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The Journal of Politics / Volume 74 / Issue 01 / January 2012, pp 156 - 173
DOI: 10.1017/S0022381611001186, Published online: 10 February 2012

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381611001186

How to cite this article:

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The Coalition Merchants: The Ideological Roots of the Civil Rights Realignment

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Over the course of the twentieth century, the Democratic and Republican parties have reversed positions on racial issues. This reversal is credited to a variety of factors, chief among them strategic decisions on the part of party leaders competing for votes. An original dataset of the opinions expressed by political thinkers in leading magazines and newspapers is used to develop a measure of ideological positions parallel to NOMINATE scores for members of Congress. Results show that the current ideological pattern, in which racial and economic liberalism are aligned together, emerged among political intellectuals at least 20 years before it appeared in congressional voting. The finding is consistent with the view that ideology shapes party coalitions.

Ideology might be thought to play two distinct roles in partisan conflict. In one role, it rationalizes partisan coalitions. Party leaders create coalitions for electoral reasons and concoct ideologies to justify them (e.g., Downs 1957). In another role, however, the ideas come first: ideologies organize policies and their proponents into coalitions that party leaders then seek to represent.

To explore these alternatives, this project examines the twentieth-century shift in the policy positions of the two major parties in the United States on race and racial issues. A century ago, the solid South belonged to the Democrats, and with it opposition to the rights of blacks. Republicans, based in the North, supported civil rights for blacks at least some of the time. But regional voting blocs and party positions flipped during the Civil Rights Movement. A considerable literature has explored how this occurred. One view is that the parties saw electoral advantage in pursuing different voters. Democrats wooed the support of growing numbers of black voters in the north even at the risk of losing their base in the south, while Republicans adopted a “southern strategy” of appealing to southern white conservatives (e.g., James 1997; Karol 2009; Lee 2002; Sitkoff 1971). Another view, however, is that Democratic activists forced party leaders and candidates to adopt procivil rights positions (Caro 2002; e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; McMahon 2005).

One simple empirical implication of these competing views concerns their sequence: which changed first—the content of the country’s two ideological coalitions, or the content of the party agendas? The content of ideology is measured from the positions taken by leading political intellectuals in political publications. The content of party agendas is measured by partisan votes in Congress. The widely familiar NOMINATE approach is used to scale the positions of both pundits and members of Congress (MCs), making it possible to test which group held what views at what time.

I find that, in 1910, parties in Congress were still voting along patterns set in the nineteenth century, in which probusiness and procivil rights views were at one pole of partisan conflict, opposed to antibusiness and anticivil rights views at the other. But positions taken by political intellectuals on race and economics had become unrelated in 1910. Beginning in the 1930s, congressional voting began to display that same lack of alignment between race and economics. Meanwhile, pundits had begun by 1930 to align their positions on race and economics in the now familiar ideological pattern: Progressive intellectuals were becoming both procivil rights and antibusiness. Conservative pundits adopted the new ideological pattern sometime before 1950. Congressional voting on race and economics did not fall onto the same dimension until the 1960s.

1Supplemental material, including data and other files necessary to produce all numerical results and figures will be available at http://bit.ly/hansnoel upon publication.

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While this temporal pattern does not demonstrate that ideology shapes party coalitions, it is an important element of a causal argument. In particular, it rules out the alternative, that the parties changed their positions and intellectuals then rationalized their coalitions. The rationalization, or perhaps better, the articulation, came first.

The article proceeds in five parts. The first section outlines a theory of ideology and its relationship to political parties, and the second covers the background of the realignment on race, as it appears in congressional voting. The next section develops a measure of ideology for intellectuals, independent of the political opinions of members of Congress, and the fourth section applies that measure to intellectuals in the decades before and after the racial realignment, to show that ideology changed before politicians did. The final section concludes with discussion of the mechanisms of ideological change and of the linkage between that change and party coalitions.

A Theory of Ideology

Nearly every study of ideology begins with the idea that ideology “constrains” groups of individuals to take similar positions on a series of issues, even in cases in which there may be little obvious basis for the constraint (Converse 1964; Gerring 1997; Knight 2006). The notion that constraint is a defining feature of ideology leads naturally to dimensional models used both theoretically (e.g., Enelow and Hinich 1989; Hinich and Munger 1994) and empirically (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1997). In these models, ideology is simply that dimension which best explains the common choices of many actors across many issues. Those who tend to take the liberal (or conservative) position on many issues will be located at the liberal (or conservative) end of the spectrum, while those who take ideologically heterodox positions will be located in a “moderate” position. Insofar as issue positions are well predicted by an ideological dimension, that is constraint.

A similar kind of constraint is also present in party coalitions. A coalition is simply a group of actors united in their choices. Thus those who share liberal positions would appear to be in a liberal coalition, while those who share conservative positions are in a conservative coalition. We tend to use the word coalition to describe groups of actors who act together for strategic or at least conscious reasons. But if we are agnostic about the origins of constraint, then an ideology defines a coalition, a point made clear by comparing Aldrich (1995) and Schwartz (1989) on party coalitions with Bawn (1999) on ideological coalitions, all of which use the same basic model.

Constraint from Whom?

Where does ideological constraint come from? On this point, there is no consensus. One view, as indicated, is that it is simply a rationalization for electorally convenient coalitions. Another, radically different view is that ideological constraint is based on some sort of unifying principles or logic, but the exact role of such forces is not clear. Another distinct view is that constraint is based on psychological traits or even genes (e.g., Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Amodio et al. 2007; Jost et al. 2003) that give people predispositions, which in turn shape who they listen to in politics (Zaller 1992, 23). Yet another view is that ideology ties together the views necessary to protect or advance one’s place in the social system—an edifice created to justify “baser motives,” or other goals (Apter 1964; Downs 1957; Mannheim 1955; Marx and Engels [1845, 1932] 1998).

Disentangling all of these sources is complicated, but they have one thing in common. Some actor or group of actors must organize the issues of the day and explain how they fit into the principles, interests, or basic predispositions that supposedly lie at the foundation of ideology. This work could be deductive, beginning with principles and deriving policy positions, or it could be inductive, beginning with the policies demanded by material interest or even gut feelings and constructing rationalizations of them. But, as everyone agrees, constraint does not materialize out of the ether; it is the product of a social process. In one of the most foundational works on belief systems in the United States, Converse (1964) put it this way:

First, the shaping of belief systems of any range into apparently logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act of creative synthesis characteristic of only a miniscule proportion of any population. Second, to the extent that multiple idea-elements of a belief system are socially diffused from such creative sources, they tend to be diffused as “packages,” which consumers come to see as “natural” wholes, for they are presented in such terms (“If you believe this, then you will also believe that, for it follows in such-and-such ways”). (211)
That is, the content of ideology is the result of some small set of idea organizers, who define what it means to be liberal or conservative. Voters merely respond to this organization. Converse offers no direct evidence for this characterization, but their existence is central to his theory of ideology, and they fit well with later findings built on his theory.

Who, then, constitutes this “miniscule proportion of the population” doing the “creative synthesis” of ideology? One possible answer is politicians. Perhaps everything we call ideology is little more than a justification for the preferences of the members of party coalitions. This is essentially the role ideologies play in Downs (1954), for instance.

Another likely candidate is the set of public intellectuals and pundits whose careers are based on discussing political issues. Notably, no previous study of which I am aware has undertaken a systematic investigation of the possible role of political intellectuals in creating ideology. This is the point of departure for my study. It aims, in particular, to measure the views of political intellectuals in order to find out whether intellectuals or politicians are the primary—or at least earlier—organizers of constraint. The question is important, because the two types of political actors respond to different incentives, operate in different spheres, and would possibly create coalitions in different ways. Many of these differences are beyond the scope of this manuscript, but are worth sketching for contextual purposes.

**Politician-Created Constraint**

One way politicians create constraint is through the legislative coalitions they create. Every issue might be independent, and politicians initiate logrolls across issues. “You vote for my project, I’ll vote for yours.” As these logrolls become permanent, they define political parties, which may then nominate candidates dedicated to them (Aldrich 1995; Schwartz 1989).

Party logrolls create the appearance that some issue positions go together, which is in a turn a cue that can shape unorganized public opinions—and perhaps even elite opinion—into ideology. The vote trading that creates this constraint does not require any principles or internal logic. It might, however, gain the appearance of principle as partisans create rationalizations for their joint agendas. Downs argues that this is how ideologies form (1957, 97). Ideology is created to help bind together positions that were originally adopted for other reasons.

**Intellectual-Created Constraint**

The process by which intellectuals create constraint is likely quite different. They do so by means of their writings, which invoke logic and principle, both directly and indirectly. They might argue, for example, that if you believe in protecting the interests of working-class whites, you should also care about economically disadvantaged blacks. This sort of dynamic seems to be what Converse had in mind with the term “creative synthesis.” More simply, pundits might make arguments in favor of labor unions on Tuesday and in favor of homosexual rights on Thursday, but to the same audience both days, inducing a relationship.

Political writers surely care about winning in elections and on the floor of Congress. But they do not have the immediate stake in those outcomes that elected officials do. So while they want to induce coalitions that can win, they are also free to think about inducing the coalitions with which they want to win. And they are certainly freer to advocate views that currently lack majority support but may someday have it than are politicians who must stand regularly for election.

The rhetoric of pundits is more closely watched and is more central to their identities. This doesn’t mean that they cannot twist their arguments in favor of politically expedient outcomes, but the principles and logic they invoke will be more central to their position taking.

Pundit-induced constraint is enforced by persuasion. If pundits organize themselves into opposing camps, as they seem to do, and if consumers of punditry come to adopt the positions of their favorite pundits, they will internalize a set of positions that makes them look very much like ideologues.

Constraint that originates with pundits fits basic notions about what an ideology is. It therefore seems reasonable to associate pundit-created constraint ideology and politician-created constraint with something different, perhaps “party platforms” or “party agendas.”

Of course, both pundits and parties contribute to the dissemination of ideology. By the time the voters have absorbed an ideology, the distinctions between the various actors at its headwaters are largely blurred. A voter who is inclined to be liberal and self-identifies as a Democrat will receive signals from both pundits and politicians and may not care much

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3There are no doubt other candidates. These, however, are the most apparent and are the focus of this project.
about the difference. But the distinction has empirical, theoretical, and normative implications and is therefore worth making. This article attempts to find the empirical relevance of the distinction in the context of race. It first traces the development of procivil rights positions among liberals and opposition to civil rights policies among conservatives. It then shows that these develop before similar associations develop among members of Congress.

Racial Politics in the Twentieth Century

Party politics was structured around economic issues in the early part of the twentieth century. Antimonopoly and antibusiness language in the Democratic presidential party platforms peaked in the period from 1900 to 1908 (Gerring 1998, 77, 199) and remained high into the 1930s. Initially, however, many economic issues remained crosscutting. The progressive movement affected each party differently in different places. (Sundquist 1983, 170–81) And conservatives could be found in both parties.

The economic differences between the parties sharpened with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Tariffs and trusts became less central to the agenda, eventually replaced by direct economic intervention in the Keynesian mode. By the mid 1930s, the Democratic Party was the party of labor, the working class, and redistribution. The Republicans were the party of business. Thus the New Deal coalition, widely understood as a marriage of southern segregationists and northern workers and immigrants, continued to unite elements of the old Democratic coalition (Gerring 1998; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).

During this period of consistent economic conflict between the Democrats and Republicans, another issue is consistently absent: race. During Reconstruction, race had been a powerful symbolic issue: Democrats were the party of white supremacy and the solid South, and Republicans were the party of Reconstruction. But the Civil War amendments had taken most slavery issues off the agenda, and few new issues were taken up, especially after the end of Reconstruction. Republicans did sometimes push for voter protections (Vallely 2004), but the most salient votes in Congress were highly partisan antilynching measures, and the last of these was in 1921. As late as the 1940s, the Democratic Party’s platform offered vague language on race, while the Republican Party took explicitly problack positions (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Johnson and Porter 1973, 403, 412), but generally did not act on them. Neither party wanted race on the national political agenda.

This is the opposite of the cleavage today. Today, more than 90% of the African American vote goes to the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party is the home to those who oppose affirmative action and defend the Confederate flag.

This reversal in party positions has been thoroughly studied (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Murphy and Gulliver 1971; Petrocik 1987; Sundquist 1983). The primary explanations are a mix of strategy and coalition politics. After World War II ended, some Democrats realized they could gain votes in the North, especially from African Americans, if they came out in favor of civil rights. As demographics were changing, the parties had to respond (Bass and De Vries 1995). Much attention was paid to finding the right way to do so. Clark Clifford famously offered a memo on strategy to Truman in 1948 that argued for that the risk of losing southern Democrats was small compared to the potential gains in the North, among blacks and whites (James 1997; Sitkoff 1971). Truman followed the suggestion in 1948, prompting the Dixiecrats to run Strom Thurmond as a rival Democrat against him. Although Truman won the election, he split the Democratic Party and lost four states to Thurmond.

And so the Democratic Party inched away from the civil rights stance taken by Truman. The party’s platforms in 1952 and 1956 were similar to those from before Truman (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 31–58; Johnson and Porter 1973). Carmines and Stimson show that the national party’s campaign positions first began to shift on race in the early 1960s. Nixon and Kennedy both took procivil rights positions in 1960 (Scammon and Wattenberg 1971), and in that year, the Democratic Party suddenly made race a central element of the platform. But southern Democrats held back their support from Kennedy, putting unpledged electors on the ballot in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, although the unpledged slate only won in Alabama.

The broad pattern of party allegiances on race in this period can be seen in Figure 1, which depicts congressional voting over the period 1860 to 1980. This figure is adapted from Poole and Rosenthal. The figure plots how well civil rights bills fit the first dimension in the House of Representatives from 1861 to 1988. The APRE, or aggregate proportionate reduction in error, measures how much of the error in voting is reduced by the first dimension of the NOMINATE model. Since NOMINATE scores measure the primary division among Members of Congress on economic issues, the APRE for civil rights bills measures how strongly race is correlated with the partisan agendas of the period.
In the immediate postbellum period, bills on race were largely first dimensional. These were mostly antilynching bills, which Democrats opposed and Republicans favored. But there were not many such votes in this period, and none on the floor of Congress between 1921 and 1937. In 1937, well into the period of the New Deal, the issue ceased to be explained by the first dimension of conflict. This is the beginning of the conservative coalition in Congress, which cut across the primary economic party division on a number of issues, especially race. But beginning in the 1960s, the issue comes back to the first dimension. Now pro-black policies (which were increasingly redistributive) are opposed by economic conservatives, while economic liberals in the Democratic Party favor those policies.

Most scholarship explains these developments in terms of the pressures of electoral competition. In some accounts (Karol 2009; Lee 2002), those elites are constrained by voters or activist groups, whose support they must court. For others, party leaders pursue the policies they personally prefer, even when the policies have negative electoral consequences. Carmines and Stimson, for instance, note that while party elites may choose policies for a variety of reasons, only some will resonate with voters and evolve to be central to party competition. Feinstein and Schickler (2008) suggest that this process began among state party activists. Using data on state party platforms, they show that the activists began to divide on racial segregation in the mid-to-late 1940s.

**Figure 1** Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error of Race Votes in the U.S. Congress

Note: The Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error (APRE) measures how well the votes are explained by the estimated first dimension.

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**Ideology and race.** Although scholarship on issue and party evolution on race pays scant attention to political intellectuals, they also evolved their views on race. In the late nineteenth century, the central issue was also economic: how should society think about the poor and working class? One strain of thought, led by Lester Ward and picked up by Herbert Croly, argued that the government should not be seen as the enemy of the working class, as Democrats in the antebellum period saw it. Rather, the power of government ought to be directed to helping bring “The Promise of American Life” to excluded citizens (Croly 1909).

Another strain, perhaps exemplified by William Graham Sumner and Herbert Spencer, argued that attempts to use government power to correct income inequality were doomed. Spencer is credited with coining the term “Social Darwinism,” by which he meant that in an unregulated economy, the most talented and hard-working would succeed, while the lazy would fail. Efforts to intervene in this mechanism would only undermine the incentive to work provided by the economy.

Race, however, was not central to this turn-of-the-century economic debate. Ward and Croly focused on the urban poor, not rural black sharecroppers. Ward and other Progressives, drawing on the state of the art in sociology, held views we’d call racist today (Gossett 1963, 1997; Southern 2005; but see Stocking 1994). Eventually, intellectuals did make the link between economic justice and racial justice. Widely known thinkers in this vein include Franz Boas, who rejected the notion of race in *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911), Gunnar Myrdal, whose *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944) outlined the obstacles blacks faced in participating in society, and W.E.B. DuBois, who regularly challenged scientific racism.

It is, however, an open question whether the views of this handful of famous names is representative of any broader intellectual currents. We can always identify early proponents of policies that are later adopted. Understanding the evolution of ideology requires looking systematically, across many intellectuals. We thus need a measure of ideology among pundits that is temporally comparable to our best temporal measure of party cleavages, namely the NOMINATE scores of members of Congress.

**A Measure of the Ideological Space**

The central question in this article is whether the observed constraint among issues is first organized by political officeholders or intellectual pundits. I have, for the sake of convenience, labeled the former a
“party agenda” and the latter “ideology.” Because both reflect policy constraint, they can be measured in parallel ways.

The primary way political scientists measure ideology is through Item Response Models, including the popular NOMINATE scores. These models posit and attempt to measure whatever dimension(s) may underlie people’s votes or issue positions. This conception is developed formally in Hinich and Munger (1994), which treats ideology as a predictive dimension that voters and other actors can use to map a candidate or party to specific policy positions. The poles of this dimension are often called liberalism and conservatism. There is no strong a priori reason to believe that congressional voting can be explained by a single dominant dimension, but Poole and Rosenthal have shown that, in most periods of American history, this is the case.

We cannot observe the latent trait, nor can we know a priori how well it will predict particular votes. What we can do is look at the pattern of the votes and deduce both the trait itself and the parameters that relate each issue to the trait. Scaling does this.

Since the dimension is estimated from the positions taken by a population, different populations may generate different dimensions. But since pundits and politicians exist in the same political system and respond to many of the same issues, it is reasonable to compare the dimensions generated by the two groups. This comparison, partly quantitative and partly interpretative, will seek to determine how pundit-created ideology is related to party agendas, both generally and as regards racial issues.

**The Data.** The data are the recorded positions of pundits in major political publications on the issues of the day. The sampling frame is based on a number of publications observed at 20-year intervals. Every opinion piece published in these publications is available electronically, and except as noted below, every piece within the calendar year was examined. A few publications that began publishing shortly after the year in question are also included. (For example, The New Republic began publication in 1914 but is included in 1910.) The initial unit of observation, then, is the opinion article.


These publications are meant to be representative of the general political discourse at the time, but they do not cover everything. Important exchanges take place in smaller or more narrowly targeted publications and in letters between intellectuals. Even at cocktail parties. This dataset covers only the tip of the iceberg of politically important discussion, but every effort has been made to make it representative. Publications were selected that appeared significant in the secondary literature. To the extent that selected publications fail to represent the broader discourse, they do so in ways consistent with theory. That is, publications in major cities that were read by politically active thinkers are included, while publications that were less salient among intellectuals are often excluded.4

Data were collected by the author and a team of undergraduate researchers.5 For each opinion article, researchers recorded the author, source, and the issue(s) on which an opinion was taken, and what position (for or against) was taken. Articles were coded for all positions taken in them, which in most cases was more than one. Researchers also wrote a detailed

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4Another significant way the sample is incomplete, for the purposes of the present study, is that it includes few African American thinkers, especially in the early years. This is not surprising, since many black intellectuals struggled to create their own outlets for their work. Segregation in life was mirrored by segregation in the public sphere, something that normative students of the public sphere (e.g., Fraser 1990; Dawson 2001; Roberts 1996; Young 1996) have been concerned with for some time. Since I claim that punditry most directly influences the opinions of national elites, focusing on mainstream sources is appropriate. The absence of many black voices is empirically accurate. Attempting to adjust the sample to increase the representation of blacks would bias our estimate of the relationship between racial issues and ideological positions in the mainstream publications that were still closed to many black writers. Still, we know that important ideas were advanced in other outlets, such as The Crisis, Opportunity, Negro World, and the Chicago Defender. Some writers who appeared in those publications also write in these, and white writers do interact with their ideas. But these data cannot speak to the particular contribution of black intellectuals on ideology. Understanding the contribution of black intellectuals per se is beyond the scope of this project.

5With some exceptions, researchers took a course on political ideas in American history. Students applied to take the course, and only students with excellent academic records were admitted.
abstract of the article. Articles include unsigned editorials for each publication, which are attributed to the “editorial board” of the publication. The author then reviewed each article code, checking it against the abstract, and in some cases, against the original article.

Each article is coded for its author, including institutional ones. Thus the database includes a variety of actors, such as The New York Times editorial board, periodic correspondents with a publication, and major figures such as Herbert Croly or William Graham Sumner. It includes some elected officials, such as Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, when they wrote in the sampled publications. Each article is also coded for as many opinions as are taken in the article. Some articles focus on one issue, but many address multiple issues, sometimes drawing explicit comparisons between them, sometimes not.

The data analyzed in this article are from publications in the calendar years of 1910, 1930, 1950, 1970, and 1990, with a few exceptions for journals that began publication shortly after these years. Data from the initial publications was supplemented by direct searches on the names of all writers to capture articles written shortly before or after each of these years. In the few cases in which a writer is an important figure in American history, biographical information is used to fill in positions on issues not addressed in available sources from a given year. Writers who were not found in the initial sample of articles are not included, even when I know they were active in the period. Biographical information is used only when it reflects opinions that were held in and around the year in question.

An example should illustrate the process. In 1950, Walter Lippmann’s syndicated column appeared in the Washington Post. Thus several articles covering Lippmann’s attitudes about a variety of issues are included in the sample for the 1950 window. But Lippmann also has published extensively outside of his column, including significant works decades earlier, including A Preface to Politics (1913) and Public Opinion (1922). Even though Lippmann’s positions on many issues did not change after 1913, his positions from these earlier works are not incorporated into his record for 1950. However, positions published in the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example in The Cold War (1947), were included in the 1950 sample. And Lippmann’s positions in the 1910 and 1930 samples, when he was also in the dataset, are informed by works published in that period.

As should be evident, these data differ from the data usually used to estimate ideal points of Members of Congress. First, defining issues is tricky. For Congress, we know that everyone is voting on the same issues without even knowing what the bill is about. For the pundit data, the issue must be defined from the context. On the one hand, overly general issue definitions can mask significant differences from writer to writer. For instance, an advocate of better treatment for workers might still oppose labor unions as corrupt or ineffective. On the other hand, overly specific issues degenerate into minutia, where each writer is writing about some very narrow matter unaddressed by others. To identify issues that are as specific as possible while still maintaining a large number of responses on each issue, similar issues were clumped together in general issue areas (taxes, foreign policy, race, trade) and then broken down further as appropriate. Decisions to change an issue from more to less specific were made after careful reading of the abstracts and original articles to be sure they were appropriate.

Relatedly, the framing of the issue is also important. Opinions can be considered in terms of policy prescriptions, groups (or individuals) who are affected, or abstract principles that are invoked. Effort was made to focus on the first two, especially policy. However, pundits are not constrained to propose detailed policy options. Coding of general principles had to be done with care. We are not interested in who endorses freedom of speech in the abstract, but who thinks free speech should not apply to offensive art or hate speech. Many writers also take up groups, individuals, and programs for praise or reproach. These too are informative. Thus, pundits take positions on “issues” such as “The Bricker Amendment,” “blacks,” “The Democratic Party,” and “Dwight Eisenhower.”

Second, writers must address multiple issues in order for me to tell what issues cluster together, but many specialize in only a handful of issues. This contrasts with the situation faced in the analyses of legislatures where, despite some abstentions, every legislator faces and usually votes on the same set of issues. Thus, pundit-by-issue matrix produced by my coding procedure is “missing” just less than 90% of the possible observations (that is, compared to a scenario in which every pundit addressed every issue that has been raised in the year). This missingness is misleading, however. It comes largely from the many writers who take on two or three issues, or the many issues that are addressed by only a few writers. It is missing data only from the standpoint of a complete matrix.

We could focus on the editorial boards and a few key writers who address most of the leading issues. In
that case, this project would be akin to the estimation of ideal points of the nine members of the Supreme Court (Martin and Quinn 2002), although with fewer issues. Dropping the remaining cases would leave less "missingness," but it would also throw away useful information. The major issues are addressed by most of the major writers, but the additional issues and writers help to clarify the relationships. We cannot learn much about those issues or writers, but we can learn something about the underlying dimension, which in turn tells us something about the other issues. Including everything provides more information about the space as a whole. Since the procedure gives confidence bounds for all parameters, it is easy to know on which issues or for which pundits we do not have enough information to draw inferences.

Once positions have been coded by issue, they are represented in a pundit by issue matrix that is identical in form to the legislator by vote matrices used in the study of congress. Each period generates about 3,000 coded opinions, but some of these are repetitive or on issues that no other writer addresses. After eliminating noninformative cases, the matrix for 1910 has 172 issues and 82 writers, with 810 different opinions. There are 155 issues, 97 writers, and 1,002 opinions in 1930 and 223 issues, 100 writers, and 1,441 opinions in 1950.

The models. The models estimated here are adaptations of a standard Item-Response Model, as developed by Albert and Chib (1993; See also Baker 1992; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2000; Treier and Jackman 2002). These models estimate the ideal point of each actor on one dimension, as well as item parameters. Higher dimensions could be estimated, but in most years, the data are too sparse to do so with much precision. As noted above, estimating higher dimensions can tell us which issues cluster together on another dimension, but this is unnecessary to know which issues are part of the primary cleavage. The theoretical questions here are all about which issues are part of the primary division between the two parties, the first dimension would be sufficient.

Details of the models are in the appendix. Two important points are necessary to understand the results reported below. First, two different models are estimated for each time period. Both models produce results that are consistent with each other, but the second model extracts information that the first does not. The first model treats the pundit's decision as a binary choice between "for" and "against" an issue, analogous to the binary choice in Congress. The second model treats the decision as a multinomial choice, where the pundit can be "for" or "against" the issue or abstain. Abstention is important because the decision to talk about the issue at all might be related to ideology. In the second model, abstentions are treated as informative, rather than as missing data.

Both models estimate a hierarchical structure in which pundits' ideal points are drawn from journal-specific distributions. More details are in the appendix.

The second point about the models is that each generates two key outcome measures. One is the Aggregate Proportionate Reduction in Error from the first dimension, and the other is the issue discrimination parameter. The APRE measures how much better we can explain the actors' choices once we include the first dimension. Thus the APRE tells us how well the estimated dimension explains choices. We can look at the APRE for all issues or groups of issues, in which case we can say something about how well say economic issues collectively relate to the underlying dimension.

The issue discrimination parameter \( \beta \) is estimated for each issue. In the binary model, these parameters are analogous to slopes (or more precisely, logit coefficients) linking the first ideological dimension with the actors' choice on that issue. Where the \( \beta \)s are large in magnitude, the issue is strongly related to the main dimension. When positive, the \( \beta \) indicates that conservatives are more likely to take a "pro" position while liberals will take the "con" position. A negative \( \beta \) indicates the opposite.

In the multinomial model, the coefficients should be evaluated in comparison to the left out category, which is abstention. It is thus possible that both liberals and conservatives are more likely to take the "pro" position, relative to abstaining. There are now two \( \beta \)s to be evaluated. Where both are large (in magnitude) and of opposite signs, then the \( \beta \) from the first model will also be large, and this is the case where the issue is strongly related to the dominant ideological dimension.

However, it is possible for the difference between the two parameters to be small (or indistinguishable from 0), because one of the parameters is large and the other is small or imprecisely estimated. This is the case where taking one position on the issue is related to ideology, while taking the other position is not. Sometimes, no one will take one side of the issue, either because it is unpopular or because it is the status quo and its advocates do not feel the need to defend it. For instance, before the Civil Rights movement, very few pundits take openly pro segregation
positions. Supporting segregation is either unpopular or unnecessary, since there are few serious efforts to end it.

Both $\beta$’s can also be large but of the same sign. In that case, their difference will not be large, but the issue is related to ideology. If both parameters are positive, this means that “conservatives” (those with positive $x$’s) are more likely to take both the pro and con position. Such an issue is the source of internal conflict. Some partisan issues are like this. For example, few liberals offered an opinion on whether Dwight Eisenhower was a good candidate for the Republican nomination, but conservatives fought over it.

**Measuring Race and Ideology from the 1910s to 1950s**

Using the results from these models, we can ask how well racial issues map to the ideological space in this period. It turns out to be rather complicated. It also turns out not to mirror the behavior in Congress.

Results for the 1910, 1930, and 1950 datasets are presented, supplemented with information from the 1970 and 1990 datasets. Figure 2 provides a quick overview of race in ideology from the binary model, which is the relevant comparison for NOMINATE. It includes the APRE for economic issues and racial issues, from 1910 through 1990. The APRE, recall, measures how well the issues fit the estimated dimension. Where the APRE is large, the issues are important for the estimated dimension. In the 1910s the first dimension is largely an economic one; economic issues have a reasonably large APRE. Race, however, is not related. This is true in the 1930s as well, but in the 1950s, the fit of racial issues come to parallel economic issues. Beginning in 1950, and continuing in 1970 and 1990, race and economics are on the same dimension.

But in the 1950s, according to Figure 1, race had just fallen off the primary dimension in Congress. In Congress, race and economics were highly related from the Civil War up until 1921, when probusiness Republicans voted for antilynching laws. Among ideologues, the tie between racial sympathy and economic conservatism established in the antebellum period has evaporated by 1910. In the 1910s, race is orthogonal to economics among intellectuals. It largely remains so in 1930. Thus the intellectuals herald both the decoupling of race from the economic issues that form the core of ideology (1910 among pundits vs. 1921 to 1937 in Congress) and its new association with the other side of those issues (1950 vs. 1970 or later).

Figure 3 combines the information from Figures 1 and 2 to illustrate the sequence between pundit-driven and politician-driven constraint. The ideologues move first. That is, the fit for racial issues increases first among the ideologues, followed almost a generation later by the politicians in Congress.7

This suggests, then, that the ideological dimension among pundits absorbed race before Congress did. If these dimensions measure the coalitions that ideology and party define, respectively, then the ideological coalition led the party coalition. And if we look more closely at the ideology of race in 1910, 1930, and 1950, especially as revealed in the multinomial model, the story becomes still richer.

**Ideology in the 1910s.** The APRE in 1910 is large only for economic issues. The intellectual space in 1910 is not highly polarized, nor is it significantly one-dimensional. However, many issues do align with a first, dominant ideological dimension, which is an economic dimension. As noted above, the economic dimension was the primary arena of conflict between the parties, and so it is among the pundits as well.

Figure 4 presents a selection of discrimination parameters from both the binary and multinomial

7It is movement in the two trends that matters the most. Other factors might account for different levels of APRE between Congress and pundits, but the within-group trends, identified in Figures 1 and 2 fit the claim about timing.
models for the pundit data. The issues include all race issues and a number of other issues of note.8

Figure 4 (like Figures 5 and 6) includes two columns. On the left are the discrimination parameters for the binary model. They show the relationship between moving in the “conservative” direction on the ideological dimension and favoring versus opposing the issue advanced. So on the bottom right, where the coefficient is negative, this means that those on the “right” are less likely to favor “Government Intervention in the Economy” (and so those on the “left” are more likely). Those who do not take a position on the issue are treated as missing data in the binary model.

The right side of the figure breaks apart support and opposition. The “for” parameter measures how much moving in the “conservative” direction is related to supporting the issue, while the “against” parameter measures how much a move in that direction is related to opposing the issue. Again, using the bottom example, we see that moving to the right is positively related to opposing the issue, but that the ideological dimension is not strongly related to favoring the issue. This is because conservatives are more likely to talk about government intervention (and say it is a bad thing), while liberals do not often explicitly discuss intervention. They are more likely to talk about, for example, the need to protect “Worker’s Rights” (the next issue up). There, conservatives are less likely to explicitly say that workers should not have rights. On some issues, like “Labor Unions,” both liberals and conservatives take frequent but opposing positions.

Since the discrimination parameters measure how well the issue is related to the main dimension, issues with large parameters are those that define the dimension. The main issues that do so are economic. Meanwhile, racial issues are not on the primary dimension. There are only three clearly racial issues in 1910: Negro suffrage, racial segregation, and attitudes toward blacks as a group.

The multinomial model shows further nuance. On attitudes toward blacks, few conservatives even speak. Liberals are more likely to take both supportive and unsupportive positions toward African Americans. Some conservatives do take positions: for instance, the otherwise somewhat economically conservative (in 1910) publication The Christian Science Monitor defends blacks, and the overtly probusiness Wall Street Journal runs some overtly racist editorials.

But most of the talk is on the left. Most people who defend blacks are liberal, but most people who condemn them are also liberal, economically. The editors of Harper’s magazine, for instance, a publication that defends socialism and women’s suffrage, take a hostile view of blacks. And populist William E. Borah, writing in the North American Review, opposes suffrage for blacks while advocating for labor unions and other progressive causes.

If we were to fit a two-dimensional model to the data, this conflict might appear on the second dimension.9 Or it might be the third or fourth dimension. What is significant, though, is that race appears to be an internal conflict among economic liberals in 1910, but economic conservatives, with a few exceptions, are not interested in the issue.

Part of the story seems to be a tension within the progressive movement. Its populist elements—perhaps well represented by Sen. Tom Watson (D-Ga.) or William Jennings Bryan—were quite racist. But others—perhaps represented by Jane Addams or Robert La Follette (R-Wis.)—were less so.

This is not the pattern we see in the legislature. In fact, in 1910, NOMINATE shows that Republicans are more likely to cast racially liberal votes at this time.

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8A number of robustness checks on the following results are not reported here. For instance, one might reestimate the issue space without any race issues and compare that space to the space reported here. One might also use those ideal points to predict race positions. Those predictions ought to be similar to the discrimination parameters estimated here. They are.

9Two-dimensional models of these data are very noisy, but it appears that race probably does not dominate the second dimension in any period.
There was strategic value to Republicans from waving the bloody shirt, and similarly, Democrats did not challenge the interests of the South, which many represented. This fits the ideological pattern observed in the nineteenth century, when the pundits were also aligned in this way. By 1910, that alignment has given way among the pundits, but not among MC’s.

Thus, in 1910, race was not a central element of the dominant ideology among pundits, but it was in Congress. The battle lines drawn by Ward and Sumner in the late 1800s were significant, but race, while being debated, seemed to be an internal struggle among liberal intellectuals, and one that was probably of low priority. The other side of the ideological divide ignored the issue.

**Ideology in the 1930s.** The ideological dimension in 1930 appears far more one-dimensional, although the APRE for all issues is still not especially large. Still, many more issues are related to the main dimension. And again, the dimension is economic. Figure 5 shows a selection of issues for 1930.

As before, economic issues dominate. Conservatives like railroad corporations and consolidation, trusts, and private utilities. They tolerate Fascism abroad and unemployment, while liberals do not. Conservatives like the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which liberals felt was toothless. Liberals again support government intervention in the economy, workers rights, and government spending programs.

But by and large race remains unimportant for the ideological division. As with 1910, the main racial issues in the binary model are not strongly related to economic issues, which are the dominant elements of ideology. Obviously, in light of the depression, economic issues were incredibly important. In the binary model, attitudes toward segregation and blacks are not strongly related to the ideological dimension. The “attitudes toward blacks” issue does have a significant but not incredibly large relationship with ideology, because the only publication to take an antiblack position is the economically conservative *Wall Street Journal*. There is a stronger relationship with the “justice system fair to blacks” issue, on whether or not African Americans are treated fairly by the courts. But this, too, is driven...
by one negative position, by the then-conservative Washington Post.

So, as with 1910, there is a weak ideological association with antiblack positions and conservatism. But it is based on a small number of articles. A more careful interpretation of the data is that a number of liberal writers are taking up racial issues, arguing that blacks are disadvantaged by our legal system and in society generally. But almost no one is defending the system from these charges.

The multinomial model allows for such one-sided issues. One reason for using the multinomial model, as mentioned above, is that it allows us to disentangle the pro and con side of the issue. Another reason is that it allows us to include issues on which only one side is taken. There are many such issues. Among them are “Civil Rights” and “lynching.” Just as almost no one defends the legal system from the charge of racism in the 1930s, absolutely no one takes a position against Civil Rights for blacks, and no one defends lynching. But the writers who tackle those issues in 1930 are largely economic liberals. A few of the major economically conservative editorial pages, such as the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times, do oppose lynching. But none advocates Civil Rights, and far more liberal publications are taking up both issues. It would appear that the battle over race among the progressives has been won. Economically liberal intellectuals are all problack by 1930.

This closer inspection of the ideology of 1930 is instructive. Rather than interpret the 1930s as a period when race is not related to the main dimension, what we see is that, for liberal intellectuals, race was becoming an important issue. But these liberals were not yet being opposed by conservatives on race. The issue is not on the agenda.

Compare this to Congress at that time. There were no antilynching bills between 1922 and 1934 to estimate the APRE for race in that period. But in 1934, there is one race policy vote, on preventing discrimination within the House of Representatives, and it is not related to the first dimension. A change in 1934 is too close to interpret as following the 1930 pundits, but it certainly follows the 1910 pundits. The issue becomes disconnected from economic issues among the pundits in 1910 and has become an internal conflict among liberal pundits by 1930. In 1934, that separation is just beginning in Congress. The reversal we will see eventually, with Republicans voting against racial issues, has not yet developed. In 1934, the only people opposed to
the antidiscrimination law are Southern Democrats. So, in 1921, no change had occurred, but by 1934, Congress is starting to emulate what happened among the pundits in 1910 and 1930.

**Ideology in the 1950s.** The biggest shock to the ideological space of the pundits follows World War II. The space in 1950 is fundamentally different than in any period before, and the reason is the introduction of writers for the *National Review* and *Human Events*. In the first half of the decade, there were many writers on the “right.” But they were not writing for clearly defined conservative journals. When *Human Events* began publishing in 1944 and the *National Review* began in 1955, that changed, and the conservative intellectual movement began to coalesce (Nash 1996). These publications anchor the right in the 1950s, while *The Nation* and *The New Republic* anchor the left.

Now, ideology is sharply distinguished between liberals and conservatives, on nearly every issue. The ideological dimension now accounts for a great deal of the variance. The APRE for the entire model is 0.69, a huge leap from the previous period. And in Figure 6, almost all issues are strongly related to the main ideological dimension in both the binary model and the multinomial model. The most important issues include anticommunist foreign policy issues (the cold war, the Bricker Amendment, and admitting China the United Nations), domestic economic issues (taxes, Keynesianism, labor unions, and price controls) and racial issues (federally enforced desegregation, the fair employment practices act, and the civil rights movement).

The division in 1950 contrasts sharply with the division in Congress. The period from 1950 through the 1960s is the lowest point for race being related to the ideological dimension. Economic issues divide Democrats and Republicans, but racial issues crosscut both parties. The “conservative coalition” of this period united conservatives of both parties against their copartisans. Racial issues do not start to be related to the first dimension until the 1970s in Figure 1. Thus, race and economics are both first-dimensional issues in 1990, and today, echoing the cleavage among intellectuals in 1950.

**Discussion**

The analysis here visits one of the most discussed subjects of American history. A great deal has already been said on the subject of the partisan alignment over race. This analysis adds an understanding of the role of ideology. Most theories of ideology simply posit an ideological dimension, which then turns out...
to be useful theoretically and empirically. But it is not clear why two issues that are not inherently related ought to go together.

These findings suggest that there is some intellectual process that brings issues into the ideological agenda. It might be a strategic process of party coalition builders, but then we would expect party leaders to initiate it. Instead, progressives seem to have been working out what they thought about race before they brought it to the agenda.

In 1910, some liberals were antiblack, and some were problack. But all progressives at the turn of the century saw themselves as supporting the less well-off. They worried about the effects of the national economy on political and social equality. These were worries shared by the proslavery Democrats during the Civil War. It was not obvious to many whether principle of equality ought to apply to blacks, and thus whether it ought to trump the principle of white supremacy.

Blacks, of course, were not a politically powerful group. If you sought to build a coalition to be minimal winning, blacks should not be included, since they would contribute little to victory. And neither should poor whites, who also were not politically powerful. But while ideology does define a coalition, it does not need to build that coalition solely on the basis of voting blocks. It builds also on the beliefs of intellectual thinkers. Such thinkers might, incidentally, represent potential voting blocks, but ideology does not form through explicit bargains among intellectual spokespeople. And so, possibly, the coalitions that these intellectuals form may not represent majorities. The problack ideology that emerged on the left was not a majority.

It’s not clear why the problack ideology won out. It might not have. It is very difficult to measure the persuasiveness of individual arguments. The important thing for ideology building is how arguments tie different interests together. How should the principles you already support for one set of issues apply to a new issue? This process continued in the period studied, shifting to the right as well as the left. Lowndes (2004) shows that conservative thinkers such as William F. Buckley actively courted southern white writers to contribute to the conservative movement. Lowndes recounts a debate within the pages of the *National Review* in 1957, in which William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell argued over how the principles of conservatism should be applied to racial issues. Buckley argued that white southerners were “the advanced race,” and thus should suppress black voting rights if necessary. Bozell objected to the cavalier attitude toward democracy, instead advocating the states’ rights position later developed in Barry Goldwater’s *The Conscience of a Conservative* (for which Bozell was ghostwriter).

The conflict between Buckley and Bozell nicely illustrates the evolution of ideological positions. Different strands of conservative thought, brought together at the *National Review*, pointed toward a number of issue positions, including smaller government and an opposition to Civil Rights. The arguments that could best unite the various potential coalition members—in this case Bozell’s antifederalism more than Buckley’s antidemocracy—were the ones that became broadly endorsed.

Likewise, in some ways it is the fight over civil rights that helped teach liberals that they approved of federal power. The New Deal expanded federal power, justified on the grounds that the federal government was the only force powerful enough to fight the Great Depression. With Civil Rights, there was a new reason to support federal expansion—some states could not be relied upon to enforce basic rights. Southerners objected to self-righteous northerners swooping in to the south to tell them how to live, but for liberals, segregationist southerners needed to be told how to live, at least on this issue. And the federal government, which they now controlled, was a reasonable tool for this end.

This dynamic was happening on more issues than just race, which has been the focus here. Foreign policy, social issues, and a number of others are also coming into alignment in 1950, as is evident from Figure 2. Of course, many of the issues that are important today, such as abortion or stem-cell research, are not on the agenda in 1950, but many of the issues that would dominate the 1970s, including feminism and Vietnam, are already polarizing intellectuals at this time.

Intellectuals, then, would seem to have organized those issues as well. A richer analysis of other issues is warranted. The realignment on race, at least, occurred first among intellectuals.

### Methodological Appendix

**The model.** The models in this article are adaptations of a standard Item-Response Model, as developed by Albert and Chib (1993; See also Baker 1992; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2000; Treier and Jackman 2002). Responses to items—in this case issues in the public debate—are the dependent variable. They are predicted by the latent trait—in this case ideology—and parameters. More formally,
each $i^{th}$ article is a Bernoulli trial with a probability defined by parameters for the $j^{th}$ issue and the latent traits for the $i^{th}$ pundit:

$$y_{ij} \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\pi_{ij})$$

(1)

where $\pi$ is a function of the x’s, as follows:

$$\pi_{ij} = \text{f}_{\logit} (\beta_j (x_i - \alpha_j))$$

(2)

and where $\pi$ is the probability of a “1” response, $x$ is a respondent-specific ideology score, and $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are item-specific parameters.11

The $\alpha$ and $\beta$ parameters have a straightforward interpretation. The $\alpha$ parameter is the cutpoint. Those with values of $x$ (ideal points on the ideological dimension) to one side of it are predicted to take one position, opposing those to the other. (In this project, positive ideal points are to the “right,” or conservative.) The $\beta$ is the discrimination parameter. It measures how well this issue reflects the underlying ideological dimension measured by $x$. Issues with high values of $\beta$ define the ideological dimension, while those with low values are off-dimensional. A second, third or higher dimension is needed to explain them.

Issues that are highly related to the dimension will also have the largest explanatory power, or proportionate reduction in error. The PRE is a comparison to a null model, in which everyone takes the majority position. Since not everyone does, there will be some classification error. Using the first dimension to predict the position will reduce that error. The proportion of the error reduced is a measure of fit for each issue. We can also average over that reduction for many issues to see how well the dimension fits a cluster of similar issues (say, all economic policy issues, or all race issues).

Two adjustments are applied to the basic model. The first is a hierarchical model for the ideal points, taking advantage of the known relationship between two pundits writing for the same publication. The second is multinomial model, which allows the decision to speak at all, as well the both the pro and con position, to be related independently to the primary dimension.

**Model 1: Hierarchical parameters for ideology.**

Many of the pundits in the dataset address very few issues. However, each pundit is writing for a known publication, and each publication is represented on nearly every issue.

It would be possible to simply treat every article in a given journal as representing the same ideal point, that of the journal’s editorial board.12 This would collapse the data down to a smaller number of almost complete cases, one for each journal. But this is surely inaccurate. Even among ideological fellow travelers there can be disagreement. Some publication editors even take pride in the diversity of opinion presented. On the other hand, we would be ignoring useful information if we didn’t account for the relationship between different pundits writing for the same journal. Ideological birds of a feather do tend to flock to the same publications.

A reasonable middle ground is a hierarchical model, in which each pundit’s latent trait is a draw from a journal-specific distribution. A hierarchical model does more than address the gaps in the data matrix. Even without these gaps, the model is more efficient by borrowing strength across observations involving pundits writing for the same outlet. That is, we add to the model above these hierarchical parameters:

$$x_i \sim \text{N}(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2)$$

(3)

where $\mu_k$ is the $k^{th}$ journal’s mean, and $\sigma_k^2$ is that journal’s variance.13

Both $\mu_k$ and $\sigma_k^2$ are parameters to be estimated. This is a reasonable model of the actual process. Editors presumably have ideal points, but they are also willing to accept pundits who deviate from them to some degree. The editors probably differ in how much deviation they are willing to accept. The *New York Times* consciously wants to include a mix on its editorial page, so we would predict that its variance parameter would be larger. Other publications burnish a particular point of view and do not publish articles that deviate much from it.

The model will estimate just how ecumenical each publication is. If the ideal points from the journal appear to be all over the map, the estimated $\sigma_k^2$ will be large.

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11 All models reported here are estimated in WinBUGS. For a one-dimensional model, identification is straightforward. We can pin down two points to define a line. In fact, any two restrictions on the x’s are sufficient to define one dimension. Rivers (2003) has shown that the required identifying restrictions are $n\times(n+1)$ independent restrictions for an n-dimensional model. In this case, the model is identified after the MCMC estimation. Each posterior draw is normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 (See e.g., Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2005 for more on this procedure.) Posterior means are reported. Standard diagnostics suggest that the posterior distribution has been explored.

12 I have estimated this model, and it does not produce results at odds with those reported here.

13 In Bayesian estimation, priors are defined for the “precision,” or inverse of the variance.
On the other hand, an ideologically pure publication will have a smaller \( \sigma_e^2 \). The model treats the “editorial board” itself as just another pundit in that mix, which has an ideal point of its own, also just drawn from the journal’s distribution. The editorial board’s ideal point can be very different from the hierarchical parameter. Thus the hierarchical parameter measures the editors in their capacity as gatekeepers, while the editorial board ideal point measures editors in their capacity as opinion holders. In the data, these vary as expected: newspaper editorial pages, especially in the later period, are more inclusive than ideological publications. There is also interesting variation over time.\(^{14}\)

**Model 2: Multinomial choice with hierarchical parameters.** The first adjustment attempts to glean as much information as possible from the positions taken by the actors. But there is information in the decision to take a position itself, as well. The second model includes the hierarchical parameters of the first model, but changes the object to be modeled. Instead of treating the pundits’ choice as pro or con, the second model uses a multinomial link to allow for pro, con, and abstention to be predicted by ideology. That is, choosing not to speak is a choice on par with speaking in favor or against, and so must be treated as such. The choice is not sequential. A pundit does not first decide to talk about civil right, for example, and only then decide what side to take.

This allows for ideology to be revealed in ways additional to taking a common position on an issue. First, pundits might decline to speak on an issue at all, and second, they might argue with their co-ideologues about it. In the first case, we would expect abstention to be associated with the ideology. In the second, we would expect pro and con to both be associated with the same ideology. A multinomial model allows these possibilities. Alternatively, if both sides are internally debating an issue, or if both sides ignore it, then this issue is not related to the first ideological dimension.

Such a model stops short of estimating a second dimension, which would also accommodate internal divisions within those on the left or the right, but in a different way. This model is superior, in that it does not require the issue to be on the second dimension (or the third, or fourth) to capture internal debate. Whether an issue is on the second dimension is interesting, but an issue can be internally divisive even if it’s not related to other internally divisive issues. On the other hand, if an issue is truly cross-cutting for both sides (among liberals and conservatives), then this approach will not pick it up.

This unordered choice model is just an extension of the model above, again derived from a random utility model. It can be estimated as a multinomial logit, on the assumption that the errors have a type one extreme value distribution (McFadden 1973; Train 1986).\(^{15}\) In that case, the model is as follows:

\[
P(y = 1) = \frac{e^{\beta_1 x_i + a_{1j}}}{e^{\beta_1 x_i + a_{1j}} + e^{\beta_2 x_i + a_{2j}} + e^{\epsilon_i}}
\]

\[
P(y = 2) = \frac{e^{\beta_2 x_i + a_{2j}}}{e^{\beta_1 x_i + a_{1j}} + e^{\beta_2 x_i + a_{2j}} + e^{\epsilon_i}}
\]

\[
P(y = 3) = \frac{e^{\epsilon_i}}{e^{\beta_1 x_i + a_{1j}} + e^{\beta_2 x_i + a_{2j}} + e^{\epsilon_i}}
\]

Where \( y = 1 \) is a “con” response, \( y = 2 \) is a “pro” response, and \( y = 3 \) is no response.

Note that the model is typically identified through setting the parameters for the third response category, or abstention, to be zero: \( \beta_3 = \alpha_3 = 0 \). However, for some speakers, staying silent might have nothing to do with ideology. Some writers just write more often. The editorial boards of the major publications, for instance, have a more frequent platform. So do regular columnists. The model in equation (4) thus estimates a second latent trait, which might be called talkativeness, which affects the relative probability of no response. Rather than holding the parameters for non response constant at 0, they vary with \( i \), but not with \( j \). The variable \( z \) is a second latent trait, this time related to the decision (not) to speak.\(^{16}\)

The \( x \)'s from the multinomial model have the same interpretation as above. The \( \beta \)'s are also similarly interpreted. Now, each issue has two discrimination parameters: \( \beta_{1j} \) is the associated with the pro position on issue \( j \), while \( \beta_{2j} \) is associated with the con position. Their difference, \( \beta_{Dj} = \beta_{2j} - \beta_{1j} \), analogous to the \( \beta \) from the first model,\(^{17}\) and can be

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\(^{14}\)The hierarchical model does succeed in improving our estimates. One measure of this is the Deviance Information Criterion, which measures how well the model would predict a new dataset that has the same structure as the one being analyzed. Smaller values of DIC correspond to better fits. For every pairing except in 1930, the DIC is smaller for the hierarchical model. In 1930, where the hierarchical parameters do not improve the fit, the hierarchical parameters are perhaps not providing much heft. But there is no compelling reason not to use the still theoretically correct model in that case. It does suggest that the editorial constraint exerted on the writers in this period is less than in other periods, but that is beyond the scope of this article.

\(^{15}\)See also Whitten and Palmer (1996), Merrill and Adams (2001); and Schofield and Sened (2005) for applications in political science.

\(^{16}\)The estimated \( z \)'s turn out to be a straightforward function of the total number of times each writer wrote.

\(^{17}\)Estimates of \( \beta_{Dj} \) are correlated with estimates of \( \beta \) from the first model at .9 or greater across different samples. The estimated \( x \)'s from the two models are correlated at .85 or greater.
interpreted in the same manner. Where both parameters are large (in magnitude) and of opposite signs, then $\beta_{D}$, will also be large, and this is the case where the issue is strongly related to the dominant ideological dimension.

However, the individual $\beta$’s can now also be interpreted. It is possible for the difference between the parameters to not be very large (or distinguishable from 0), but one of the parameters is large and significantly different from 0 (while the other is small or imprecisely estimated). This is the case where taking one position on the issue is related to ideology, while taking the other position is not. Sometimes, no one will take one side of the issue, either because it is unpopular or because it is the status quo and its advocates do not feel the need to defend it.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Michael Bailey, Kathleen Bawn, Rick Hall, Jeff Lewis, Seth Masket, Rob Mickey, Rogers Smith, John Zaller and the anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own.

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