The strains of silence in literature, from Sade to Beckett, convey complexities of language, culture, and consciousness as these contest themselves and one another. Such eerie music may yield an experience, an intuition, of postmodernism but no concept or definition of it. Perhaps I can move here toward such a concept by putting forth certain queries. I begin with the most obvious: can we really perceive a phenomenon, in Western societies generally and in their literatures particularly, that needs to be distinguished from modernism, needs to be named? If so, will the provisional rubric “postmodernism” serve? Can we then—or even should we at this time—construct of this phenomenon some probative scheme, both chronological and typological, that may account for its various trends and counter-trends, its artistic, epistemic, and social character? And how would this phenomenon—let us call it postmodernism—relate itself to such earlier modes of change as turn-of-the-century avant-gardes or the high modernism of the twenties? Finally, what difficulties would inhere in any such act of definition, such a tentative heuristic scheme?

I am not certain that I can wholly satisfy my own questions, though I can assay some answers that may help to focus the larger problem. History, I take it, moves in measures both continuous and discontinuous. Thus the prevalence of postmodernism today, if indeed it prevails, does not suggest that ideas of institutions of the past cease to shape the present. Rather, traditions develop, and even types suffer a seachange. Certainly, the powerful cultural assumptions generated by, say, Darwin, Marx, Baudelaire, Nietzsche, Cezanne, Debussy, Freud, and Einstein still pervade the Western mind. Certainly those assumptions have been reconceived, not once but many times—else history would repeat itself, forever the same. In this perspective postmodernism may appear as a significant revision, if not an original épistemé, of twentieth-century Western societies.

Some names, piled here pell-mell, may serve to adumbrate postmodernism, or at least suggest its range of assumptions: Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard (philosophy), Michel Foucault, Hayden White (history), Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, R. D. Laing, Norman O. Brown (psychoanalysis), Herbert Marcuse, Jean Baudrillard, Jurgen Habermas (political philosophy), Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend (philosophy of science), Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Wolfgang Iser, the “Yale Critics” (literary theory), Merce Cunningham, Alwin Nikolais, Meredith Monk (dance), John Cage, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Pierre Boulez (music), Robert Rauschenberg, Jean Tinguely, Joseph Beuys (art), Robert Venturi, Charles Jencks, Brent Bolin (architecture), and various authors from Samuel Beckett, Eugene Ionesco, Jorge Luis Borges, Max Bense, and Vladimir Nabokov to Harold Pinter, B. S. Johnson, Rayner Heppenstall, Christine Brooke-Rose, Helmut Heissenbuttel, Jurgen Becker, Peter Handke, Thomas Bernhardt, Ernest Jandl, Gabriel Garcia Márquez, Julio Cortázar, Alain RobbeGrillet, Michel Butor, Maurice Roche, Philippe Sollers, and, in America, John Barth, William Burroughs, Thomas Pynchon, Donald Barthelme, Walter Abish, John Ashbery, David Antin, Sam Shepard, and Robert Wilson. Indubitably, these names are far too heterogenous to form a movement, paradigm, or school. Still, they may evoke a number of related cultural tendencies, a constellation of values, a repertoire of procedures and attitudes. These we call postmodernism. Whence this term? Its origin remains uncertain, though we know that Federico de Onis used the word postmodernismo in his Antologia de la poesía española e hispanoamericana (1882-1932), published in Madrid in 1934; and Dudley Fitts picked it up again in his Anthology of Contemporary Latin-American Poetry of 1942.¹ Both meant thus to indicate a minor reaction to
modernism already latent within it, reverting to the early twentieth century. The term also appeared in Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History* as early as D.C. Somervell's first-volume abridgement in 1947. For Toynbee, Post-Modernism designated a new historical cycle in Western civilization, starting around 1875, which we now scarcely begin to discern. Somewhat later, during the fifties, Charles Olson often spoke of postmodernism with more sweep than lapidary definition.

But prophets and poets enjoy an ample sense of time, which few literary scholars seem to afford. In 1959 and 1960, Irving Howe and Harry Levin wrote of postmodernism rather disconsolately as a falling off from the great modernist movement. It remained for Leslie Fiedler and myself, among others, to employ the term during the sixties with premature approbation, and even with a touch of bravado. Fiedler had it in mind to challenge the elitism of the high modernist tradition in the name of popular culture. I wanted to explore the impulse of self-unmaking which is part of the literary tradition of silence. Pop and silence, or mass culture and deconstruction, or Superman and Godot—or as I shall later argue, immanence and indeterminacy—may all be aspects of the postmodern universe. But all this must wait upon more patient analysis, longer history.

Yet the history of literary terms serves only to confirm the irrational genius of language. We come closer to the question of postmodernism itself by acknowledging the psychopolitics, if not the psychopathology, of academic life. Let us admit it: there is a will to power in nomenclature, as well as in people or texts. A new term opens for its proponents a space in language. A critical concept or system is a “poor” poem of the intellectual imagination. The battle of the books is also an ontic battle against death. That may be why Max Planck believed that one never manages to convince one's opponents—not even in theoretical physics!—one simply tries to outlive them. William James described the process in less morbid terms: novelties are first repudiated as nonsense, then declared obvious, then appropriated by former adversaries as their own discoveries.

I do not mean to take my stand with the postmoderns against the (ancient) moderns. In an age of frantic intellectual fashions, values can be too recklessly voided, and tomorrow can quickly preempt today or yesteryear. Nor is it merely a matter of fashions; for the sense of supervision may express some cultural urgency that partakes less of hope than fear. This much we recall: Lionel Trilling entitled one of his most thoughtful works *Beyond Culture* (1965); Kenneth Boulding argued that “postcivilization” is an essential part of *The Meaning of the 20th Century* (1964); and George Steiner could have subtitled his essay, *In Bluebeard's Castle* (1971); “Notes Toward the Definition of Postculture.” Before them, Roderick Seidenberg published his *Post-Historic Man* exactly in mid-century; and most recently, I have myself speculated, in *The Right Promethean Fire* (1980), about the advent of a posthumanist era. As Daniel Bell put it: “It used to be that the great literary modifier was the word beyond.... But we seem to have exhausted the beyond, and today the sociological modifier is post.”

My point here is double: in the question of postmodernism, there is a will and counter-will to intellectual power, an imperial de-sire of the mind, but this will and desire are themselves caught in a historical moment of supervision, if not exactly of obsolescence. The reception or denial of postmodernism thus remains contingent on the psychopolitics of academic life—including the various dispositions of people and power in our universities, of critical factions and personal frictions, of boundaries that arbitrarily include or exclude—no less than on the imperatives of the culture at large. This much, reflexivity seems to demand from us at the start.
But reflection demands also that we address a number of conceptual problems that both conceal and constitute postmodernism itself. I shall try to isolate ten of these, commencing with the simpler, moving toward the more intractable.

1. The word postmodernism sounds not only awkward, uncouth; it evokes what it wishes to surpass or suppress, modernism itself. The term thus contains its enemy within, as the terms romanticism and classicism, baroque and rococo, do not. Moreover, it denotes temporal linearity and connotes belatedness, even decadence, to which no post-modernist would admit. But what better name have we to give this curious age? The Atomic, or Space, or Television, Age? These technological tags lack theoretical definition. Or shall we call it the Age of Indeterminance (indeterminacy + immanence) as I have half-antagonistically proposed? Or better still, shall we simply live and let others live to call us what they may?

2. Like other categorical terms—say poststructuralism, or modernism, or romanticism for that matter—postmodernism suffers from a certain semantic instability: that is, no clear consensus about its meaning exists among scholars. The general difficulty is compounded in this case by two factors: (a) the relative youth, indeed brash adolescence, of the term postmodernism, and (b) its semantic kinship to more current terms, themselves equally unstable. Thus some critics mean by postmodernism what others call avant-gardism or even neo-avant-gardism, while still others would call the same phenomenon simply modernism. This can make for inspired debates.

3. A related difficulty concerns the historical instability of many literary concepts, their openness to change. Who, in this epoch of fierce misprisions, would dare to claim that romanticism is apprehended by Coleridge, Pater, Lovejoy, Abrams, Peckham, and Bloom quite the same way? There is already some evidence that postmodernism, and modernism even more, are beginning to slip and slide in time, threatening to make any diacritical distinction between them desperate. But perhaps the phenomenon, akin to Hubble's “red shift” in astronomy, may someday serve to measure the historical velocity of literary concepts.

4. Modernism and postmodernism are not separated by an Iron Curtain or Chinese Wall; for history is a palimpsest, and culture is permeable to time past, time present, and time future. We are all, I suspect, a little Victorian, Modern, and Postmodern, at once. And an author may, in his or her own lifetime, easily write both a modernist and postmodernist work. (Contrast Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* with his *Finnegans Wake*.) More generally, on a certain level of narrative abstraction, modernism itself may be rightly assimilated to romanticism, romanticism related to the enlightenment, the latter to the renaissance, and so back, if not to the Olduvai Gorge, then certainly to ancient Greece.

5. This means that a “period,” as I have already intimated, must be perceived in terms both of continuity and discontinuity, the two perspectives being complementary and partial. The Apollonian view, rangy and abstract, discerns only historical conjunctions; the Dionysian feeling, sensuous though nearly purblind, touches only the disjunctive moment. Thus postmodernism, by invoking two divinities at once, engages a double view. Sameness and difference, unity and rupture, filiation and revolt, all must be honored if we are to attend to history,
apprehend (perceive, understand) change, both as a spatial, mental structure and as a temporal, physical process, both as pattern and unique event.

6. Thus a “period” is generally not a period at all; it is rather both a diachronic and synchronic construct. Postmodernism, again, like modernism or romanticism, is no exception; it requires both historical and theoretical definition. We would not seriously claim an inaugural “date” for it as Virginia Woolf pertly did for modernism, though we may sometimes woefully imagine that postmodernism began “in or about September, 1939.” Thus we continually discover “antecedents” of postmodernism in Sterne, Sade, Blake, Lautreamont, Rimbaud, Jarry, Tzara, Hofmannsthal, Gertrude Stein, the later Joyce, the later Pound, Duchamp, Artaud, Roussel, Bataille, Broch, Queneau, and Kafka. What this really indicates is that we have created in our mind a model of postmodernism, a particular typology of culture and imagination, and have proceeded to “rediscover” the affinities of various authors and different moments with that model. We have, that is, reinvented our ancestors—and always shall. Consequently, “older” authors can be postmodern—Kafka, Beckett, Borges, Nabokov, Gombrowicz—while “younger” authors need not be so—Styron, Updike, Capote Irving Doc, Irving, Doctorow, Gardner.

7. As we have seen, any definition of postmodernism calls upon a four-fold vision of complementarities, embracing continuity and discontinuity, diachrony and synchrony. But a definition of the concept also requires a dialectical vision; for defining traits are often antithetical, and to ignore this tendency of historical reality is to lapse into single vision and Newton’s sleep. Defining traits are dialectical and also plural; to elect a single trait as an absolute criterion of postmodern grace is to make of all other writers preterites. Thus we can not simply rest—as I have sometimes done—on the assumption that postmodernism is antiformal, anarchic, or decreative; for though it is indeed all these, and despite its fanatic will to unmaking; it also contains the need to discover a “unitary sensibility” (Sontag), to “cross the border and close the gap” (Fiedler), and to attain, as I have suggested, an immanence of discourse, an expanded noetic intervention, a “neo-gnostic im-mediacy of mind.”

8. All this leads to the prior problem of periodization which is also that of literary history conceived as a particular apprehension of change. Indeed, the concept of post modernism applies some theory of innovation, renovation, novation, or simply change. But which one? Heraclitean? Darwinian? Marxist? Freudian? Kuhnian? Viconian? Derridean? Eclectic? Or is a “theory of change” itself an oxymoron best suited to ideologues intolerant of the ambiguities of time? Should postmodernism, then, be left—at least for the moment—unconceptualized, a kind of literary-historical “difference” or “trace?”

9. Postmodernism can expand into a still large problem: is it only an artistic tendency or also a social phenomenon, perhaps even a mutation in Western humanism? If so, how are the various aspects of this phenomenon—psychological, philosophical, economic, political—joined or disjoined? In short, can we understand postmodernism in literature without some attempt to perceive the lineaments of a postmodern society, a Toynbeean postmodernity, or future
Foucauldian épistémè, of which the literary tendency I have been discussing is but a single, elitist strain?¹²

10. Finally, though not least vexing, is postmodernism as an honorific term, used insidiously to valorize writers, however disparate, whom we otherwise esteem, to hail trends, how ever discordant which we somehow approve? Or is it, on the contrary, a term of opprobrium and objurgation? In short, is postmodernism a descriptive as well as evaluative or normative category of literary thought? Or does it belong, as Charles Altieri notes, to that category of “essentially contested concepts” in philosophy that never wholly exhaust their constitutive confusions?¹³

No doubt, other conceptual problems lurk in the matter of postmodernism. Such problems, however, can not finally inhibit the intellectual imagination, the desire to apprehend our historical presence in noetic constructs that reveal our being to ourselves. I, move, therefore, to propose a provisional scheme that the literature of silence, from Sade to Beckett, seems to envisage, and do so by distinguishing, tentatively, between three modes of artistic change in the last hundred years. I call these avant-garde, modern, and postmodern, though I realize that all three have conspired together to that “tradition of the new” that, since Baudelaire, brought “into being an art whose history regardless of the credos of its practitioners, has consisted of leaps from vanguard to vanguard, and political mass movements whose aim has been the total renovation not only of social institutions but of man himself.”¹⁴

By avant-garde, I means those movements that agitated the earlier part of our century, including Pataphysics, Cubism, Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Suprematism, Constructivism, Merzism, de Stijl—some of which I have already discussed in this work. Anarchic, these assaulted the bourgeoisie with their art, their manifestoes, their antics. But their activism could also turn inward, becoming suicidal—such as happened later to some postmodernists like Rudolf Schwartzkogler. Once full of brio and bravura, these movements have all but vanished now, leaving only their story, at once fugacious and exemplary. Modernism, however, proved more stable, aloof, hieratic, like the French Symbolism from which it derived; even its experiments now seem olympian. Enacted by such “individual talents” as Valéry, Proust, and Gide, the early Joyce, Yeats, and Lawrence, Rilke, Mann, and Musil, the early Pound, Eliot, and Faulkner, it commanded high authority, leading Delmore Schwartz to chant in Shenandoah: “Let us consider where the great men are/ Who will obsess the child when he can read. . .” But if much of modernism appears hieratic, hypotactical, and formalist, postmodernism strikes us by contrast as playful, paratactical, and deconstructionist. In this it recalls the irreverent spirit of the avant-garde, and so carries sometimes the label of neo-avant-garde. Yet postmodernism remains “cooler,” in McLuhan's sense, than older vanguards-cooler, less cliquish, and far less aversive to the pop, electronic society of which it is a part, and so hospitable to kitsch.

Can we distinguish postmodernism further? Perhaps certain schematic differences from modernism will provide a start:
The preceding table draws on ideas in many fields—rhetoric, linguistics, literary theory, philosophy, anthropology, psychoanalysis, political science, even theology—and draws on many authors European and American-aligned with diverse movements, groups, and views. Yet the dichotomies this table represents remain insecure, equivocal. For differences shift, defer, even collapse; concepts in any one vertical column are not all equivalent; and inversions and exceptions, in both modernism and postmodernism, abound. Still, I would submit that rubrics in the right column point to the postmodern tendency, the tendency of indeterminance, and so may bring us closer to its historical and theoretical definition.
The time has come, however, to explain a little that neologism: “indeterminance.” I have used that term to designate two central, constitutive tendencies in postmodernism: one of indeterminancy, the other of immanence. The two tendencies are not dialectical; for they are not exactly antithetical; nor do they lead to a synthesis. Each contains its own contradictions, and alludes to elements of the other. Their interplay suggests the action of a “polylectic,” pervading postmodernism. Since I have discussed this topic at some length earlier, I can avert to it here briefly.15

By indeterminacy, or better still, indeterminacies, I mean a complex referent that these diverse concepts help to delineate: ambiguity, discontinuity, heterodoxy, pluralism, randomness, revolt, perversion, deformation. The latter alone subsumes a dozen current terms of unmaking: decreation, disintegration, deconstruction, decenterment, displacement, difference, discontinuity, disjunction, disappearance, decomposition, de-definition, demystification, detotalization, delegitimization—let alone more technical terms referring to the rhetoric of irony, rupture, silence. Through all these signs moves a vast will to unmaking, affecting the body politic, the body cognitive, the erotic body, the individual psyche—the entire realm of discourse in the West. In literature alone our ideas of author, audience, reading, writing, book, genre, critical theory, and of literature itself, have all suddenly become questionable. And in criticism? Roland Barthes speaks of literature as “loss,” “perversion,” “dissolution”; Wolfgang Iser formulates a theory of reading based on textual “blanks”; Paul de Man conceives rhetoric—that is, literature—as a force that “radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration”; and Geoffrey Hartman affirms that “contemporary criticism aims at the hermeneutics of indeterminacy.”16

Such uncertain diffractions make for vast dispersals. Thus I call the second major tendency of postmodernism immanences, a term that I employ without religious echo to designate the capacity of mind to generalize itself in symbols, intervene more and more into nature, act upon itself through its own abstractions and so become, increasingly, immediately, by its own environment. This noetic tendency may be evoked further by such sundry concepts as diffusion, dissemination, pulsion, interplay, communication, interdependence, which all derive from the emergence of human beings as language animals, homo pictor or homo significans, gnostic creatures constituting themselves, and determinedly their universe, by symbols of their own making. Is “this not the sign that the whole of this configuration is about to topple, and that man is in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our horizon?” Foucault famously asks.17 Meanwhile, the public world dissolves as fact and fiction blend, history becomes derealized by media into a happening, science takes its own models as the only accessible reality, cybernetics confronts us with the enigma of artificial intelligence, and technologies project our perceptions to the edge of the receding universe or into the ghostly interstices of matter.18 Everywhere—even deep in Lacan’s “lettered unconscious,” more dense than a black hole in space—everywhere we encounter that immanence called Language, with all its literary ambiguities, epistemic conundrums, and political distractions.19

No doubt these tendencies may seem less rife in England, say, than in America or France where the term postmodernism, reversing the recent direction of poststructuralist flow, has now come into use.20 But the fact in most developed societies remains: as an artistic, philosophical, and social phenomenon, postmodernism veers to-ward open, playful, optative, provisional (open in time as well as in structure or space), disjunctive, or indeterminate forms, a discourse of ironies and fragments, a “white ideology” of absences and fractures, a desire of diffractions, an invocation of complex, articulate silences. Postmodernism veers towards all these yet implies a
different, if not antithetical, movement toward pervasive procedures, ubiquitous interactions, immanent codes, media, languages. Thus our earth seems caught in the process of planetization, transhumanization, even as it breaks up into sects, tribes, factions of every kind. Thus, too, terrorism and totalitarianism, schism and ecumenism, summon one another, and authorities decretely themselves even as societies search for new grounds of authority. One may well wonder: is some decisive historical mutation-involving art and science, high and low culture, the male and female principles, parts and wholes, involving the One and the Many as pre-Socratics used to say-active in our midst? Or does the dismemberment of Orpheus prove no more than the mind's need to make but one more construction of life's mutabilities and human mortality?

And what construction lies beyond, behind, within, that construction?

NOTES

1 For the best history of the term postmodernism see Michael Kohler, “‘Postmodernismus’: Ein begriffsgeschichtlicher Oberblick,” Amerikastudien, vol. 22, no. 1 (1977). That same issue contains other excellent discussions and bibliographies on the term; see particularly Gerhard Hoffmann, Alfred Hornung, and Rudiger Kunow, “‘Modern; ‘Postmodern,’ and ‘Contemporary as Criteria for the Analysis of 20th Century Literature.”


5 See pp. 46-83 [in The Postmodern Turn.]

6 Matei Calinescu, for instance, tends to assimilate “postmodern” to “neo-avant-garde” and sometimes to “avant-garde,” in Faces of Modernity: Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch (Bloomington, 1977), though later he discriminates between these terms thoughtfully, in “Avant-Garde, Neo-Avant-Garde, and Postmodernism,” unpublished manuscript. Miklos Szabolcsi would identify “modern” with “avant-garde” and call “postmodern” the “neo-avant-garde,” in “Avant-Garde, Neo-Avant-Garde, Modernism: Questions and Suggestions,” New Literary History, vol. 3, no 1 (Autumn 1971); while Paul de Man would call “modern” the innovative element, the perpetual “moment of crisis” in the literature of every period, in “Literary History and Literary Modernity,” in Blinding and Insight (New York, 1971), chapter 8; in a similar vein, William V Spanos employs the term “postmodernism” to indicate “not fundamentally a chronological event, but rather a permanent mode of human understanding.” in “De-Struction and the Question of Postmodern Literature: Towards a Definition,” Par Rapport, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1979), 107. And even John Barth, as inward as any writer with postmodernism, now argues that postmodernism is a synthesis yet to come, and what we had assumed to be postmodernism all along was only late modernism, in “The Literature of Replenishment: Post modernist Fiction,” Atlantic Monthly 245, no. 1 (January 1980).

7 In my own earlier and later essays on the subject, I can discern such a slight shift. See “POSTmodernISM,” pp. 25-45 above, “Joyce, Beckett, and the Postmodern Imagination,” TriQuarterly 34 (Fall 1975), and “Culture, Indeterminacy, and Immanence,” pp. 46-83 above.

8 Though some critics have argued that postmodernism is primarily “temporal” and others that it is mainly “spatial,” it is in the particular relation between these single categories that postmodernism probably reveals itself. See the two seemingly contradictory views of William V Spanos, “The Detective at the
Hassan, “Toward a Concept of Postmodernism”


10 For some views of this, see Ihab Hassan and Sally Hassan, eds. Innovation/Renovation: Recent Trends and Reconceptions in Western Culture (Madison, Wis., 1983).

11 At stake here is the idea of literary periodicity, challenged by current French thought. For other views of literary and historical change, including “hierarchic organization” of time, see Leonard Meyer, Music, the Arts and Ideas (Chicago, 1967), 93, 102; Calinescu, Faces of Modernity, 147ff; Ralph Cohen, “Innovation and Variation: Literary Change and Georgic Poetry,” in Ralph Cohen and Murray Krieger, Literature and History (Los Angeles, 1974); and my Paracriticisms, chapter 7. A harder question is one Geoffrey Hartman asks: “With so much historical knowledge, how can we avoid historicism, or the staging of history as a drama in which epiphanic raptures are replaced by epistemic ruptures?” Or, again, how can we “formulate a theory of reading that would be historical rather than historicist”? Saving the Text: Literature/Derrida/Philosophy (Baltimore, 1981), xx.

12 Writers as different as Marshall McLuhan and Leslie Fiedler have explored the media and pop aspects of postmodernism for two decades,, thought their efforts are now out of fashion in some circles. The difference between postmodernism, as a contemporary artistic tendency, and postmodernity, as a cultural phenomenon, perhaps even an era of history, is discussed by Richard E. Palmer in “Postmodernity and Hermeneutics,” Boundary 2, vol. 5, no. 2 (Winter 1977).

13 Charles Altieri, “Postmodernism: A Question of Definition,” Par Rapport, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1979), 90. This leads Altieri to conclude: “The best one can do who believes himself post-modern ... is to articulate spaces of mind in which the confusions can not paralyze because one enjoys the energies and glimpses of our condition which they produce,” p. 99.


17 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York, 1970), 386.

18 “Just as Pascal sought to throw the dice with God ... so do the decisions theorists, and the new intellectual technology, seek their own tableau entier—the compass of rationality itself,” Daniel Bell remarks in “Technology, Nature, and Society,” in Technology and the Frontiers of Knowledge (Garden City, 1975), 53. See also the more acute analysis of “l’in-formatique” by Jean-Francois Lyotard, La Condition postmoderne (Paris, 1979, passim).

19 This tendency also makes the abstract, conceptual, and irrealist character of so much postmodern art.

See Suzi Gablik, Progress in Art (New York, 1977), whose argument was prefigured by Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art (Princeton, 1968). Note also that Ortega presaged the gnostic or noetic tendency to which I refer here in 1925: “Man humanizes the world, injects it, impregnates it with his own ideal substance and is finally entitled to imagine that one day or another, in the far depths of time, this terrible outer world will become so saturated with man that our descendants will be able to travel through it as today we mentally travel through our own most inmost selves—he finally imagines that the world, without ceasing to be like the world, will one day be changed into something like a materialized soul, and, as in Shakespeare’s Tempest, the winds will blow at the bidding of Ariel, the spirit of ideas,” p. 184.

20 Though postmodernism and poststructuralism can not be identified, they clearly reveal many affinities. Thus in the course of one brief essay, Julia Kristeva comments on both immanence and indeterminacy in
terms of her own: “postmodernism is that literature which writes itself with the more or less conscious intention of expanding the signifiable, and thus human, realm”; and again: “At this degree of singularity, we are faced with idiolects, proliferating uncontrollably.” Julia Kristeva, “Postmodernism?” in Romanticism, Modernism, Postmodernism, ed. Harry R. Garvin (Lewisberg, Pa. 1980), 137, 141.