TWO PARTY VS. MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS

THE TEA PARTY, OCCUPY WALL STREET AND OTHER IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS

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TWO PARTY VS. MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS

THE TEA PARTY, OCCUPY WALL STREET AND OTHER IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST PAST THE POST</th>
<th>PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>single-member districts</td>
<td>multi-member districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plurality winner</td>
<td>allocated by proportion. 30% of vote ≈ 30% of seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct representation by district</td>
<td>indirect representation by party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two-parties</td>
<td>multiple parties</td>
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DUVERGER’S LAW

“The simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system”

- Single-Member Districts with Plurality Rule → Two-Party Systems
- Proportional Representation → Multiparty Systems
- More disproportional → Fewer parties
Duverger’s Law:
“The simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system”
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“The simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system”
U.S. DISPROPORTIONALITY

First Past the Post
Disproportionality at the aggregate level

Electoral College
Exaggerates Disproportionality
- Single-member “district” (the presidency)
- Winner-take-all for each state

Top Two Parties’ Performance in U.S. House Elections

Top Two Candidate’s Performance in U.S. Presidential Elections

Aggregate Popular Vote Share

Popular Vote Share

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MEXICO

Tries to split the difference

Chamber of Deputies
Camera de Diputados
- 300 by FPTP
- 200 by PR

Senate
Senado
- 62 FPTP
- 31 by "first minority"
- 32 by PR

President
Presidente
- Direct popular vote
DUVERGER’S LAW

“The simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system”

Single-Member Districts with Plurality Rule

Two-Party Systems

Depends a lot on the distribution of preferences:
DUVERGER’S LAW

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At the Constituency Level

- In each state, county or other office
- But then parties have to work together at later stages.
- Major splinter parties often succeed regionally
  - Republicans/Free Soil/Liberty; Prohibition; Dixiecrats; Greens
  - In India, Canada, Great Britain.
Duverger’s Law: “The simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system”

Works at the constituency level
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESIDENTIAL</th>
<th>PARLIAMENTARY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>head of government (president)</td>
<td>head of government (prime minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(president) selected independently</td>
<td>selected by legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majority not needed (or manufactured)</td>
<td>May require a coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legislature/executive informal</td>
<td>if no majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordination</td>
<td>fused legislature/executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>separation of powers</td>
<td>PM can dissolve legislature</td>
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**Legislative coordination:**
- Still necessary
- Governing coalitions formed in the legislature vs. elections

**Electoral coordination:**
- Could still happen
- *We don’t know* if a majority prefers the PRD or PAN presidential candidates to the PRI.
- Why don’t they coordinate better?
DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Liberal

ECONOMICS
Labor, intervention

SOCIAL ISSUES
Non-traditional, secular

RACE
Pro-ethnic minorities

FOREIGN POLICY
Multilateral

REPUBLICAN PARTY

Conservative

ECONOMICS
Business, free market

SOCIAL ISSUES
Traditional, religious

RACE
Color-blind

FOREIGN POLICY
Unilateral
PROGRESSIVES
AND THE ELECTION OF 1912

DEMOCRAT
WILSON

REPUBLICAN
ROOSEVELT  TAFT
PROGRESSIVES
AND THE ELECTION OF 1912

PROGRESSIVES
“Reform”
Especially economic

DEMOCRAT
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"BULL MOOSE" PROGRESSIVE
ROOSEVELT

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“Reform”
Especially economic

Taft (R) 23.2%
Roosevelt (P) 27.4%
**Wilson (D)** 41.8%
Debs (S) 6.0%
PROGRESSIVES AND THE ELECTION OF 1912

“BULL MOOSE” PROGRESSIVE

ROOSEVELT

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PROGRESSIVES

“Reform”
Especially economic

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} 50.6%
LIBERALS vs. CONSERVATIVES

DEMOCRATS vs. REPUBLICANS

McGOVERN  ROCKEFELLER

WALLACE  GOLDWATER
LIBERALS vs. CONSERVATIVES
DEMOCRATS vs. REPUBLICANS

LIBERALS
Economic justice
Race (civil rights)
anti-Vietnam War

DEMOCRATS
McGOVERN

REPUBLICANS
ROCKEFELLER

WALLACE

GOLDWATER
LIBERALS VS. CONSERVATIVES

DEMOCRATS VS. REPUBLICANS

LIBERALS
- Economic justice
- Race (civil rights)
- anti-Vietnam War

DEMOCRATS
- McGovern

REPUBLICANS
- Rockefeller

CONSERVATIVES
- Reaction to liberals
- Laissez faire
- State’s Rights
- Cold War

WALLACE
- Gillespie

GOLDWATER
- Goldwater
LIBERALS vs. CONSERVATIVES
DEMOCRATS vs. REPUBLICANS
McGOVERN
ROCKEFELLER
WALLACE
GOLDWATER
LIBERAL
CONSERVATIVE
LIBERALS vs. CONSERVATIVES
DEMOCRATS vs. REPUBLICANS

GORE  OBAMA  ROMNEY  BUSH

LIBERAL  CONSERVATIVE
1952-1954
1952-1954

DEMOCRATS

REPUBLICANS
1952-1954

DEMOCRATS

REPUBLICANS
1952-1954

DEMOCRATS

REPUBLICANS
1952-1954
1952-1954

First Dimension

Second Dimension

DEMOCRATS

SOUTH

CONSERVATIVES

REPUBLICANS

NORTH

LIBERALS
1952-1954

DEMOCRATS

LIBERALS

REPUBLICANS

CONSERVATIVES
2005-2007

DEMOCRATS

LIBERALS

CONSERVATIVES

REPUBLICANS
THE TEA PARTY

DON'T TREAD ON ME

OCCUPY WALL STREET
THE TEA PARTY

Conservative or Right Wing
Economics focused (fighting government intervention), but not limited
Involved in elections
Taking ownership of the Republican Party

OCCUPY WALL STREET

Liberal or Left Wing
Economics focused (fighting income inequality), but not limited
Wants to reshape broader discourse
Disappointed in the Democratic Party
THE TEA PARTY

DONT TREAD ON ME
THE TEA PARTY

DONT TREAD ON ME

SANTELLI
THE TEA PARTY

DON'T TREAD ON ME

SANTELLI

CARENDER
THE TEA PARTY

DONT TREAD ON ME

SANTELLI
BECK
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THE TEA PARTY

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SANTELLI  BECK  CARENDER  KOCH
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THE TEA PARTY

DON'T TREAD ON ME

SANTELLI
BECK
PALIN
BACHMANN
DeMINT
CARENDER
KOCH
PAUL
Tend to look like conservatives on abortion, gay marriage, immigration, the Iraq War, etc.
TEA PARTY IN ELECTION 2010

Impact on GOP Two-Party Vote Share (Percentage Points)
From models in Bailey, Mummolo and Noel 2012

Estimating the effect of Tea Party measures on the Republican vote in the 2010 Midterm
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ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF TEA PARTY MEASURES ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE 112TH HOUSE FROM MODELS IN BAILEY, MUMMOLLO AND NOEL 2012
OCCUPY WALL STREET
Tend to look like liberals on other issues.
OCCUPY IN ELECTIONS
OCCUPY IN ELECTIONS

KLEINMAN
Ran unsuccessfully in the Democratic primary in Pennsylvania against incumbent Allyson Schwartz.
"I am not running from Occupy, I am not an Occupy candidate even though that’s been used to describe me already. In fact, actually there might be a proposal tonight, …to make it clear that Occupy does not endorse candidates and if I don’t miss the vote, I’m planning to vote for that because I haven’t sought the endorsement of Occupy Philadelphia and I never will. I haven’t sought the endorsement of Occupy Wall Street and I never will, though I intend to be involved in both as long as I am still welcome."

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OCCUPY IN CONGRESS
OCCUPY IN CONGRESS

DEUTCH

Proposed OCCUPIED amendment, (Outlawing Corporate Cash Undermining the Public Interest in our Elections and Democracy). Would reverse Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

**SANDERS**

Proposed similar **Saving American Democracy amendment** in the Senate.