What drives individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa? *

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Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa using the 1996, 2001 and 2007 rounds of the World Value Survey, looking at the role played by both economic and non–economic drivers. Our findings suggest that economic characteristics that work through the labor market are not likely to explain the observed variation in individual preferences. At the same time, cultural drivers that work through ethnic cleavages appear to play an important role, and suggest that sharing a perceived common background with the immigrant has a positive effect on preferences. We also find evidence for the role played by faith–based individual drivers, suggesting that greater religious dissimilarity between natives and migrants in a given area tends to have a negative impact on preferences towards immigration. Our analysis thus highlights the importance of grasping the role of cultural factors for the design of migration policy in South Africa.

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"One of the fundamental problems facing Home Affairs and any drafters of a new regionalist and development-oriented immigration policy is a public that remains extremely hostile to immigration as a principle and to migrants in general." (Crush 2008).

1 Introduction

Who is against immigration in South Africa? In this paper, we investigate the drivers of individual attitudes towards immigrants in the post-Apartheid period, looking at the role of both economic and non-economic determinants. We use data from three rounds of the World Value Survey, carried out in 1996, 2001 and 2007. The main question we want to answer is whether South African public opinion on migration is affected by the potential labor market competition of migrants towards natives or otherwise by non-economic factors. We investigate this by estimating the impact of survey respondents’ individual skill on their pro-migration attitudes. Our findings show that the latter is positive and significant in both 1996 and 2001, whereas it becomes not significant in 2007. However, in all the years in our sample immigrants to South Africa are on average more skilled than natives (Facchini, Mayda and Mendola 2011). As a result, if the impact of individual skill on preferences was driven by the labor market channel, we would expect it to be negative, since it is the more educated natives who should feel the labor-market competition of immigrants the most. Our analysis thus suggests that in South Africa over the 1996-2007 period, the labor-market channel does not play a role in preference formation over immigration. What might explain the positive impact of individual skill are non-economic determinants. For example, more educated individuals may be more favorable to migration because they are better-informed about its benefits, because they are more cosmopolitan and, possibly, more politically correct (see, for instance, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007 and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Furthermore, our evidence shows that cultural drivers that work through ethnic cleavages and religion play a significant role in preference formation over migration. As for the former, our findings suggest that sharing a perceived common background with the migrant has a positive effect on pro-immigration attitudes. As for the latter, greater religious dissimilarity between migrants and natives in a given geographic area tends instead to have a negative impact on preferences towards immigration.

Our analysis is motivated by two sets of considerations. First, migration to South Africa is likely to have positive development effects on both the receiving country and other African origin countries. However, while in recent years the official government rhetoric has moved towards a more open stand towards migrants, South African voters have become more and
more averse to international migration. As a result, a growing gap has emerged between voters' attitudes and announced government preferences. Since our analysis clarifies which factors drive (or do not drive) public opinion, it can shed light on how immigration to South Africa can be made politically feasible, which ultimately can benefit both South Africa and other countries in the region. In what follows, we explain this point in greater detail.

International migration, especially from neighbouring countries, represents a long-standing feature of South African history. Starting from the 1850’s, many migrant workers were brought into the country from the surrounding regions, to work on the newly discovered gold mines (Crush 2000) and in the agricultural, construction and service sectors. This type of migration continued and rose up to the 1970’s. In the last twenty years of the Apartheid regime, migration to South Africa came to a halt, as black migration started to be perceived by the government as a source of political threat. Instead, over the last two decades, with the end of the Apartheid regime and the evolution of the country into a regional superpower, South Africa was able to turn itself again into a very attractive destination for foreign workers – especially skilled ones – coming from the surrounding regions (Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola 2011). However, the end of the Apartheid regime in 1994 did not lead to a change in the government’s restrictive policies towards immigration. The 1991 “Aliens Control Act” – ‘Apartheid’s last act’ as has been named by many observers – continued to shape migration policy with its “control and expulsion” mentality. It was only with the passage of the Immigration Act in 2002, and its Amendment in 2004, that the policy towards migration changed. In the government’s official discourse migration is now perceived as a development tool, both for South Africa and the neighbouring countries (Crush 2008).¹

Migration to South Africa is likely to have important effects on many origin countries in both Eastern and Southern Africa – for example, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Malawi – especially through the positive role played by remittances. There is indeed evidence that remittances from South Africa to the origin countries are substantial.² As far as South Africa

¹“The South African Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, has also championed a development-oriented approach to migration policy and management. She spoke on behalf of the G77 plus China at the UN High Level Dialogue in September 2006, touching in a measured and constructive way (in contrast to the churlish inputs of many Western countries) on many of the themes central to the migration-development debate. Within South Africa itself, Mapisa-Nqakula has also advanced the concept of migration for development. South Africa has endorsed both the African Union (AU) Strategic Framework on Migration and the AU Common Position on Migration and Development.” (Crush 2008).

²“The Zimbabwean economy — and consequently many Zimbabwean families — have survived only because of remittances sent from those living in South Africa and elsewhere. The World Bank has no estimates of the remittances Zimbabwe has received in recent years, but it does report that remittance flows out of South Africa exceeded US$1 billion in both 2005 and 2006: what proportion of those flows went to Zimbabwe, however, is unclear, particularly since Lesotho and Mozambique are also major recipients of remittances.” (Crush 2008).
itself is concerned, while income distribution effects will probably take place (see for example, Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola 2011), there is likely to be a “migration surplus” (Borjas 1995).

In other words, according to the theory, the impact of migration on the destination country should be positive on net through the labor market channel. From a public finance point of view, since migrants to South Africa tend to be quite skilled, they are also likely to make a positive net contribution to the welfare state.

The recent shift in the rhetoric of the South African government towards an open, development-oriented immigration policy contrasts with South African public opinion, which tends to be very hostile towards immigrants. According to the World Value Survey data, only approximately a third of respondents in a nationally representative sample favored migration in 1996 and 2001, respectively. The share of individuals supporting immigration declined in 2007 by ten percentage points, to only 23% of the population. Thus, there exists a substantial gap between the government’s recent migration policy discourse and public opinion towards immigrants. The goal of this paper is to shed light on why South African voters are so opposed to immigration. To that end, we will follow the growing literature that has studied the formation of preferences towards immigration and consider the role of both economic and non–economic determinants.

Second, our analysis of the determinants of public opinion towards immigrants, in particular focusing on the labor market channel, is motivated by our recent work on the effect of migration to South Africa on natives’ labor market opportunities over the same period (Facchini, Mayda and Mendola 2011). In that paper, when we estimate regressions of the impact of immigration on natives’ employment rates, we find a large negative coefficient on the the share of immigrants of a given skill level in a given district. If the negative coefficient is evidence of an adverse labor market impact of migrants on native workers, then the labor market should play a key role in shaping individual preferences. This is not what we find in this study.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature, whereas section 3 presents a theoretical framework that clarifies the link between individual attitudes and immigration policy. Section 4 details the evidence in the literature on the labor-market impact of migration in South Africa. Section 5 describes our data and section 6 presents our individual–level empirical analysis. Section 7 provides suggestive evidence on the role of non–economic factors at the province level, and Section 8 concludes.

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3 Facchini, Mayda and Mendola (2011) find that migration inflows into South Africa, between 1996 and 2007, have led to a large and negative impact on the employment rate of native workers.

4 Negative public opinion towards immigrants is consistent with the recent xenophobic attacks which left, in May 2008, 62 people dead.

5 See Section 2 for more details.
2 Related literature

The analysis carried out in this paper represents a contribution to the large literature that has studied the determinants of individual level preferences towards immigration in destination countries, by systematically analyzing the evolution of public opinion towards immigration in South Africa in the post–Apartheid era.

Starting from the mid nineties, several papers have looked at the drivers of public opinion towards immigration in advanced destination countries. Early contributions based on US data, like Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and Citrin et al. (1997), find mainly evidence in favor of non-economic explanations behind preference patterns. Similar results have also been found in a recent paper by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) using an experimental setting. At the same time, the results in Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Kessler (2001) and Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) have drawn attention to the importance of economic determinants: the former two papers provide evidence in line with the labor market channel,\textsuperscript{6} while the latter finds support also for the role payed by the welfare-state channel. The importance of the labor market and of the welfare state has also been emphasized in many cross–country studies (see Mayda (2006) and Facchini and Mayda (2009)), even if most of these studies do also find evidence supporting the role played by non-economic determinants of public opinion (see in particular Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) and Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2009)).

As it has been argued by many observers, opinions towards immigration in South Africa are the result of the complex interaction of an array of different socio-economic and political factors. Particularly important is the role played by the heritage of the Apartheid regime, during which discrimination and racial segregation were actively promoted by the government. The laws enacted in this period were purposely designed to create divisions among groups and to manipulate the concept of identity by stigmatizing foreigners. As a result, even after the fall of the regime, some of the sense of territory it had created, combined with the perception of the outsiders as a threat, have continued to be widespread among South African citizens, spoiling Nelson Mandela’s dream of a rainbow nation (Nieftagodien 2008). The recent eruption of xenophobic violence in May 2008 has made the question of ‘who is against immigration?’ the focus of much debate among local social scientists. Given the virulence of the phenomenon, it has received much attention in the official rhetoric of the government, and policy makers have suggested a wide range of speculative explanations and recommendations, which have

\textsuperscript{6}Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that, in the United States, the more educated an individual is, the more likely he is to be pro-migration, which is consistent with the labor-market channel since migrants to the United States are less skilled than natives on average.
been followed by a multitude of interventions and responses by the South African civil society (Misago et al. 2009, Everatt 2011).

Studies focusing on what drives attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa are scarce. An interesting exception is represented by the descriptive analysis carried out by Crush et al. (2008), who attempt to shed light on the factors behind xenophobic sentiments, discriminatory practices and violence against migrants and their families. To that end, Crush et al. (2008) use two nationally representative surveys collected by the South African Migration Project (SAMP) in the post-apartheid period (respectively in 1999 and 2006). Two interesting facts emerge from these surveys. First, the incidence of negative attitudes towards immigrants has continued to increase between 1999 and 2006, which is consistent with what we find based on the WVS dataset. Second, the very strong opinions against foreigners are often the result of prejudice: in fact, most of the respondents have only had a very limited exposure to foreign nationals (Crush et al. 2008). Several theories have been put forward to explain the observed negative attitudes, but little analysis has been carried out to provide support for one or the other. Pillay (2008) has emphasized the importance of inequality in shaping xenophobic sentiments, arguing that immigration is likely to exacerbate the already vast inequality characterizing South Africa. Confirming the theory of relative deprivation, Misago et al. 2009 also identify high unemployment and poor services delivery as the main drivers of conflict between socio-economic groups (see also Gelb 2008). Still, the widespread hostility towards foreigners expressed also by wealthy people in the 2006 SAMP survey contrasts with the argument based on unequal opportunities. Our goal in this paper is to provide a more systematic analysis of the forces at play.

3 Theoretical framework

To understand the process of migration policy formation we can take advantage of a conceptual scheme which is based on Rodrik (1995). The basic idea is that the formulation of migration policies is the result of the interaction between “policy demand” and “policy supply”. On the demand side, the starting block is represented by voters’ individual preferences, and by how these preferences are shaped by the inflows of foreign workers. Both economic and non-economic factors are likely to play a role. Grass roots movements, political parties and/or organized pressure groups aggregate these preferences into a migration policy demand. On the

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7See Figure A1 in the Appendix.
supply side, policy makers’ behavior is shaped by their own views towards immigration and, of course, by the institutional setting in which the policy making process takes place. This theoretical framework thus highlights the key role played by individual preferences in shaping immigration policy. In this paper we will analyze their determinants, and how they are shaped by both economic and non-economic factors.

To understand economic drivers, the existing literature has assumed that respondents are characterized by self-interest maximizing behavior. As a result, in forming their opinion, individuals consider the impact of migration on their utility. Since the economic impact of migration is uneven across the population, the main economic drivers of attitudes are associated with income-distribution effects. Among the economic drivers of opinions, as we have discussed in section 2, much emphasis has been put on the role played by the labor market. To understand the working of this mechanism, assume that skilled and unskilled labor are combined to produce a single good according to a constant returns to scale production function. Under these assumptions theory predicts that, through the labor market channel, the income-distribution effects of migration depend on the skill composition of migrants relative to natives in the destination country. If immigrants are on average less skilled than natives, they will hurt unskilled natives and benefit skilled ones, as their arrival will induce a decrease in the unskilled wage and an increase in the skilled wage. Conversely, if migrants are relatively more skilled than natives, skilled natives will be hurt, whereas unskilled ones will benefit from their presence. Similar predictions could also be obtained in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, as long as the immigration shock is sufficiently large to put the economy outside of the cone of diversification.

A second channel that has been considered in the economic literature highlights the role played by the “welfare state”. In many immigrant destination countries, the public sector redistributes a substantial fraction of national income across individuals (Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick 2002). In these contexts, immigration has a non-negligible impact on public finances, since foreign workers both contribute to and benefit from the welfare state. This channel is less likely to play an important role in shaping preferences towards immigration in South Africa, as even if the welfare state in this country is well developed by middle income standards, it is still relatively small compared to the other rich destinations studied by the literature, and immigrants enjoy only limited access to these programs (OECD 2008).

From a non-economic point of view, cultural, racial and ideological considerations have also been found to play a role. It has been argued that more educated individuals are more in favor of immigration (independently of the immigrants’ skill level) simply because they better appreciate the value of diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Moreover, affiliation/alignment
with right-wing political parties has been usually found to have a negative impact on pro-immigration attitudes (Mayda 2006). Similarly, natives tend to be more in favor of immigration if foreigners share a common ethnic background. Indeed, the natives’ desire to retain their cultural heritage and/or a separate identity that would be lost in the presence of large inflows of foreigners may increase opposition against immigration, independently of economic factors (e.g. Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2009), Epstein and Gang (2010)). Furthermore, it has been argued that the interaction among natives and migrants is likely to involve potentially large adjustment costs, brought about for instance by the lack of local language skills (Chiswick and Miller (1996), Dustmann and van Soest (2001), Lazear (1999), Bauer, Epstein, and Gang (2005)). This type of costs, and the perception that illegal immigrants might be disproportionately involved in criminal activities (Bodenhorn, Moehling, and Piehl 2010), have been found to contribute to a reduction in the stated support for immigration. Finally, there is also evidence that the level of exposure to mass media outlets with different ideological positions is likely to play an important role in shaping public opinion (Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2009).

4 The labor market impact of migration in South Africa in 1996-2007

Several papers in economics analyze the impact of migration on the labor market opportunities of natives in the destination country. Recent work by the authors (Facchini, Mayda and Mendola 2011) uses the methodologies developed in the existing literature to investigate the effect of international migration on South African workers’ employment rates and wages. Using data from the 1996 and 2001 rounds of the Census and from the 2007 South African Community Survey, we exploit the variation in the labor market characteristics of migrants and in their geographical distribution within the country. In the regressions on the impact of immigration on natives employment rates, we find a large negative and significant coefficient on the immigration share of a given skill level in a given district. In our benchmark specification, a ten percentage point increase in the labor supply of a skill group in a district – brought about by immigration – is associated with a 6.7 percentage points decrease in natives’ total employment rate. Interestingly, we find that this negative average employment effect is for the most part

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9 Examples of this literature are the seminal work by Card (1990) on the effect of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market and the analysis in Hunt (1992) of the forced repatriation of pieds noirs from the North African colonies to France. This first set of papers, based on the spatial correlation approach, was followed by the national-level analyses like the one by Borjas (2003) etc.
driven by medium and highly skilled migration. At the same time, we do not find a significant effect of immigration on our monetary compensation measure. One important caveat in interpreting the latter finding is that the South African Census only provides information on individual total income and, as a result, it is not possible for us to disentangle changes in labor income from changes in other sources of income and, within labor income, changes in wages from changes in the number of hours worked. It is indeed the results of this analysis, in particular the employment rates results, which has motivated the investigation in this paper of the political economy of migration in South Africa focusing specifically on the labor market channel.

The correlations we uncover in the employment regressions in Facchini, Mayda and Mendola (2011) can be interpreted in four different ways. First, we can understand the negative coefficient as evidence of a negative causal impact of international migration on South African natives’ employment rates. Second, we can view the negative coefficient as support for a negative causal impact of international migration on South African natives’ flows within the country, i.e. natives react to the presence of foreign workers by relocating to other districts within the same country and, as a consequence, natives’ employment rates decrease. Third, the negative coefficient can be interpreted as showing the negative causal impact of international migration to South Africa on natives’ flows to other countries, i.e. South African emigration to other countries. In this case, the less favorable labor market conditions for natives, brought about by immigration, lead natives to move to other countries. While these first three interpretations are different, they share a common message: all of them imply a causal effect running from international migration to South African natives’ outcomes through the less favorable labor market conditions natives face because of immigration. In particular, according to these interpretations, international migration causes natives’ displacement, either in the form of work displacement or in the form of physical displacement. If one of these three interpretations is correct, we would then expect South Africans’ attitudes towards migrants to reflect the adverse impact of migration. In other words, we would expect to find that the labor market channel plays a role in shaping attitudes towards immigrants.

The fourth interpretation of the negative coefficient on the migration share in the employment rates’ regressions is related to reverse causality. In particular, the negative correlation could be driven by emigration of South African native workers which causes international migration inflows. According to this interpretation, South African workers leave the country for reasons unrelated to immigrant inflows to South Africa, for example due to improved labor market condition abroad. As South African workers move abroad, they leave vacant positions,
which are taken up by migrants moving to South Africa. If the fourth interpretation is correct, we would not expect the South African labor market to be driving public opinion towards migrants.\footnote{Our own research in progress in Facchini, Mayda and Mendola (2011) aims to establish the direction of causality in the employment regressions by using an instrumental variable estimation strategy.}

5 Data

To study what drives individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa, we use individual-level data from three waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) (1996, 2001 and 2007). The immigration question in the WVS asks the following: “How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? (a) Let anyone come who wants to? (b) Let people come as long as there are jobs available? (c) Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here? (d) Prohibit people coming here from other countries? (e) Don’t know.” We transform answers to the WVS immigration question into two dependent variables: an ordered variable, \textit{Immig Opinion}, and a dichotomous variable, \textit{Pro Immig Dummy}, both constructed after excluding “Don’t know” responses from the sample. We also exclude from the analysis individuals who were not born in South Africa. The variable \textit{Immig Opinion} ranges from 1=“prohibit people coming here from other countries” to 4=“Let anyone come who wants to”. \textit{Pro Immig Dummy} is instead defined as follows: \textit{Pro Immig Dummy} =1, if \textit{Immig Opinion}=3 or 4; 0, if \textit{Immig Opinion}=1 or 2.

The WVS also contains information on the socio-economic background of each respondent and on his/her labor market characteristics. We use information from questions on age, gender, social class, broad political affiliation with the right/left, political party affiliation and religion. We control for the ethnic background of the individual, using two different measures: the first one is a broad measure based on four big categories (white, black, indian, coloured); the second measure is based on information from the survey on the language spoken by the respondent at home. We construct two measures of individual skill from, respectively, data on education (the highest education level attained by the individual) and data on occupation. We use these skill measures to test the implications of the labor-market model, together with an indicator of employment status. We use each respondent’s individual real income as a basic indicator of individual economic status. Finally, we account for the geographical location of the respondent, by using province fixed effects.

Furthermore, we have access to aggregate data on the province within South Africa where
each respondent lives. The sources of these data are the 1996 and 2001 rounds of the South African Census and the 2007 South African Community Survey. We are thus able to match the individual-level survey data with province-specific data, such as on the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. To conclude, the dataset we construct makes it possible to identify both stated immigration policy preferences and individual and provincial characteristics that explain immigration opinions in standard economic and non-economic models.

Summary statistics are available from the online appendix that accompanies this paper. What emerges clearly from the data is that very few South Africans are in favor of migration. In fact, in 1996, only 34% of the respondents would allow anyone to come to work or they would allow anyone to come provided that there jobs available. The corresponding figure for men is 32%. Interestingly, in 1996 South Africa is one of the countries included in the World Value Survey where the population is most opposed to immigration. This result is telling given that the cross-country sample includes several other middle and low-income countries. For example, in 1996 54% of the respondents in Nigeria are in favor of migration.

In 2001 the picture is quite similar. Approximately 37% of the respondents surveyed supports migration (and the same is true for 36% of the men in the labor force), and South Africa continues to be more hostile to the phenomenon than the majority of countries included in the WVS. Interestingly, in 2007 support for migration drops substantially, and only 23% of the population (24% of the men in the labor force) are in favor of it. In the cross-country sample, now only Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand are more opposed to migration than South Africa. This evidence is consistent with the xenophobic feelings that have recently characterized the immigration debate in South Africa, and they are also broadly consistent with the results obtained in the SAMP survey carried out in 2006 (Crush et al. 2008).

6 Empirical results

In this Section, we study the drivers of individual opinions towards immigration in South Africa using balanced data sets of South African men in the labor force.\footnote{11} As discussed before, we have constructed two different measures of pro-migration attitudes, a dichotomous one (Pro Immig Dummy) and an ordered one (Immig Opinion). We use non-linear models. Since ordered probit results are harder to summarize, we use the dichotomous measure and estimate probit specifications. Our econometric model takes the following form:

11Focusing on balance data sets allows us to better compare the coefficients reported in the various specifications. This reduces the possible sample, as several individuals did not answer all questions asked in the survey.
\[ \text{Prob}(\text{Pro Immig Dummy}_i = 1|x_i) = \Phi(x_i\beta) \] (1)

where \( \Phi(\cdot) \) is the cumulative distribution function of the Normal distribution and \( x_i \) is a vector of individual level economic and non-economic characteristics that, depending on the specification, might be interacted with provincial level variables. We include in all specification province dummies to account for unobserved, additive province–specific effects\(^{12}\) and cluster standard errors by province. In order to simplify the interpretation of our results, Tables 1–3 report marginal effects. Thus, our estimates capture the change in the probability of favoring immigration due to an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable, and a discrete change in the probability for dichotomous variables.

The main goal of the empirical analysis is to assess the role of economic and non-economic factors in shaping individual preferences. To capture the former, we focus on the role of the labor-market channel. As for the latter, we look at ethnic and ideological drivers. Column (1) in Tables 1, 2 and 3 represents our benchmark specification.

In 1996 and 2001 individual skill, measured both with educational attainment (column 1) and an occupation-based measure (column 2), appears to have a positive and mostly significant impact on South Africans’ individual preferences towards immigration.\(^{13}\) For example, moving to a higher education level increases the probability of being pro-migration by 3.8 (5.1) percentage points in 1996 (2001) – see column (1) of Tables 1 (2). This result continues to hold also when we control for employment status (column 3), and when we carry out a series of robustness checks on the role of non-economic drivers (columns 4, 5 and 6). The interpretation of this finding is not straightforward. In fact, Census data suggest that both in 1996 and in 2001 immigrants tend to be quite skilled in South Africa compared to natives. On average, immigrants increased the supply of men in the labor force by 4.6% in 1996 and by 4.9% in 2001; however, they have increased the supply of men with a completed university education by 12.2% in 1996 and 16.3% in 2001 (Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola (2011)). If the impact of individual skill on attitudes was driven by the labor market channel, we would expect the effect of education on pro-immigration attitudes to be negative in both years, since it is the more educated natives who should feel the labor-market competition of immigrants the most. Our results suggest the opposite, and thus we conclude that the labor-market channel does not seem to play a role in shaping attitudes. What might explain the positive impact of individual skill?

\(^{12}\)The only exception are the results presented in Table 5, where we directly exploit the variation at the province level.

\(^{13}\)A positive gradient is evident also if we use separate education dummies for each education level. This result is available from the authors upon request.
on pro-migration public opinion are non-economic determinants. For example, more educated individuals might be more in favor of migration because they are better-informed about the benefits linked to migration and also because they are more cosmopolitan and, possibly, more politically correct (see for instance Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007 and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Alternatively, given that migrants arriving in South Africa tend to be well-educated, they might be more “similar” to the highly skilled natives along a variety of other non-economic dimensions (ethnicity, language, culture) than their less educated counterparts, and thus be welcome in the country by the more highly skilled natives. Interestingly, the role of skill is no longer significant in 2007 (see Table 3).

As for the role played by non-economic drivers, in the benchmark specification (column 1 of Tables 1, 2 and 3) we control for the ethnic background of the respondent and for his political orientation. As for the former, in 1996 and 2001 non-whites are less likely than their white counterpart (the omitted category) to support immigration. Interestingly, this effect is reversed in 2007. A possible interpretation for this finding is that as migrants are increasingly more likely to originate from other African countries at the end of our sample period, they might be perceived as “more similar” from the perspective of sharing a common cultural background to non-white native South Africans (Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola 2011). The role of political orientation is less clear. While in 1996 more right leaning individuals appear to be more opposed to migration, the effect becomes insignificant in 2001 and surprisingly turns positive and marginally significant in 2007. These findings must be interpreted with caution, because first of all, reverse causality might be biasing our results since political orientation might respond to underlying migration patterns. Furthermore, the somewhat puzzling 2007 result might be driven for instance by the tougher government’s rhetoric on the enforcement of existing migration policies, that might please individuals affiliated with right wing parties and reduce their opposition to migration.

In column (4) we replace our ethnic background variable with a language based measure (where the omitted category is Afrikaan). We don’t find any significant effect. In column (5) we look instead more specifically at the role of affiliation with a particular political party. The patterns we find are comparable to those that emerge from our benchmark specification. In 1996, supporters of the Conservative Party appear to be more opposed to migration than members of the African National Congress (ANC), the omitted category in our regressions, and the same is true for the supporters of the Freedom Front. In 2001, with a more fragmented party structure, supporters of the African Christian Democratic Party and those of the United

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14We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting this interpretation.
Democratic Movement appear to be more in favor of migration than ANC supporters, whereas the opposite is true for supporters of the Minority Front. Finally, in 2007 more anti-immigrant sentiments characterize supporters of the New National Party, of the Freedom Front and of the Independent Democrats compared to supporters of the ANC.

In several studies on individual attitudes religious affiliation has been found to play a role in shaping attitudes towards immigrants (see for instance Facchini and Mayda 2008 and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003). For this reason, in column (6) of tables 1, 2 and 3 we have included also a control for the religious faith of the respondent. Very limited evidence can be found of a systematic effect of a specific religious confession. For example, in 2007 Jewish respondents appear to be more pro-migration than protestants (the omitted category), but the opposite is true in 1996.

7 Robustness checks

In this section we carry out two sets of robustness checks on our main findings. The first is reported in Table 4 and concerns the economic channel. The second is reported in Table 5 and concerns instead the non-economic channel.

As we have argued, our findings suggest that the labor market channel is likely not to explain immigration attitudes in South Africa. However, there are two possible caveats for this conclusion. First, while we have evidence that the South African Census captures a portion of illegal migrants (see Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola 2011), it is unlikely to account for all of them. Since illegal migrants tend to be unskilled, our country-wide measure of the skill composition of migrants relative to natives might be upward-biased. Second, labor markets might be segmented within the country, in which case we would need to consider the relative skill composition of migrants in the geographical unit which defines the labor market. This is what we investigate next in Table 4. Columns 1–3 report coefficient estimates for 1996, columns 4–6 for 2001 and columns 7–9 for 2007. Columns 1, 4, and 7 reproduce our benchmark estimates, whereas in the subsequent specifications we introduce in the regression both the direct effect of skill – measured using education (columns 2, 5 and 8) and the occupation-based measure of individual skill (columns 3, 6 and 9) – and the interaction of skill with the relative skill composition of natives to migrants in the province where the respondent lives. If the labor market channel is at work, we should find a negative impact of the direct effect of skill and a positive impact of the interacted effect of skill. In other words, we should find that more skilled natives are less pro-migration if migrants are skilled, while they are more pro-migration if
migrants are unskilled. This is not what our results suggest. In particular, the province-specific impact of skill is generally not affected by the relative skill composition of natives to migrants in each province, i.e. both the interaction coefficient and the marginal effect of the interaction are mostly not significant. Furthermore, whenever the interaction coefficients and marginal effects are significant, they are negative, i.e. they have the opposite sign compared to what we would expect. Thus, in most regressions, no matter how skilled migrants are, the impact of individual skill is positive. These results continue to hold also when we lag our measure of the province-level relative skill composition to account for the possibility that it takes time for the respondent to become acquainted with the skill composition of the migrants in his area.\footnote{The results are available from the authors upon request.}

We confirm the robustness of these results on the labor market by estimating a regression which includes the number of immigrants relative to natives in the education category of the respondent (results not shown). In one specification we consider the number of immigrants relative to natives in the province in which the respondents lives. In another, we consider the number of immigrants relative to natives at the national level. In both specifications, we find that impact of the ratio is not significant. Thus these results confirm the interpretation based on non-economic determinants.

In order to shed additional light on the effects of non-economic determinants of individual preferences towards immigration, we have explored in Table 5 the role played by a series of socio-cultural drivers at the province level.\footnote{Of course, in these specifications we cannot include province fixed effects.} In particular, we have controlled for (i) the provincial-level crime rate, (ii) the extent of racial dissimilarity, (iii) the extent of language dissimilarity, (iv) the extent of religious dissimilarity and additionally for the year 2007, for the effect of media exposure.

Several observers have suggested that one of the main reasons people are against immigration is because they perceive a direct link between immigration and crime. To assess this possibility we have used a measure of total crime rates per capita at the province level obtained from Statistics South Africa. The results reported in columns 1, 5 and 9 of Table 5 suggest that crime does not have a significant impact on preferences towards immigration. To capture the role of the racial heterogeneity between natives and immigrants at the province level we have used information available in the 1996 and 2001 rounds of the South African census on racial affiliation (i.e. White, Black-African, Asian-Coloured) to construct a race dissimilarity index.\footnote{The variable Race Dissimilarity is an average across provinces of the Census dissimilarity index calculated as \( \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x} 1/2|P_x(N) - P_x(M)| \) where \( N \) and \( M \) stand for native and immigrant population and \( P_x \) represents the share of population of ethnicity \( x \).}
The impact of this measure varies over time, but appears to be mostly not significant, with the exception of 1996, where the effect is positive (see columns 2, 6, 10). This latter finding may reflect a positive effect of (ethnic) cultural diversity on immigration attitudes, or may simply mirror a spurious correlation, due in particular to reverse causality. This is because immigrants, especially those who are racially different from the local population, are likely to locate themselves in provinces where people are more favorable to immigration. Similarly, more ‘cosmopolitan’ natives may decide to live where there is a higher degree of diversity, driven by immigration. Thus, the positive impact of provincial dissimilarity in terms of race on pro-immigration attitudes may suffer from an upward (positive) bias.

We have constructed an analogous measure for dissimilarity based on language spoken at home\(^{18}\), and also in this case there is no clear effect on attitudes towards immigrants (see columns 3 and 6).

To capture the role of other faith–based cultural factors we have also constructed a measure of religious dissimilarity using information from the Census (the possible categories are no religion, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Other). Interestingly, the latter does appear to have a systematic effect on preferences towards immigration. In particular, both in 1996 and 2001, the years for which data are available (see columns 4 and 8), greater religious dissimilarity between natives and migrants tends to have a negative impact on preferences towards migration. This effect is consistent with earlier cross-country empirical evidence provided by Mayda (2006). The latter paper shows that, across several destination countries, individuals with a taste for a multicultural society are negatively affected in their immigration opinion by bigger dissimilarities between natives and immigrants in religious terms.

To delve further into the role played by cultural traits and values, we provide additional suggestive evidence on the role of mass media. As we have already mentioned, many observers have pointed out that the mass media are likely to be very influential in the formation of individual preference towards immigration (Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2009). To assess their role, we have constructed a measure of media exposure based on the number of times the word “migration” or “xenophobia” was mentioned in 2007 in articles published by South African newspapers\(^{19}\) available in the Factiva database.\(^{20}\) In columns 11 and 12 we report our findings.

\(^{18}\)First languages spoken at home as reported in the Census are: Afrikaans, English, IsiNdebele, IsiXhosa, IsiZulu, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, SiSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Dutch, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, French, Tamil, Hindi, Telugu, Gujarati, Urdu, Chinese, Swahili, Shona, Arabic, Other.

\(^{19}\)Of course, a more complete analysis would involve also looking at the transcript of TV and Radio newscasts, at the ownership structure of the various media outlets etc. Unfortunately the detailed data that would allow us to carry out this type of analysis are not readily available.

\(^{20}\)We have used information from the following English language South African newspapers: Cape Argus, Cape
On average, we find that media exposure is positively related to public opinion in favor of immigration in 2007. This finding must be interpreted with caution. In particular, while it could point to an educative role of the media with respect to immigration attitudes, we cannot control for the specific media’s (positive or negative) narrative about immigration in South Africa, nor can we account for the self-selection of individuals into reading newspapers, which might also explain the positive correlation we observe.

8 Conclusions

In this paper we have empirically investigated the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa. We have used three rounds of the World Value Survey to show first of all that immigration is very widely opposed, and that opposition against foreigners has increased in the post–Apartheid period, notwithstanding the major shift in the policy stance brought about by the Immigration Act of 2002 and its amendment of 2004. Secondly, we have analyzed the role played by both economic and noneconomic drivers in shaping individual preferences.

We have found that economic characteristics that work through the labor market are not likely to explain the observed variation in preferences. This is an important result, which allows us to better interpret evidence reported in the existing literature. In particular, in a related paper on the effects of immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes (Facchini, Mayda and Mendola 2011), we find large negative effects of immigration on natives’ employment rates. The fact that economic labor-market factors do not appear to shape individual preferences towards immigration seems to suggest that the above finding cannot be interpreted as the result of the displacement of natives by foreign workers. A much more likely interpretation is that immigrants might just be “filling” existing gaps in the South African labor market brought about by emigration – where especially highly skilled workers are in very scarce supply.

Non–economic factors, on the other hand, are important determinants of individual level preferences. In particular, cultural drivers that work through ethnic cleavages appear to play a relevant role, and suggest that sharing a perceived common background with the migrant has a positive impact on preferences towards migration. Furthermore, our results also suggest that faith–based individual level drivers, and even more importantly, the religious dissimilarity between natives and foreigners do play an important role in shaping attitudes towards foreigners.

Times, Daily News, Independent on Saturday, Mercury, The Post, Pretoria News, SAPA (South Africa Press Association), The Star. We have also used information from the following Afrikaan language South African newspapers: Die Burger, Beeld, Volksblad.
Thus, our analysis suggest that to design policies towards immigration that more closely reflect the population’s preferences in a interesting developing country like South Africa, grasping the importance of cultural factors is paramount.

References


Table 1. Determinants of individual attitudes towards migrants in South Africa (WVS 1996)

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The table presents marginal effects with robust standard errors clustered by province. Constant not shown. Province fixed effects not shown. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%. The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in South Africa. The analysis is restricted to men, in the labor force, who are between 15 and 64 years old. education (the highest education level attained by the individual) is coded as follows: 1=none; 2=less than primary; 3=primary; 4=less than secondary university preparatory; 5=secondary university preparatory; 6=some university education; 7=university. upper social class is coded as follows: 1=lower class, 2=working class; 3=lower middle class; 4=upper middle class; 5=upper class. political affiliation with the right is coded as follows: in order, from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing). individual skill is coded as follows: 1=agricultural worker; 2=farmer; 3=unskilled manual; 4=semi-skilled manual; 5=skilled manual; 6=foreman, supervisor; 7=non manual-office; 8=supervisor non manual; 9=high qualified professional; 10=manager of establishment with less than 10 employees; 11=manager of establishment with 10 or more employees. income is coded as follows: from 1=lowest decile in the country to 10=highest decile in the country. The omitted categories are: white (ethnic group), afrikans (language spoken at home), african national congress (party), protestant (religion).
Table 2. Determinants of individual attitudes towards migrants in South Africa (WVS 2001)

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</table>

The table presents marginal effects with robust standard errors clustered by province. Constant not shown. Province fixed effects not shown. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%. The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in South Africa. The analysis is restricted to men, in the labor force, who are between 15 and 64 years old. The definitions of the variables are given in the footnote to Table 1. The omitted categories are: white (ethnic group), afrikans (language spoken at home), African National Congress (party), protestant (religion).
Table 3. Determinants of individual attitudes towards migrants in South Africa (WVS 2007)

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<td>xhosa (language spoken at home)</td>
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<td>shoto (language spoken at home)</td>
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<tr>
<td>other (language spoken at home)</td>
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<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
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The table presents marginal effects with robust standard errors clustered by province. Constant not shown. Province fixed effects not shown. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%. The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in South Africa. The analysis is restricted to men, in the labor force, who are between 15 and 64 years old. The definitions of the variables are given in the footnote to Table 1. The omitted categories are: white (ethnic group), afrikans (language spoken at home), African National Congress (party), protestant (religion).
The table presents coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by province. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%. Province fixed effects not shown. The analysis is restricted to men, in the labor force, who are between 15 and 64 years old. The relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the relative skill composition (RSC). The RSC is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with secondary completed and university education to the number of individuals with less than primary and primary completed. In order to get the semi-elasticity with respect to the RSC, one needs to multiply coefficients' estimates of the relative skill ratio by RSC/(1+RSC). The RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in South Africa in 1996, 2001 and 2007, respectively. See also footnotes to Tables 1, 2 and 3. The omitted category for ethnic group is white.
## Table 5. Impact of province-level variables on individual attitudes towards migrants in South Africa (WVS 1996, 2001, 2007)

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<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xenophobia hits (media exposure)</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table presents marginal effects with robust standard errors clustered by province. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%. The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in South Africa. The analysis is restricted to men, in the labor force, who are between 15 and 64 years old. See also footnotes to previous tables. The omitted category for ethnic group is white.
APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURES

(not for publication)
Appendix Figure A1: Determination of immigration policy outcomes

individual preferences on immigration policy (A) → median voter, interest groups, political parties (B) → “demand side” of immigration policy → Immigration policy outcomes → institutional structure of government (D) → policymaker preferences (C) → “supply side” of immigration policy
### Appendix Table A1. Individual attitudes towards immigration and trade in South Africa (WVS 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</td>
<td>2779</td>
<td>0.3390</td>
<td>0.4734</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig Opinion (WVS)</td>
<td>2779</td>
<td>2.2303</td>
<td>0.7897</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Trade Dummy (WVS)</td>
<td>2679</td>
<td>0.3550</td>
<td>0.4786</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Opinion (WVS)</td>
<td>2679</td>
<td>1.3550</td>
<td>0.4786</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (15-64 YEARS OLD)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>0.3155</td>
<td>0.4650</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig Opinion (WVS)</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>2.1922</td>
<td>0.7337</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Trade Dummy (WVS)</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>0.3559</td>
<td>0.4790</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Opinion (WVS)</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>1.3559</td>
<td>0.4790</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in South Africa. Immig Opinion (WVS) gives responses to the following question: "How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? Prohibit people coming here from other countries (=1); Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here (=2); Let people come as long as there are jobs available (=3); Let anyone come who wants to (=4)." In the definition of Immig Opinion (WVS), missing values include "don't know" and NA responses. Pro Immig Dummy (WVS) is instead defined as follows: Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)=1, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=3 or 4; 0, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=1 or 2; "don't know" and NA responses are missing values. Trade Opinion (WVS) gives responses to the following question: "Do you think it is better if: Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them (=2); or There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country (=1). In the definition of Trade Opinion (WVS), missing values include "don't know" responses. Pro Trade Dummy (WVS) is instead defined as follows: Pro Trade Dummy (WVS)=1, if Trade Opinion (WVS)=2; 0, if Trade Opinion (WVS)=0; "don't know" responses are missing values.

### Appendix Table A1 (cont.). Individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa (WVS 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration Policy</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (15-64 YEARS OLD)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>&quot;How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?</em></td>
<td>absolute frequencies</td>
<td>percentages</td>
<td>absolute frequencies</td>
<td>percentages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let anyone come who wants to?</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let people come as long as there are jobs available?</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>27.53</td>
<td></td>
<td>290</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here?</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>48.38</td>
<td></td>
<td>543</td>
<td>51.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibit people coming here from other countries?</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>16.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>162</td>
<td>15.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na, dk</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix Table A2. Immigration attitudes across countries (WVS 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</th>
<th>Immig Opinion (WVS)</th>
<th>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</th>
<th>Immig Opinion (WVS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>men in the labor force (15-64 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.2485</td>
<td>2.2225</td>
<td>0.2363</td>
<td>2.2051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.2573</td>
<td>2.1084</td>
<td>0.2842</td>
<td>2.1858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>0.2822</td>
<td>2.2415</td>
<td>0.3136</td>
<td>2.2864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0.3224</td>
<td>2.2636</td>
<td>0.3505</td>
<td>2.3207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.3327</td>
<td>2.1737</td>
<td>0.3299</td>
<td>2.1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.3390</td>
<td>2.2303</td>
<td>0.3155</td>
<td>2.1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0.3438</td>
<td>2.2947</td>
<td>0.3661</td>
<td>2.3272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.3504</td>
<td>2.3048</td>
<td>0.3851</td>
<td>2.3366</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.3530</td>
<td>2.1859</td>
<td>0.3462</td>
<td>2.1918</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.3729</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.3924</td>
<td>2.3946</td>
<td>0.3981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.4058</td>
<td>2.4878</td>
<td>0.3964</td>
<td>2.4675</td>
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<td>2.1706</td>
<td>0.4269</td>
<td>2.2157</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
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<td>0.4190</td>
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<td>0.4388</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.4516</td>
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<td>0.5195</td>
<td>2.4648</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.4583</td>
<td>2.4848</td>
<td>0.4239</td>
<td>2.4514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.4649</td>
<td>2.3649</td>
<td>0.5296</td>
<td>2.4605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.4748</td>
<td>2.4353</td>
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<td>2.5781</td>
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<td>0.6554</td>
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<td>0.6146</td>
<td>2.6624</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.6038</td>
<td>2.5357</td>
<td>0.5954</td>
<td>2.5305</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.6120</td>
<td>2.6471</td>
<td>0.6585</td>
<td>2.6831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>2.6934</td>
<td>0.6147</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>2.7316</td>
<td>0.6154</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.6310</td>
<td>2.5993</td>
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<td>2.7741</td>
<td>0.7206</td>
<td>2.8151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>0.7094</td>
<td>2.8235</td>
<td>0.7007</td>
<td>2.8095</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.7150</td>
<td>2.8103</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>0.7229</td>
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<td>0.7690</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>0.8214</td>
<td>2.9889</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>0.7818</td>
<td>3.1328</td>
<td>0.7904</td>
<td>3.1617</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.
Appendix Table A3. Summary Statistics by Province (WVS 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</th>
<th>skilled to unskilled labor ratio N vs. M (RSC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>0.3744</td>
<td>0.2117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>0.3758</td>
<td>0.2203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>0.4836</td>
<td>0.3062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>0.1527</td>
<td>0.5607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>0.0978</td>
<td>1.4137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>0.2926</td>
<td>1.7514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>0.2547</td>
<td>1.8142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>0.1698</td>
<td>1.8933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo-Nothern Province</td>
<td>0.1155</td>
<td>2.5794</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Figure A2. The relationship between migration attitudes and the relative skill composition (RSC) of natives to immigrants
Appendix Table A4. Individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa (WVS 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</td>
<td>2856</td>
<td>0.3662</td>
<td>0.4819</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig Opinion (WVS)</td>
<td>2856</td>
<td>2.2167</td>
<td>0.8147</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (15-64 YEARS OLD)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>2.2032</td>
<td>0.8019</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig Opinion (WVS)</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>0.3562</td>
<td>0.4791</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in South Africa. Immig Opinion (WVS) gives responses to the following question: “How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? Prohibit people coming here from other countries (=1); Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here (=2); Let people come as long as there are jobs available (=3); Let anyone come who wants to (=4).” In the definition of Immig Opinion (WVS), missing values include "don't know" and NA responses. Pro Immig Dummy (WVS) is instead defined as follows: Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)=1, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=3 or 4; 0, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=1 or 2; "don't know" and NA responses are missing values.

Appendix Table A4 (cont.). Individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa (WVS 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration Policy</th>
<th>ALL Absolute Frequencies</th>
<th>ALL Percentages</th>
<th>MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (15-64 YEARS OLD) Absolute Frequencies</th>
<th>MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (15-64 YEARS OLD) Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Let anyone come who wants to?</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let people come as long as there are jobs available?</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>30.42</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>30.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here?</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>41.72</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>43.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibit people coming here from other countries?</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>18.98</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>18.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na, dk</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,982</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix Table A5. Immigration attitudes across countries (WVS 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</th>
<th>Immig Opinion (WVS)</th>
<th>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</th>
<th>Immig Opinion (WVS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>all</td>
<td>men in the labor force (15-64 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.2575</td>
<td>2.2741</td>
<td>0.2476</td>
<td>2.2611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>0.2814</td>
<td>2.3134</td>
<td>0.2992</td>
<td>2.3594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.3050</td>
<td>2.3192</td>
<td>0.3573</td>
<td>2.3760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.3243</td>
<td>2.3674</td>
<td>0.3333</td>
<td>2.3827</td>
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</table>

The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.
Appendix Table A6. Summary Statistics by Province (WVS 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>province</th>
<th>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</th>
<th>skilled to unskilled labor ratio N vs. M (RSC)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>0.3702</td>
<td>0.1856</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>0.4496</td>
<td>0.2206</td>
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<td>0.4113</td>
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<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>0.2211</td>
<td>0.6405</td>
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<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>0.2459</td>
<td>1.3881</td>
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<td>Free State</td>
<td>0.3754</td>
<td>1.3902</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>0.3436</td>
<td>1.4766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>0.3272</td>
<td>2.1449</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limpopo-Nothern Province</td>
<td>0.2042</td>
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Appendix Figure A3. The relationship between migration attitudes and the relative skill composition (RSC) of natives to immigrants
Appendix Table A7. Individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa (WVS 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</td>
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<td>1.9993</td>
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<td>MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (15-64 YEARS OLD)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</td>
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<td>0.4269</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2.0234</td>
<td>0.8341</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</table>

The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in South Africa. Immig Opinion (WVS) gives responses to the following question: "How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? Prohibit people coming here from other countries (=1); Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here (=2); Let people come as long as there are jobs available (=3); Let anyone come who wants to (=4)." In the definition of Immig Opinion (WVS), missing values include "don't know" and NA responses. Pro Immig Dummy (WVS) is instead defined as follows: Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)=1, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=3 or 4; 0, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=1 or 2; "don't know" and NA responses are missing values.

Appendix Table A7 (cont.). Individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa (WVS 2007)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Immigration Policy</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (15-64 YEARS OLD)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absolute frequencies</td>
<td>percentages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let anyone come who wants to?</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>5.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Let people come as long as there are jobs available?</td>
<td>470</td>
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<tr>
<td>Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here?</td>
<td>1,340</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibit people coming here from other countries?</td>
<td>780</td>
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<td>2,744</td>
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<td>Immig Opinion (WVS)</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
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The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.
### Appendix Table A9. Summary Statistics by Province (WVS 2007)

<table>
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<th>province</th>
<th>Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)</th>
<th>skilled to unskilled labor ratio N vs. M (RSC)</th>
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### Appendix Figure A4. The relationship between migration attitudes and the relative skill composition (RSC) of natives to immigrants (WVS 2007)
Appendix Figure A4. The relationship between migration attitudes and the relative skill composition (RSC) of natives to immigrants (excluding Eastern Cape)

Note: This figure excludes Eastern Cape.