting evidence from Greece and elsewhere, and his research has revealed that macro-level cleavages (political ideology, ethnic affiliation) often do not explain micro-level motives for violence. People committing violent acts often have idiosyncratic, personal reasons that do not necessarily correspond to the macro-level cleavages that we observe at the national


Civil war is about civilian and territorial control, so Kalyvas argues that, as war progresses, violence must become selective. Indiscriminate violence is counter-productive and cannot secure popular support. Mass-level indiscriminate killing will occur mostly in areas where the balance of control between the government and the rebels is uncertain.

By considering the links between war duration, magnitude, and termination, we can identify a set of determinants that might explain the risk of postwar failure of the peace. International peacebuilding operations can help provide information that resolves any uncertainty about the parties’ commitment to a peace settlement or the likelihood of military victory in a new cycle of hostilities. They can help shape the parties’ incentives to cooperate in peace implementation by increasing the costs of defection from agreement through selective enforcement and by providing financial and other inducements to those who cooperate. And they can support the emergence of new players whose actions can counterbalance the actions of spoilers. We consider those functions of international peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations later in the chapter.

Peacekeepers will face tough challenges in wars that have caused large-scale human suffering. Kalyvas’s research on the magnitude of violence in civil war is relevant here because he demonstrates how violence can be self-sustaining by creating deep animosities that make a stable peace hard to negotiate. Wars that have produced a lot of killing leave deep wounds in societies that need much time to heal. While an arsenal of military strategies and socio-economic policies have been used to help civil

war-ravaged countries transition to peace, we do not yet know how effective each policy (or combination of policies) has been in countries with different levels of war-generated hostility and variable local capacities to rebuild peace. If the parties have agreed to a treaty, this could be a positive sign of a commitment to peace. But often, such commitment is missing and forcible external intervention is required to ensure compliance with the terms of an imposed or forcibly negotiated settlement.

Thus, in hostile environments, ending civil wars may require enforcement, but not just enforcement. In contrast to economic models of civil war, we would argue that addressing underlying grievances and resolving institutional failure is a necessary component in preventing war recurrence and building positive peace. Simply limiting the opportunity to organize insurgency is not sufficient. Negotiated settlements must ultimately rebuild the country’s institutional capacity for self-sustaining peace. This is an argument that we develop throughout the book.

Ending the war through negotiated settlement is a function of the parties’ relative capabilities, as extreme power imbalances will typically result in military solutions to the war. But external intervention can create military parity and increase the chance of a settlement. Impartial intervention might result in accommodative policies by the state,


88 Fearon and Laitin 2003.

including some sort of power-sharing arrangement.\textsuperscript{90} However, power-sharing can backfire if elites do not interact with each other as necessary and former allies may come into conflict in the new polity.\textsuperscript{91} Support for multiparty electoral competition can also increase inter-group collaboration (e.g., where minorities form useful electoral constituencies), but may also mobilize ethnic and nationalist conflict over control of the new polity.\textsuperscript{92} Successful elections must therefore not be rushed and should be the culmination of a peacebuilding process that has successfully transformed political institutions.\textsuperscript{93} External intervention that focuses narrowly on rebuilding the military capabilities of the state will fail in that important dimension. Thus, we will argue, external intervention must necessarily address this complex mix of challenges and only a certain type of intervention will be successful in difficult peacebuilding ecologies.

We see the problem of rebuilding a war-torn state as one of rebuilding social trust. To increase trust in the new political institutions, power-sharing arrangements may have to take the form of regional autonomy or federalism, as war will typically limit minority


groups’ trust in the time-consistency of cooperation within a unified, centralized state.\textsuperscript{94} A related problem—a problem of creating shared institutions—is that civil wars are frequently over issues that are thought to be indivisible.\textsuperscript{95} However, issue indivisibility is a slippery concept. If utility can be ascribed to each issue over which the war is fought, then tradeoffs among different issues can be constructed and the parties can exchange bundles of concessions that generate equal levels of utility. A secessionist conflict might thus be settled through a combination of increased cultural autonomy and a redistribution of the state’s fiscal surplus, leaving the central government undivided and achieving a level of utility for the insurgents comparable to that of secession. The possibility for such tradeoffs implies that no good is truly indivisible, but some issues to require much more complex solutions that the parties often cannot negotiate among themselves.\textsuperscript{96}

International peacebuilding intervention can help develop solutions and assure parties of each other’s commitment to a negotiated solution. It can also help create the political and social institutions that are necessary for a participatory process of resolving the underlying political conflicts that led to the civil war.

A critical difficulty in negotiating an end to civil wars is that negotiated agreements are typically not credible. Credible agreements are either self-enforcing or

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{94} Gurr 2000; Rothchild 2000; David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Political Decentralization and Civil War Settlements” (Paper prepared for presentation at the APSA, 2001).


\textsuperscript{96} Even if truly indivisible goods did exist, we cannot find a way to identify and measure such goods, so we do not pursue this topic further in our analysis.
\end{quote}
externally enforced. Even without the informational asymmetries that can complicate the negotiation of peace, negotiated settlements will be time-inconsistent in the absence of external security guarantees. This means that the government can easily renege on its promises after the rebels have demobilized and surrendered their arms. If the problem of post-war cooperation lies in an inability to make a credible bargain to share power, and if this problem is exacerbated by a perceived power asymmetry between the parties, then solutions that divide the disputed territory among the different groups and permit each group to retain its weapons might increase the likelihood of post-war peace. Thus, partition is consistent with rationalist accounts of how to end civil war, particularly wars between ethnic groups.

While in some cases, partition may indeed work, it can also backfire by transforming internal to international war and cause human suffering greater than that caused by the war. Partition can transform a highly diverse society into a polarized one or one that is dominated by a single group. This can create fears among minorities, causing conflict where none existed previously. Moreover, despite its simplicity and


plausibility, partition theory does not pass simple empirical tests as it does not outperform other solutions to civil war in terms of its impact on the likelihood of war recurrence.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, before we can advocate that the international community support a policy of ethnic partition, we need to conduct more systematic testing to identify the conditions under which partition can provide a lasting and acceptable peace.

Short of partition or conquest, stable peace might also be achieved through the internationally-assisted implementation of a peace agreement. In this book, we argue that international peacebuilding can be a major component of strategies to satisfy people’s “basic needs” and create institutions that can support the peace, resolving at least partially the credibility problems associated with peace implementation. Peacebuilding can be an alternative to other, more extreme strategies, such as partition or conquest. An ingredient of that strategy is good peacekeeping, which reduces the opportunity for insurgency and enhances incentives for peace. But peacekeeping can only be as credible as the peacekeepers’ mandate and resources and effective peacekeeping must be able to adapt to the particularities of the civil wars they are sent to resolve. We turn to this question next.

**Implications of Civil War Theory for UN Intervention**

Peacekeeping was initially designed to respond to threats to international security and relied on truce supervision and monitoring of the behavior of standing armies. It is now being used heavily to respond to internal conflicts. In thinking about how to adapt

\textsuperscript{101} See Sambanis 2000. If partition succeeded in ethnically “cleansing” the disputed territories, and if the new territories with ethnically “pure” populations acquired sovereignty, then by definition, civil war could not re-occur. But such manipulations of a country’s demography are often more painful than civil wars and can hardly be considered good solutions. And in practice, partitions fail to relocate entire ethnic groups and usually leave behind residual populations.
peacekeeping strategies to respond to internal war, we can learn useful lessons from the theories of civil war that we surveyed in the previous pages. Peacekeeping can help if it reduces the parties’ fear of victimization by providing security; improves the flow of information to prevent the political manipulation of fear by elites; facilitates the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements; reassures parties of each other’s compliance with the terms of a negotiated settlement; identifies spoilers and increases their costs from violating the peace agreements; identifies moderates and offers them inducements to cooperate in building participatory political institutions.

Not all types of peacekeeping can achieve those difficult goals. Peacekeeping – particularly first generation operations—has a tendency to favor the status quo.\(^{102}\) While this need not be an obstacle to effective peacekeeping in interstate conflicts, where recognized boundaries can be the fall-back position for both parties, it is more problematic in internal conflicts, where the *status quo ante* at the time that peacekeepers are deployed is usually not acceptable to one or more of the parties.

Both peacekeeping and peacemaking are easier when the conflict is over a small number of well-defined issues and the parties are few and readily identifiable.\(^ {103}\) In internal war, issues are often interrelated and the aggressor is not easily identifiable. The problem of “issue indivisibility” that we mentioned earlier is exacerbated if factions split during peace negotiations, making it harder to negotiate tradeoffs and concessions among several hostile and often incoherent factions.\(^ {104}\) Peacemakers must therefore create

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tradeoffs between issues and peacekeepers must credibly reduce the expectation that any one of the parties can make its goals “indivisible” by violating the peace agreement and using force. In doing so, different strategies must be used to solve different problems. Peacekeeping will only work where there is a peace to keep, where the parties perceive an incentive to collaborate. Where there is no such agreement on peace, peace must be enforced. Understanding this elemental difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is a key to peacebuilding success. But so is the need to use force selectively within the context of a consent-based operation so as to allow peacekeepers to enhance the parties’ initial consent and prevent spoilers from undermining the process.

Type of Conflict and Optimal Peacekeeping Strategy

The peacekeepers’ first concern in designing intervention strategies is to properly identify the type of conflict underlying the civil war. To simplify, conflicts can be over coordination or cooperation, depending on the structure of the parties’ preferences over possible outcomes of the negotiations. Each preference structure characterizes a specific type of conflict and different intervention strategies are optimal for different conflict types. Well-chosen strategies can maximize the available space for peace, whereas strategies that are poorly matched to the conflict can reduce the space for peace.

104 Walter (2002) defines indivisible (or hard to divide) conflicts (1) where the stated goals of the rebels are total; (2) where rebels are interested in control of the government; and (3) where it is hard to separate population and resources within the country easily. This definition is useful, though not without problems, as it is not clear why a conflict over “control of the government” is more of a “total” conflict than a conflict over secession. However, the basic idea seems right: it is easier to strike a bargain in some conflicts than others. Even if tradeoffs are always theoretically possible, they may be so costly as to make a negotiated settlement unlikely.
We draw on insights from simple applications of game-theory to problems of international cooperation to discuss intervention strategies for coordination and cooperation problems.\textsuperscript{105} Coordination problems have a payoff structure that gives the parties no incentives to unilaterally move out of equilibrium, once they reach equilibrium.\textsuperscript{106} A classic example is driving on the right (or the left, if you are in Great Britain). It is well-established that the best strategy to resolve coordination problems is information-provision and improvement of the level of communication between the parties.\textsuperscript{107} Communication gives the parties the ability to form common conjectures about the likely outcomes of their actions.\textsuperscript{108} Without the ability to communicate, they will not choose the most efficient outcome. By contrast, cooperation problems create incentives to renege on agreements, particularly if the parties discount the benefits of long-term cooperation in favor of short-run gain. In one-shot games of cooperation (of which the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a well-known example), the parties will try to trick their adversaries into cooperating while they renege on their promises. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, two accomplices in police custody are offered a chance to “rat” on their partner. The first to rat gets off and the “sucker” receives a very heavy sentence. If neither rats, both receive light sentences (based on circumstantial evidence); and, if


\textsuperscript{108} Morrow 1994, 222.
both rat, both receive sentences (but less than the sucker’s penalty). Even though they
would be better off trusting each other by keeping silent, the temptation to get off and the
fear of being the sucker make cooperation extremely difficult. These structural
differences between cooperation and coordination problems imply that different
peacekeeping strategies should be used in each case. In Figure 3.1, we suggest that a
spectrum of strategies ranging from strong intervention strategies, such as
multidimensional peacekeeping or enforcement with considerable international authority,
are needed to resolve cooperation problems, whereas weaker peacekeeping strategies,
such as monitoring and traditional peacekeeping, are sufficient to resolve coordination
problems. Weak peacekeeping has no enforcement or deterrence function. Stronger
peacekeeping through multidimensional operations can increase the costs of non-
cooperation for the parties and provide positive inducements by helping rebuild the
country and restructure institutions so that they can support the peace. Enforcement may
be necessary to resolve the toughest cooperation problems.¹⁰⁹ Not all civil war
transitions are plagued by cooperation problems. Some wars resemble coordination
problems, whereas frequently, we find both types of problems, in which case intervention
strategies must be carefully combined or sequenced.

¹⁰⁹ Strong peacekeeping is different from peace enforcement, as discussed in the Introduction. Strong
peacekeeping can only deter or punish occasional violations. If the violations are systematic and large-
scale, a no-consent enforcement operation might be necessary.
Enhancing Coordination by Improving Communication, Providing Assurance and Building Capacity

In a game of pure coordination, both parties want to pursue compatible strategies — in the example we gave, to both drive on their right (or left). But if neither knows the rules or what the other party prefers, they will be tempted to experiment, to try one and then the other and these of course can be costly whether in driving or other activities. Coordination can be readily achieved by credible information on rules, payoffs, and the parties’ compliance or stated preferences. Once the rule is known or the other parties’ preference is clear, coordination can be achieved. UN monitors or observers can assist such communication and help the parties coordinate to an efficient outcome.

A second formulation of a coordination problem is the “assurance” game. The classic story (as told by the 18th c French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau) is a stag hunt in which catching the stag depends on all the hunters cooperating. But if a rabbit suddenly appears, some of the hunters may be tempted to defect in order to catch the rabbit which, though less desirable than the hunter’s share of the deer, can be caught (in this story) by one hunter on his own. If all chase the rabbit, they divide the rabbit. Here, if players A and B can choose between strategies of cooperation and defection, we get a payoff structure such as the following: mutual cooperation yields a payoff of (4, 4) for players A and B, respectively, as each gets a share of the deer. When A cooperates and B defects A gets 0 and B gets 3 (the rabbit) and correspondingly when A defects and B cooperates, A gets 3 and B, 0. When both defect each gets 2 (the share of the rabbit). In this case, peacekeeping needs to be more involved than in the previous coordination game. In both cases communication should be sufficient, but the temptation to defect out
of fear that another hunter will do so first (even though this is rational for neither) requires more active facilitation and continual reassurance. Information alone may not be enough; the peacekeepers may need to provide regular reports on each party’s compliance, and so reduce the costs of communication between the parties and allow them to coordinate their strategies.\textsuperscript{110} The more the peacekeepers need to increase the costs of non-cooperation, the more we move from a coordination game to a game of cooperation.

Third, in the more complicated framework of actual peace processes, many parties that have a “will” to coordinate lack the “way.” Coordination is promoted when parties receive assistance in capacity building, demobilizing armies and transforming themselves from military factions to coherent political parties. Parties that want to “drive on the right” will better succeed if they know how to drive and their vehicles are steerable. Such assistance permits them to act rationally according to their preferences, rather than incoherently.

Enhancing Cooperation by Making Noncompliance Costly and Compliance Cheap, or Transforming the Game

Cooperation problems are much more difficult to solve. How can cooperation failure (defection) be avoided? In the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma one-shot game, we always end up at double defection (both rat) unless there is some external enforcement

\textsuperscript{110} Regional powers can play this role, if organized by an impartial party with broad legitimacy. See Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr, eds., \textit{Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN
mechanism. Conditions of repeated play (iteration) may produce cooperation in infinite-horizon games even without external enforcement, but not if there is a visible end to the game.\footnote{By contrast, even in finite, yet multiple-iteration games, if the timing of the game’s end is not known, players can be expected to play as if they were engaged in an infinite horizon game. But if the endgame is visible, then finite game strategies will be used.} Short-term defection from agreements may even be possible from iterated games if one of the parties discounts the future severely. Strong third party involvement would be necessary to support effective cooperation, unless the parties’ agreements are self-enforcing. However, self-enforcement of peace agreements in internal conflicts may be impossible for at least three reasons.

First, many conflicts are characterized by power asymmetry, which implies that the costs of cooperating while other parties are defecting may be extremely large for the weaker party. In internal conflicts, a settlement implies that the rebels would disarm, making themselves vulnerable to an attack by the state, if the state reneges on the agreement. Walter argues that this is the “critical barrier” to negotiated settlement in civil wars.\footnote{Walter, “The Critical Barrier.”} The potential for time-inconsistent behavior by the state makes the settlement non-credible.

Second, internal conflicts—especially of the ethnic variety—can escalate to the point where one or more of the groups are eliminated, forcibly displaced, or weakened to the point of not having any bargaining leverage. This seems to have been the strategy of the genocidaires in Rwanda, and of the Serbs in the Bosnian war. This also implies that the potential gains from short-term defection for the stronger party could be infinite, if...
such defection could eliminate the weaker party from future bargaining. Thus, the usual long-term benefits to cooperation in iterated play need not be greater than short-term gains from defection.

Third, in computer-simulated results of iterated prisoner’s dilemma games (where the solutions from iterated play come from), players have access to strategies that cannot be replicated in real life. For example, tit-for-tat punishment strategies of permanent exclusion of one of the parties may be feasible in a simulated environment, but are not realistic in actual civil wars. Parties that defect from peace agreements cannot be permanently excluded from further negotiation, so reciprocal punishment strategies against defection are implausible.\textsuperscript{113} This should increase the discounting of expected future costs of short-term violations by parties who can expect to be included in future negotiations regardless of their previous behavior.

Given these enforcement problems, strong peacekeeping is necessary in internal conflicts resembling cooperation problems to increase the parties’ costs from non-cooperation, or reduce the costs of exploitation, or increase the benefits from cooperation – and ideally all three at once. Can peacekeeping have such impact and how? The literature suggests that peacekeepers can change the costs and benefits of cooperation by virtue of the legitimacy of their UN mandate, which induces the parties to cooperate; by their ability to focus international attention on non-cooperative parties and condemn transgressions; by their monitoring of and reporting on the parties’ compliance with

\textsuperscript{113} As an impartial third party, the UN cannot formally exclude parties from negotiations. The inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the negotiations leading to the Paris Accords over the Cambodian civil war is a case in point. Moreover, exclusion of parties from the terms of the settlement can generate grievances that lead to renewed fighting.
agreements; and by their function as a trip-wire that would force aggressors to go through
the UN troops to change the military status quo.

Ultimate success, however, may depend less on changing incentives for existing
parties within their preferences and more on transforming preferences – and even the
parties themselves – and thus turning a cooperation problem into a coordination problem.
Later we will describe the institution-building aspects of peacebuilding as a revolutionary
transformation in which voters and politicians replace soldiers and generals; armies
become parties; war economies, peace economies. Reconciliation, when achieved, is
label for these changed preferences and capacities. To be sure, the difficulty of a
transformative strategy cannot be overestimated. Most societies, postwar, look a great
deal like they did pre-war. But, for example, if those that have committed the worst war
crimes can be prosecuted, locked up and thus removed from power, the prospects of
peace rise. The various factions can begin to individualize rather than collectivize their
distrust and hostility and, at the minimum, the worst individuals are no longer in
control.114

Therefore, even where enforcement is used at the outset, the peace must
eventually become self-sustaining and consent needs to be won if the peace enforcers are
ever to exit with their work done. And consensual peace agreements can rapidly erode,
forcing to adjust to the strategies of “spoilers.” Their success or lack of success of doing
so tends to be decisive in whether a sustainable peace follows.

114 See Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and
for the difficulties, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, 2003/04, “Trials and Errors: Principle and
Strategic Peacebuilding

The first thing peacekeepers must do is identify the nature of the conflict they face. Telling a prisoner in a Prisoner’s Dilemma what his or her accomplice plans to do (enhancing communication) ensures defection and exploitation. Enforcing solutions on every driver when most drivers already want to coordinate is a waste of resources. Peacebuilders therefore must decide when a peace must be enforced – to save lives, to avoid an escalating conflict. And they must decide when it can be negotiated and an agreement can be implemented. But their decisions, to take this a step further, can rarely be static. Circumstances change and strategic peacebuilding must adjust to “spoilers” and mobilize appropriate incentives.

How can the peacekeepers know which type of conflict they are facing? A first clue is the peace treaty. If a treaty has been signed that outlines a postwar settlement, then the parties’ preferences have been revealed to some extent (though the fact that some peace treaties are quickly undermined also means that only by observing the parties’ compliance with the treaty can we be more certain about their true preferences). Patterns of compliance with the treaty can help distinguish moderates from extremists. In other cases, such knowledge cannot be attained until the first (or several) encounters with the parties. Where a treaty is not in place, all parties can be assumed to be spoilers and strong peacekeeping must be used. Subsequent cooperation or conflict with the peacekeepers can help distinguish those parties who respond to inducements from those who are committed to a strategy of war. This also means that UN missions must be flexible to adjust their mandate given observations of cooperation or conflict on the
ground and based on the peacekeepers’ changing assessments about the nature of the conflict.

A treaty is usually the outcome of a “mutually hurting stalemate,” which is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful peacebuilding. Such a stalemate exists when the status quo is not the preferred option for any faction, while overturning the status quo through military action is unlikely to be successful. This condition pushes parties to the negotiating table and their declared preferences for peace are more credible as a result of their inability to forcibly achieve a better outcome.

However, the parties will not negotiate a settlement unless peace is likely to generate higher rewards than continued fighting. This condition becomes unattainable if “spoilers” are present. Spoilers are leaders or parties whose vital interests are threatened by peace implementation. These parties will undermine the agreement and reduce the expected utility of a negotiated settlement for all parties. In terms of our previous arguments, the presence of spoilers implies the ‘payoff structure’ of a prisoner’s dilemma or an assurance game as spoilers will not coordinate their strategies with moderates. Thus, if spoilers are present in a peace process, peacekeepers can only keep the peace if they can exercise some degree of enforcement by targeting the spoilers and preventing them from undermining the negotiations. The dynamics of spoiler problems deserve a closer look.

115 The mutually hurting stalemate is part of Zartman’s (1985) concept of “ripe” conflicts. Additional conditions for conflict “ripeness” in Zartman’s theory are: a sense of crisis; a deadline for negotiations; a reversal in the parties’ relative strength; a leveraged external mediation; and a feasible settlement that can address all the parties’ basic needs.

116 The settlement of El Salvador’s civil war is a good example of a hurting stalemate.
Spoiler problems were first systematically analyzed by Stephen Stedman, who identified three types –total, greedy, and limited spoiler— according to their strategies and likely impact on the peace implementation process. These are behavioral types and Stedman defines them in terms of their preferences over the strategies they use to undermine the peace. However, all parties can act as total spoilers if conditions deteriorate markedly. But parties whose ultimate goals over the outcomes of the peace are more moderate will have incentives not to spoil the peace process if they can get a reasonable outcome. The difficulty facing the peacekeepers is to distinguish moderates from extremists, or total spoilers, when conditions are such as to encourage all parties to defect from agreements.

The principal gain of good UN peacekeeping will be to allow moderates –limited spoilers with specific stakes— and greedy opportunists to act like peacemakers in the peace process without fearing reprisals from total spoilers who are unalterably opposed to the peace settlement. Effective strategies must combine consent from those willing to coordinate and cooperate with coercive carrots and sticks directed at those who are not. We will suggest that the record shows that by strategically combining peacemaking, peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and peace enforcement, peace can be built from problematic and unpromising foundations.

Our case-study work (which we develop in subsequent chapters) suggests that to manage spoilers effectively, peacekeepers should avoid acquiring a reputation for weakness or inconsistency and they should raise the costs of non-cooperation early in the peace process. A combination of threat and weakness will signal to extremists that their

projects will succeed and that they should strike soon, as it did in Rwanda. Failure to perform as indicated, would lead to peacekeeping failures that may force all parties—including potentially cooperative parties and moderates—to defect from the peace process. Several such failures over time may institutionalize the conflict, as the parties will establish a pattern of non-cooperative action and promises of future cooperation will be non-credible (we develop this explanation in some detail with reference to case of Cyprus).

In other words, peacekeeping failure can dynamically reduce the parties’ preferences for peacemaking. In these cases, the peacekeepers must discover ways to transform the conflict by, for example, generating new actors, as the Cambodian election created legitimate power through the vote of the electors; transforming preferences for cooperation by offering development assistance to cooperating parties; building new institutions, as was the case with the reformed police and judiciary in El Salvador; or establishing an effective state and even fostering a new nation, as is occurring in East Timor and as peacekeepers are still struggling to do in Bosnia. For all those strategies to succeed, spoilers must be identified and marginalized to the degree possible. Peacekeepers on the ground have the knowledge that is needed to identify the parties who are intent on undermining the peace. Selective use of force in defense of the mandate against the most uncooperative parties must be a viable option for peacekeeping so that they can credibly raise the costs of non-cooperation. However, if use of force is required on a regular basis, as was the case in Bosnia and the Congo, then peacekeeping can no longer be effective and peace-enforcement strategies must be used.
Defining Peacekeeping Success in a Dynamic Model of Peacebuilding

Peacekeeping is partly determined by (or at least co-varies with) a number of other variables that may also influence the final outcome of a civil war. Thus, one could only measure the value-added of peacekeeping on civil war outcomes by controlling for other relevant variables and understanding how peacekeeping interacts with those variables. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, post-conflict reconstruction, and discrete enforcement dynamically and interactively influence the outcome of the peace process.

Peacebuilding success is a function of the success of peace operations and that success can be measured in terms of the degree to which the mandate was implemented and by whether or not a stable peace was attained. We distinguish between these two standards, as the latter standard depends more heavily than the former on factors that are generally outside the peacekeepers’ control. In the empirical analysis, we analyze both standards of success. First, we assess the effectiveness of UN mandates on attaining self-sustaining peace in a macro-level statistical analysis (chapter 4 and appendix). Then, we focus on micro-level success in several case studies that analyze both successful and failed implementations of UN mandates.

Peacekeeping success may be a function of a number of variables: the support of the major powers and interested third parties in the region, a clear and implementable

118 In the empirical section of the book, we control for all observable variables that we would expect to influence the peacebuilding outcome as well as the probability of UN intervention and we explore the potential endogeneity of peacekeeping intervention.

119 Other perspectives on how to evaluate peacekeeping include Diehl (1993); Bruce R. Pirnie and William E. Simons, Soldiers for Peace: An Operational Typology (Santa Monica: RAND, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996), and Duane Bratt, 1994, “Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in Internal Conflicts” International Peacekeeping 4 (3):
mandate;\textsuperscript{120} the parties’ continuing consent;\textsuperscript{121} the peacekeepers ability to remain impartial; the likelihood of competing external intervention by a third party; support by non-state actors;\textsuperscript{122} a deadline for troop withdrawal;\textsuperscript{123} adequate financial and logistic support;\textsuperscript{124} effective command structure,\textsuperscript{125} and manageable geographic deployment of peacekeeping troops.\textsuperscript{126} Some of these variables are weakly exogenous (pre-determined) and influence the outcome of the peace process, while others are influenced by the outcomes of peacekeeping operations in an ongoing peace process. Peacebuilding strategy is in part determined by those exogenous variables, but it is not epiphenomenal and has real consequences for the success of the peace process. It is through the shaping of their mandate and its correct implementation that peacekeepers can have an independent effect on the final peacebuilding outcome.

The success of peacekeeping is partly determined by the quality of the peacemaking—the peace treaty that the peace negotiators have made. It is also shaped by the resources available and the strategy employed to direct post conflict reconstruction. And lastly, it may be crucially influenced by the enforcement capacities that the peacekeepers can draw upon to deter or coerce potential spoilers. Peacekeeping must

\textsuperscript{120} Boutros Boutros-Ghali, \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, (New York: United Nations, 1995), 59.


\textsuperscript{122} Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr 1997.

\textsuperscript{123} Evans 1993.

\textsuperscript{124} Boutros-Ghali 1995.

\textsuperscript{125} Diehl 1993, 67.
exhibit the strategic dynamism to manage all these. While resources can be considered
exogenous in the sense that the UN relies on member states to offer resources, strategy is
influenced by a dynamic bargaining process that involves the Security Council, the
General Assembly, the Secretariat, the parties to the war and other interested actors.
Once the troops are deployed and begin interacting with the parties, they acquire
information on if and how their mandate and operational guidelines must be amended so
that they can be effective. This leads to adaptation. Peacekeepers can use judgment and
discretion in interpreting their mandate, which almost always is stated in sufficiently
vague terms to allow some agency slack in the field. Good peacekeepers can select
strategies that preserve their impartiality while enhancing their leverage over the parties.
The Secretariat—not just members of the P5 in the Council—has input in adapting
peacekeeping strategy. Strategy adjustment is certainly constrained by the exogenous
factors (such as superpower interest or troop contributions from member states), but it is
also endogenous to the peacekeepers’ initiative and creativity, their training and abilities,
their proactive use of available resources, and their ability to update their beliefs about
the optimal strategy in a changing environment. If these “soft” variables played no role
in determining the outcomes of peacekeeping operations, then peacekeeping success or
failure would be due entirely to those exogenous factors and UN peacekeeping would be
entirely epiphenomenal.

The parties also learn throughout this dynamic process and their strategies also
change. The whole is best seen as a spiral in which good peacemaking can set the stage
for the use of peacekeeping (by helping the parties to negotiate a treaty), which in turn

126 Evans 1993.
can allow civilian missions to aid the country in post conflict reconstruction. And, should peacekeepers be deployed as monitors or peace enforcers sent out to maintain order before a peace is negotiated, their successful management will enhance the prospects for an agreement that established a more thoroughgoing process of institutional and economic reconstruction.

There are two major implications of our model. First, the outcome of the peace process cannot be determined *ex ante* simply on the basis of the level of hostility and local capacities in the country. International capacities for peace do play a role, but only if interventions are well-designed (this is one more reason why we should distinguish between the success of the peace process and the UN mission). Peacekeeping may have unanticipated and offsetting effects on peacemaking. For example, failed peacekeeping may inspire international concern if violence escalates, ultimately improving the likelihood of peacekeeping success (international attention to Rwanda increased after the tragic failure of a limited UN mission before the genocide). At the same time, if peacekeepers are deployed before a peace agreement, a major failure may undermine the parties’ political will for a settlement if that failure reverses the political or military status quo, making a negotiated settlement less appealing to one or more of the parties. Thus, identifying the actual impact of peacekeeping on the likelihood of successful peacebuilding is an open empirical question. In subsequent chapters, we evaluate different peacekeeping operations in terms of a narrow and a broad type of success and failure: the narrow type concerns success in discharging the mandate; broad success refers to the peacekeepers’ contribution to final outcome of the peace process. While our statistical analysis focuses on “broad” success (success or failure of the peace process),
our case studies allow us to focus more closely on the narrow view, explaining the success or failures of UN missions.

Second, the model suggests that the outcome of a peace process does not depend entirely on peacekeeping efforts, but that we must evaluate the impact of peacekeeping while controlling for all the variables that might influence the UN’s decision to intervene as well as variables that influence the final peacebuilding outcome without influencing the use of peacekeeping. The initial peacekeeping mandate, some might argue, is potentially endogenous to the levels of hostility, local capacities and other variables. Thus, some would argue that the UN has no independent effect on the peace process.127 Critics might also argue that the UN selects the easy cases to intervene, so as to avoid the costs of failure. But proving this is difficult, for a number of reasons. First, the UN is not a unitary actor and the mandate and resources of each mission are the result of a bargaining process that involves member states of the Security Council, the Secretariat, representing the interests of the organization, and other interested actors. Even if the Secretariat wanted to pick easy cases to establish a record of success, the interests of member states are often antithetical to such an approach, as they often use the UN as scapegoat, unloading difficult cases in which they have no strategic interest. Second, as an empirical matter, the UN seems to pick the hard cases in which to intervene. Average levels of deaths and displacements are higher, local capacities lower, and numbers of factions higher in cases where the UN has sent peacekeepers as compared to the rest of

127 There are exogenous variables that influence the discharge of peacekeeping mandates and are not affected by any of the variables in the model, which allows us to treat peacekeeping as weakly exogenous in our regressions. Such variables are: peacekeeping doctrine; training; institutional constraints to changes in the peacekeepers’ operational guidelines after they are deployed; and the stickiness of peacekeeping operations, which are difficult to pull out and then re-deploy.
the cases. Moreover, our model makes clear that once the mission is deployed both the initial levels of resources and the initial mandate can change in unpredictable ways and as a result of the peacekeepers’ actions on the ground. Peacekeepers often have leeway to interpret their mandate creatively, adjusting their strategy as required by conditions on the ground. Our statistical analysis considers the problem of endogeneity carefully and we believe that we can identify an independent contribution of UN operations while taking account of measurable indicators of state interest and other factors that might influence peacebuilding outcomes as well as the UN’s decision to intervene. Our case studies put this argument into richer historical context and offer narratives that demonstrate the value-added of peacekeepers on the ground, by providing before-and-after accounts of the peace process that highlight the precise contribution of UN missions.

In sum, our model illustrates the channels (mechanisms) through which peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction can shape peacebuilding outcomes. We argue that the strategic conception that unites these strategies is a peacebuilding triangle.

A Peacebuilding Triangle

International peacebuilding strategies, concepts of operations, therefore should be “strategic” in the ordinary sense of that term, matching means to ends. Although a peacebuilding strategy must be designed to address a particular conflict, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. These strategies combine peacemaking, peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and (where needed) enforcement.
Effective transitional strategy must take into account levels of hostility and factional capacities. Whether it in fact does so depends on strategic design and international commitment. Designs for transitions incorporate a mix of legal and bureaucratic capacities that integrate in a variety of ways domestic and international commitments.

Important lessons can already be drawn from efforts to establish effective transitional authority. First, a holistic approach is necessary to deal with the character of factional conflicts and civil wars. Successful exercises of authority require a coordinated approach that draws in elements of “peacemaking” (negotiations), peacekeeping (monitoring), peacebuilding reconstruction and discrete acts of enforcement, when needed, to create a holistic strategy of reconciliation.

Transitional strategies should first address the local causes of continuing conflict and second, the local capacities for change. Effective transitional authority is the residual dimension that compensates for local deficiencies and the continuing hostility of the factions -- the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. We can think of effective transitional authority as authority x resources x international institutional capacities.

Local root causes, domestic capacity, and effective transitional authority are three dimensions of a triangle, whose area is the “political space” – or effective capacity – for

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129 See Alvaro DeSoto and Graciana del Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding in El Salvador,” Foreign Policy, 94 (Spring 1994), pp. 69-83. This is the coordinating role that Japan for example played in Cambodia in organizing the Tokyo conference and the International Committee on the reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC).
building peace. This metaphor suggests that some quantum of positive support is needed along each dimension but that the dimensions also substitute for each other -- more of one substitutes for less of another, less deeply rooted causes of war substitute for weak local capacity or minor international commitment. In a world where each dimension is finite we can expect, first, that compromises will be necessary in order to achieve peacebuilding; second, that the international role must be designed to fit each case; and, third, that self-sustaining peace is not only the right aim, it is the practically necessary aim of building peace when the international community is not prepared to commit to long-term assistance.

For example, in a small community enjoying a deep and broad sense of affinity, considerable social and full political equality, substantial sources of social capital and wealth, and access to even greater resources from its national capital, peacebuilding is easy. The space for effective action is nearly boundless. Imagine a small European, Japanese or American town, struck by a tornado, typhoon or flood. Habits of cooperation, emergency public assistance, and inflows of national relief pour in. The disaster is addressed. The community might even be strengthened as it successfully meets a natural challenge. Imagine now a Cambodian town escaping from the devastation inflicted by the Khmer Rouge, up until recently governed by a force composed largely of Cambodia’s historic enemy, Vietnam; and lacking technical skills, medicine, education, infrastructure. Its national capital rather than being a source of assistance is also devastated. National GDP per capita is between $200 and $300 per year. Here the space for peacebuilding is thin and tenuous.
Strategies should address the local sources of hostility; the local capacities for change; and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. One can conceive of the three as the three dimensions of a triangle, whose area is the “political space”—or effective capacity—for building peace (see Figure 3.2). This metaphor suggests that the dimensions substitute for each other—more of one substitutes for less of another, less extreme hostilities substitute for weak local capacity or minor international commitment.

[Insert Figure 2.2 here]

International peace operation mandates must take into account the characteristics of the factions and whether the parties are prepared to coordinate or must be persuaded or coerced into cooperation. These mandates operate not upon stable states but, instead, on unstable factions. These factions (to simplify) come in various dimensions of hostility. Hostility, in turn, is shaped by the number of factions, including the recognized state as one (if there is one). Numerous factions make it difficult for them to cooperate and engender suspicion. Two, few or many factions complicate both coordination and cooperation. In addition, harm done – casualties and refugees generated – create the resentment that makes jointly beneficial solutions to coordination and cooperation that much more difficult to envisage. The more hostile and numerous the factions, the more
difficult the peace process will be and the more international assistance/authority will be needed if peace is to be established.130

In less hostile circumstances (with few factions, a hurting stalemate, or less harm done), international monitoring and facilitation might be sufficient to establish transparent trust and self-enforcing peace. Monitoring helps create transparency among partners lacking trust but having compatible incentives favoring peace. Traditional peacekeeping assistance can also reduce tradeoffs (helping, for example, to fund and certify the cantonment, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants). In these circumstances – with few players, some reconciliation, less damage – international coordination and assistance can be sufficient to overcome hostility and solve implementation problems. An international peacekeeping presence itself can deter defections from the peace treaty, because of the possible costs of violating international agreements and triggering further international involvement in an otherwise domestic conflict. International capacity-building – such as foreign aid, demobilization of military forces, institutional reform – will assist parties that favor the peace to meet their commitments.

In more hostile circumstances, international enforcement can help solve commitment and cooperation problems by directly implementing or raising the costs of defection from peace agreements. International enforcement and long term trusteeship will be required to overcome deep sources of distrust and powerful incentives to defect.

130 By ‘factions’ we refer to actual factions in a civil war. While the peacebuilding triangle measures hostility generated by these factions (e.g. it can measure the number of factions, whether or not they have signed a treaty, and the issues over which they are fighting a war), we cannot measure the factions’ local capacities except at the national level, so we use country-level indicators of local capacities in our empirical analysis.
from agreed provisions of the peace. As in other conflictual-cooperative situations such as prisoner’s dilemma and mixed motive games,\textsuperscript{131} the existence of deeply hostile, or many factions or factions that lack coherent leadership complicate the problem of achieving self-enforcing cooperative peace. Instead, conscious direction and enforcement by an impartial international agent to guarantee the functions of effective sovereignty becomes necessary and peacebuilding must include activities such as conducting a free and fair election, arresting war criminals, and policing and administering a collapsed state. The more difficult it is for the factions to cooperate, the greater the international authority and capacity the international peacebuilders must wield. In addition to substantial bodies of troops, extensive budgets for political reconstruction and substantial international authority need to be brought to bear because the parties are so unlikely to trust each other and cooperate. International mandates may need to run from monitoring to administration to executive authority and full sovereign trusteeship like supervision – if peace is going to be maintained and become eventually self-sustaining.

War-torn countries also vary in economic and social capacity. Some war-torn countries started out with considerable economic development (the former Yugoslavia) and retain levels of social capacity in an educated population. Others began poor and the war impoverished them further (Angola, Sudan, Cambodia). In both cases reconstruction is vital; the more the social and economic devastation, the larger the multidimensional international role must become, whether consent-based multidimensional peacekeeping or non-consent enforcement followed by and including

\textsuperscript{131} Axelrod and Keohane, 1986; Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” World Politics
multidimensional peacekeeping. International economic relief and productive jobs are
the first signs of peace that can persuade rival factions to truly disarm and take a chance
on peaceful politics. Institutions need to be rebuilt, including a unified army and police
force and the even more challenging development of a school system that can assist the
reconciliation of future generations.\textsuperscript{132} In countries with low levels of local capacities,
competition over resources will be intense at the early stages of the peace process, and
this can further intensify the coordination and collaboration problems that the
peacekeepers will be asked to resolve.

There thus should be a relation between the depth of hostility (harm and factions)
and local capacities (institutional and economic collapse), on the one hand, and the extent
of international assistance and effective authority, from monitoring to enforcing, needed
to build peace, on the other. In a world where each dimension is finite we can expect,
first, that compromises will be necessary to achieve peacebuilding success; and second,
that the international role will be significant in general and successful when it is designed
to fit the case. The extent of transitional authority that needs to be delegated to the
international community will be a function of the level of postwar hostility and local
capacities.

The relations among the three dimensions of the triangle are complicated. The
availability and prospect of international assistance and the existence of extensive local
capacities, for example, can, if poorly managed, both raise the gains from victory (spoils

\textsuperscript{38} 1 (1985), 1-24.

\textsuperscript{132} Having observed negotiations in El Salvador, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Brcko (Bosnia),
and Cyprus, it is our opinion that establishing a unified army or multiethnic police force, though difficult, is
easy compared to agreeing on an elementary school curriculum.
of war and rebuilding assistance) and reduce the costs of fighting (as the assistance serves to sustain the fighting). So, too, deep war-related hostilities can have dual effects. They make peace more difficult to make and increase the rational incentives for ending the conflict.

That relationship is loosely reflected in the variable shapes of the “peacebuilding triangles” for the different cases that we analyze in later chapters. The triangular metaphor suggests that the larger the triangle, the greater the chances of success and that certain “areas,” or “political spaces,” will not on average tend to be sufficient. But success or failure comes in a variety of forms depending on the local conditions, with more or less hostility, more of less local capacity and more or less internationally assisted capacity (and thus more or less intrusive foreign presence).

This triangular shape also makes it possible to visualize our key hypotheses since the three sets of variables interact competitively (H vs. IC and LC) and cooperatively (LC and IC) to produce a space for peace. Specifically, this model posits that: 133 (a) The larger the international capacities (IC), the higher the probability of PB success, given hostility (H) and local capacities (LC); (b) The greater (deeper) the hostility, the lower the probability of PB success, given LC and IC; and (c) The larger the local capacities, the higher the probability of PB success, given H and IC.

In the next chapter, we test this model by identifying and measuring proxy variables for Hostility, Local Capacities, and International Capacities and estimating an econometric model that identifies the significance of each of these determinants of

133 Note that we use the triangle metaphor to visualize the interaction of our three core variables and we will be testing that interaction without assuming a functional form for that interaction, as we would, for example, by assuming that the peacebuilding space is only given by the area of the triangle
peacebuilding success. Our statistical analysis draws upon and extends our earlier work,\(^{134}\) which presented the first quantitative analysis of the contribution of UN peace operations to peacebuilding outcomes.\(^{135}\) We then follow the statistical analysis with case studies that explore how each of the dimensions has operated in successful and unsuccessful peacebuilding. Our aim is to map the strategic environment within which peacebuilding takes place, explaining how best to use UN peace operations to prevent civil wars from recurring.

\(^{134}\) Doyle and Sambanis 2000.

Figure 2.1: Matching Problem Type and Strategy Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Ineffective/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counter-Productive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Best</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2.2: The Peacebuilding Triangle\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}

\node (int) at (0,0) {International Capacities: Max IC = 1};
\node (hostility) at (-2,-2) {Hostility \(H=0\)};
\node (local) at (2,-2) {Local Capacity \(\text{max LC}=1\)};
\node (ic0) at (0,-4) {\(i_0\)};

\draw (int) -- (hostility);
\draw (int) -- (local);
\draw (hostility) -- (local);
\draw (int) -- (ic0);

\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{136} The triangle is a metaphor for the peacebuilding space after civil war. Available space is determined by the interaction of the triangle’s three sides: Local Capacities (LC), International Capacities (IC), and Hostility (H) level. The greater local and international capacities and the lower the hostility, the greater will be the space for peace. We assume a strictly positive level of IC, given the support and legitimacy offered sovereign states by international law and norms. This positive level of international support is denoted by the constant \(i_0\) which ensures that IC cannot be zero. All three variables, LC, IC, and H can be measured as indices, ranging from 0 to 1 (maximum). We estimate a model of the likelihood of peacebuilding success using these indices as regressors in chapter 3.